Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 45
Issue 4 October 2012

Article 5

2012

Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide
S. I. Strong

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, and the International Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
S. I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 Vanderbilt Law Review 1157
(2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol45/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Arbitration of Trust Disputes:

Two Bodies of Law Collide
S.I. Strong*

ABSTRACT

Once considered nothing more than "mere" estate-planning
devices, trusts play a large and growing role in the international
economy, holding trillions of dollars of assets and generating
billions of dollars of income each year. However, the rising
popularity of both commercial and noncommercial trusts has
led to an explosion in hostile trust litigation, leading settlors
and trustees to searchfor new and less expensive ways to resolve
trust-related disputes.
One possible solution involves use of a mandatory
arbitrationprovision in the trust itself. However, the unique,
multiparty nature of trust disputes often makes this sort of
arbitrationhighly controversial.
This Article considers the various issues that arise when
two separate bodies of law-trust law and arbitrationlaw-collide, using recent developments in the field of international
commercial arbitrationto address some of the more intransigent
problems facing trust arbitration. In so doing, this Article
introduces a number of new judicial decisions not previously
considered in the scholarly literature and brings a uniquely
comparative and international perspective to the debate
regarding the jurisprudential propriety of mandatory trust
arbitration.

* D.Phil., University of Oxford (UK); Ph.D., University of Cambridge (UK); J.D.,

Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of
California, Davis. The author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York
and Illinois and as a solicitor in England and Wales, is the Henry G. Schermers Fellow
at the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law and Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Missouri. The author is a member of the American Law
Institute (AL) Consultative Groups for both the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the
Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration. Many
thanks are due David Horton and John H. Langbein for comments and insights
provided on earlier drafts of this Article. All errors of course remain the author's own.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Trusts and their civil law equivalents, often known as
foundations or associations, 1 play a large and growing role in the
international economy. Not only do trust vehicles hold assets valued
in the trillions of dollars and generate billions of dollars each year in
income, but administrators and trustees accumulate similarly
massive amounts in annual fees. 2 With a rising number of trusts

Although trusts developed historically as a common law device, civil law
1.
jurisdictions are becoming increasingly involved in this field, either through the
development of their own domestic forms of trusts or the recognition of trusts formed in
common law countries. See Henry Christensen III, Foreign Trusts and Alternative
Vehicles, 1902 PLIICORP. 323, § 4 (Aug. 18--19, 2011); Adair Dyer, International
Recognition and Adaptation of Trusts: The Influence of the Hague Convention, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989, 1013-18 (1999) (describing attempts in some civil law
countries to adopt trusts or similar devices); Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in Latin
America: Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment for Expanding Business Opportunitiesin
Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 701, 703-07, 721-51 (2007) (comparing
the Anglo-American and the Latin-American inter vivos trust); Frances H. Foster,
American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror, 94 MINN. L. REV. 602, 637-50 (2010)
(describing the Chinese interpretation of American trust law); Henry Hansmann & Ugo
Mattei, The Functionsof Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 437-45 (1998) (contrasting the common law and civil law
approaches to "trust-like relationships"); Michael Hwang, Arbitration for Trust
Disputes, in GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S LEADING EXPERTS IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
83, 84 (Legal Media Group ed., 2009) (discussing a model arbitration clause developed
by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) for use in trust disputes); John H.
Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629, 63243, 669-71 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian] (describing how civil law
jurisdictions confront the types of issues handled in common law jurisdictions by
trusts); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 186 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, Commercial Trusts]
('The Japanese have built a trust industry with assets amounting to $2 trillion.");
Maurizio Luponi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 967, 970-73 (1999)
(describing the essential elements of a trust and how these elements have been
adapted in civil law countries); Julien Perrin, The Recognition of Trusts and Their Use
in Estate Planning Under Continental Laws, 10 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 629, 630 (2008)
("[T]he increasing mobility of persons and assets fuelled the use of trusts in
circumstances connected to civil law countries."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial
Trusts as Business Organizations:An Invitation to Comparatists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 321, 322 (2003) ("[Trusts or variations on the trust form are beginning to be
embraced worldwide."); Tina Wustemann, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2007, at 33, 33-35
(Christoph Miller ed., 2007) ('"With increasing mobility of individuals in a shrinking
world, trusts are no longer confined to the Anglo-saxon world but are also often used in
civil law jurisdictions."). For ease of discussion, the term "trust" will be used to refer to
both civil law and common law devices, unless otherwise indicated.
See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary
2.
Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1070 (2012) (noting irrevocable trusts in the United
States "generated $142.5 billion in income and $3.7 billion in trustees' fees" in 2007
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moving into the international realm so as to take advantage of
favorable tax laws in various offshore jurisdictions, trusts have
become an issue of global importance. 3 Furthermore, trusts are
becoming increasingly commercial in nature, leaving behind their
4
reputation as mere estate-planning devices.
The combination of international and commercial characteristics
might suggest that arbitration would be an appropriate means of
resolving trust disputes, since arbitration is very much the preferred
means of resolving other types of international commercial
controversies.5 Indeed, such an approach might already appear to be
standard procedure, given the number of trusts that currently appear
in arbitrations in the United States and elsewhere. 6 However, the
vast majority of these arbitrations cannot really be considered "trust
disputes" per se, since they arise out of contractual relationships

alone); Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 177-78 (estimating in 1997 that
commercial trusts held assets in the range of $11.6 trillion, with noncommercial trusts
holding an additional $672 billion).
3.
See Wustemann, supra note 1, at 33-34 (noting the extent to which trust
litigation has become internationalized in recent years). The expanded use of
international trusts has been facilitated by the enactment of the Hague Convention on
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition (Hague Convention on Trusts).
See Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, July 1,
1985, 23 I.L.M. 1389, 1389-92 (1984) [hereinafter Hague Convention on Trusts]. The
Hague Convention on Trusts has been ratified or acceded to by Australia, Canada,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, San Marino,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See HCCH Status Table, HCCH,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=59 (last updated Aug.
17, 2010). It has been signed but not ratified by Cyprus, France, and the United States.
See id.
4.
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166 ("[W]ell over 90% of
the money held in trust in the United States is in commercial trusts as opposed to
personal trusts.").
See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68-71 (2009)
5.
(presenting statistics that demonstrate the growing caseload of arbitral institutions
and increasing popularity of international commercial arbitration).
6.
Evidence of trust-related arbitration can be found in various judicial
opinions. See Laughton v. CGI Tech. & Sol'ns, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 262, 263-64 (D.
Mass. 2009) (concerning the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an agreement
involving a trust); U.S. Trust Co., N.A. v. Cavalieri, No. HHDCV075013653S, 2008 WL
1822721, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2008) (concerning the arbitrability of an
employment dispute involving a trust); Delaney Elec. Co. v. Schiessle, 601 N.E.2d 978,
980 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (concerning a dispute involving the trustee of a land trust);
Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Pakistan,
[2010] UKSC 46, [1]-[2], [7] (appeal taken from Eng.) (concerning the enforceability of
an arbitration clause in an agreement involving a trust); Premium Nafta Prods. Ltd. v.
Fili Shipping Co., [2007] UKHL 40, [3]-[5], on appeal from Fiona Trust & Holding
Corp. v. Privalov, [2007] EWCA Civ 20, [2007] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 891; Trustees of the
Edmond Stern Settlement v. Levy, [2009] EWHC (TCC) 14, [1]-[2] (Eng.) (adjudicating
an appeal from a trust arbitration).

2012]

ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES

between the trust and unrelated third parties and7 typically involve
matters that are entirely external to the trust itself.
However, these kinds of external, third-party disputes are not
the only type of trust-related conflicts that exist, nor indeed are they
the most common. Instead, "[mjost trust disputes are internal
disputes" that address matters relating to the inner workings of the
trust and involving controversies between some or all of the various
parties to a trust, including trustees, protectors, and beneficiaries. 9
These types of matters are quite different from external trust
disputes, not only in terms of their subject matter (which can involve
specialized questions of trust law), but also in terms of the manner in
which arbitration arises. Arbitration with external third parties is
typically based on an arbitration clause found in an individual
contract made between the trust and the third party. Arbitration of
internal trust disputes, on the other hand, usually arises as a result
of a mandatory arbitration provision found in the trust itself.10
This latter type of arrangement is much more controversial than
arbitration with an external third party pursuant to a contract
existing outside the trust.'1 Indeed, some courts have concluded that
mandatory arbitration provisions contained in a trust are

7.
Such proceedings are largely uncontroversial, particularly in jurisdictions
with legislation giving trustees the explicit power to enter into nonjudicial means of
dispute resolution. This type of legislation has long been available, but is becoming
increasingly popular. See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text.
8.
Hwang, supra note 1, at 83. Different commentators define internal and
external trust disputes differently. See Paul Buckle & Carey Olsen, Trust Disputes and
ADR, 14 TR. & TRUSTEES 649, 651 (2008); Wiistemann, supranote 1, at 38.
9.
See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 3, art. 2 (describing the legal
relationships that make up a trust); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING TO
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
8.157-8.167 (David Hayton et al. eds., 18th ed. 2010)
[hereinafter UNDERHILL AND HAYTON] (discussing the enforceability of trusts by and
against trustees, beneficiaries, and third parties); Langbein, Contractarian,supra note
1, at 664 (discussing which parties have standing to enforce a trust); Wistemann,
supra note 1, at 36 (distinguishing parties to an internal dispute, namely trustees,
settlors, protectors, and beneficiaries, from parties who are external to the trust,
including creditors and unnamed spouses and heirs).
10.
Parties to an internal trust dispute could also enter into an arbitration
agreement after the dispute has arisen (i.e., a submission agreement or compromis),
but it is usually easier to obtain an arbitration agreement before legal controversies
arise rather than afterward, regardless of whether the matter is related to a trust or
not. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 37 (2010) ("It is difficult to negotiate a
submission agreement once a concrete dispute has arisen and litigation tactics have
been explored.").
11.
Although the current interest in mandatory arbitration of trust disputes
makes it seem as if the procedure is relatively new, these issues have been discussed at
various times in the past. See, e.g., Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration: Step-Child of Wills
and Estates, 11 ARB. J. 179 (1956) (discussing historical takes on the interplay between
arbitration and wills and trusts law); Blaine Covington Janin, Comment, The Validity
of ArbitrationProvisions in Trust Instruments, 55 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1967) (describing
the increase in interest toward arbitrating trust disputes in the mid-1960s ).

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45'1l57

unenforceable. 12 However, the potential difficulties associated with
mandatory trust arbitration have not diminished the appeal of this
particular procedure. Hostile trust litigation is reaching "near
as
epidemic" levels, and many settlors and trustees view1arbitration
3
an excellent means of limiting spiraling litigation costs.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that relatively few trusts currently
contain arbitration provisions. 14 However, it is unclear why this is so,
given the significant amount of national and international interest in
mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes. 15
One reason might be that some residual prejudice against
arbitration still exists among some members of the trust bench and
bar. 16 For example, questions have been raised about the adequacy of
due process protections in arbitration as well as the ability of
arbitrators to handle the kind of complex, multiparty disputes that
often arise in trust law, 17 even though every other area of law has

12.
See Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 614-15 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding
that the arbitration clause of a trust agreement was unenforceable against a thirdparty beneficiary), rev. granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011); Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d
305, 310 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding that the type of trust at issue was not a contract and
thus its arbitration clause was unenforceable), rev. granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 487 (Tex.
June 8, 2012).
13.
Lawrence Cohen & Marcus Staff, The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 7 J.
INT'L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 203, 203 (1999); see also AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE
COUNSEL, ARBITRATION TASK FORCE REPORT 22-23 (Sept. 18, 2006)

[hereinafter

http://www.mnbar.org/sections/probate-trust/ACTEC%20
ACTEC],
available at
(proposing alternatives to trust
Arbitration%20Task%2oForce%2OReport-2006.pdf
litigation); Georg von Segesser, Arbitrabilityin Estate and Trust Litigation, in PAPERS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF ESTATE AND TRUST LAw-2000, at 21, 21 (Rosalind

F. Atherton ed., 2001) (proposing arbitration as a possible solution to increased "hostile
litigation in estate and trust matters"); Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 33-34 (discussing
contemporary interest in arbitration of trust disputes).
14.
See Wdistemann, supra note 1, at 41 ("Arbitration clauses in trust deeds
still appear to be rare."); see also Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts:
Defining the Parametersfor Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 118, 119 (2011) (suggesting that the current law on the enforceability of
arbitration clauses in trust disputes is "thin and underdeveloped").
15.
See Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration
Provisions:A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, but Are
They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 352-53 (2007) (discussing
deficiencies of resolving trust disputes through litigation and noting alternative
solutions, including arbitration); Horton, supra note 2, at 1029 ("Recently... there has
been a surge of interest in arbitration in a different field: wills and trusts."); Katzen,
supra note 14, at 118-19 (noting increased commentary on trust arbitration and an
increase in legislative and judicial discussion of related issues); Wiistemann, supra
note 1, at 41 (stating that Switzerland has taken a leading role regarding the
arbitration of trust-related disputes).
16.
See ACTEC, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing the "blinding prejudice" to
arbitration in contemporary trusts and estates practice).
See Gerardo J.Bosques-Hernindez, ArbitrationClauses in Trusts: The U.S.
17.
Developments and a Comparative Perspective, INDRET, no. 3, 2008 at 1, 5, 15, available
at http://www.indret.com/pdf/559_en.pdf (describing the hostility of nineteenth century
judges toward arbitration); E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the
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overcome these kinds of worries about the legitimacy of the arbitral
process. 18 However, the root of the problem may simply be that
"[m]any trust practitioners have never encountered arbitration."1 9
While trust lawyers are often proud of the specialized nature of their
practice, this may be one instance where the traditional isolation of
the trust bench and bar has resulted in trust specialists' not being
exposed to some of the more positive advances that have been made
20
recently in arbitration law.
Alternatively, the minimal use of mandatory arbitration
provisions in trusts may be due to concerns about the enforceability of
such clauses. This hesitancy is often said to be the result of the
relatively small number of judicial opinions in this area of law 21 and
the wide publicity given to the few negative decisions that exist. 22 No
lawyer wants his or her client to be the precedent-setting test case in
a developing area of law, even if the outcome is ultimately in the
client's favor.
However, the situation may not be as problematic as is
commonly believed. Indeed, there are a number of signs that
mandatory trust arbitration is gaining momentum in the United
States and elsewhere. For example, a growing number of jurisdictions
are addressing issues relating to mandatory trust arbitration through
legislative means. 23 Furthermore, several older cases, including In re

Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture
Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 307-14 (1999) (detailing concerns regarding
the potential bias of the arbitrator); Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 40-41 (addressing
concerns regarding whether arbitrators have enough expertise to handle complex trust
law).
18.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 775 (discussing the erosion of skepticism over
the ability of arbitration to adequately resolve disputes); Horton, supra note 2, at
1039-40, 1042-44 (explaining that the nonarbitrability doctrine has been scaled back
in many areas of law as the court has adopted a broad policy in favor of arbitration).
19.
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 206.
20.
This isolation arises as a result of the specialized nature of trust law and
procedure. See James W. Martin, Ten Tips for Handling Complex Probate,84 FLA. B.J.
45 (2010) (identifying many of the elements that make trust law so complex). Some
jurisdictions even require trust disputes to be brought in specialized probate or
chancery courts. See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES:
INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 626 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the delays
inherent in the probate and administration process).
21.
See Katzen, supra note 14, at 118-19 (stating that few courts or
legislatures have addressed the enforceability of arbitration clauses in wills and
trusts); Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 34, 49 ("ITihe enforceability of arbitration clauses
in trust deeds is still largely unchartered territory.").
22.
See Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 614-15 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding
that the arbitration clause of a trust agreement was unenforceable against a thirdparty beneficiary), rev. granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011); Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d
305, 310 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding that the type of trust at issue was not a contract and
thus its arbitration clause was unenforceable), rev. granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 487 (Tex.
June 8, 2012).
23.
See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text.
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Estate of Jacobovitz,24 In re Meredith's Estate,25 and Schoneberger v.
Oelze, 26 that have been frequently cited for the proposition that
arbitration of trust disputes is impermissible, have all been abrogated
legislatively or judicially, even though those subsequent decisions
have not received the same kind of attention that the negative
precedents have. Finally, the amount of law concerning arbitration of
trust disputes is not perhaps as "thin and underdeveloped" as it is
said to be, since a number of relevant judicial decisions appear to
27
have been largely overlooked by legal commentators.
Indeed, the perceived scarcity of what might be considered
"clear" authority in this field appears to have led some judges and
practitioners to adopt a view that is "more conservative towards ADR
than the law actually is today," even though the lack of subjectspecific precedent would normally seem to suggest "that the general
28
principles of arbitration law ... should apply equally to trust cases."
This observation leads to another reason why mandatory trust
arbitration may appear to be a somewhat questionable proposition:
very little analysis of the issues relating to the arbitration of internal
29
trust disputes has been conducted by experts in arbitration.
Instead, most of the commentary in this field has come from the trust
community.
While it is true that trust arbitration gives rise to a number of
challenges not seen in other areas of law, many modern trusts do not
reflect any "necessary element of the probate court, or family wealth
transfer, or even of donative transfer 30 that would make the

24.
Compare In re Estate of Jacobovitz, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
Cnty. 1968) (holding that probate cases cannot be arbitrated), with In re
Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2006) (holding that a
trustee is bound by an arbitration clause in the trust agreement).
25.
Compare Campbell v. Detroit Trust Co. (In re Meredith's Estate), 266 N.W.
351, 357 (Mich. 1936) (holding that the jurisdiction of the probate court cannot be

ousted by a stipulation to arbitrate), with In re Nestorovski Estate, 769 N.W.2d 720,
732 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (explicitly abrogating In re Meredith's Estate and holding
that will contests may be resolved by arbitration).
26.
See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082-83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that arbitration clauses are only enforceable when part of a valid contract and
not as part of a trust agreement), superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410205 (2012) ("A trust instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive and reasonable
procedures to resolve issues between the trustee and interested persons with regard to
the administration or distribution of the trust."), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. 1
CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598,
9-10 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011).
27.
Katzen, supra note 14, at 118-19. These newly discovered decisions are
introduced and discussed throughout this Article.
28.
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 211.
29.
For example, the leading database on international arbitration,
kluwerarbitration.com, does not appear to include any articles focusing on the
arbitration of trust disputes. See KLUJWER ARBITRATION, kluwerarbitration.com (last
visited Sept. 29, 2012) (searching for the word "trust" as a title of any piece of
commentary).
30.
Christensen, supra note 1, § 2.
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participation of commercial and arbitration lawyers in this discussion
inappropriate. Indeed, the large number of commercial trusts
currently in use3 l and the significant degree of overlap between
commercial trusts, corporations, and other business associations
suggest that commercial lawyers should be integrally involved in the
32
debate about mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes.
This is not to say that the arbitral community has been actively
excluded from the discussion in any way. Instead, the problem seems
to be that experts in arbitration appear somewhat unaware of the
unique issues associated with mandatory trust arbitration. 33 In many
ways, the arbitration community appears to be as isolated from other
areas of practice as the trust community is.

31.

See Robert Flannigan, Business Applications of the Express Trust, 36

ALBERTA L. REV. 630, 631 (1998) (identifying the types of commercial trusts that can

arise).
32.
Numerous similarities exist between commercial trusts and other types of
business associations. See Christensen, supra note 1, § 2; Hansmann & Mattei, supra
note 1, at 479 (discussing the similarities between private trust law and corporate law);
Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 650 (highlighting the similar traits of trusts
and contracts); Paul B. Miller, The Future for Business Trusts:A ComparativeAnalysis
of Canadianand American Uniform Legislation, 36 QUEEN'S L.J. 443, 452-55, 474-78,
482, 499 (2011) (discussing similarities between commercial uses of trusts in Canada
and the United States); A. Joseph Warburton, Thusts Versus Corporations: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Competing OrganizationalForms, 36 J. CORP. L. 183, 188 (2010)
(comparing trust and company law in the United Kingdom).
33.
Although two leading arbitral institutions-the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) and the American Arbitration Association (AAA)-have both taken
steps to address the special needs of parties involved in the arbitration of trust
disputes, these efforts appear to be isolated events. See AAA WILLS AND TRUSTS
ARBITRATION RULES (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/cs/idcplgIdcService=GETsee
FILE&dDocName=ADRSTG_004135&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased;
also ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES, 19 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 9
(2008), available at http://www.iccdrl.com (search "ICC Arbitration Clause for Trust
Disputes" and follow "Commission Report" hyperlink). Indeed, neither the AAA Wills
and Trusts Arbitration Rules nor the ICC Model Trust Clause have yet been mentioned
in any judicial opinion. Furthermore, these initiatives have been largely ignored in
commentary generated by the trust bar, with the AAA and ICC's recent efforts only
being discussed in passing. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1031 (citing, without further
discussion, the ICC Model Trust Clause); Katzen, supranote 14, at 130-32 (discussing
briefly the AAA's wills and trusts reference procedures). But see Christopher P. Koch, A
Tale of Two Cities!-ArbitratingTrust Disputes and the ICC's Arbitration Clause for
Trust Disputes, 2 Y.B. INT'L ARB. 178, 199 (2012) (discussing ICC Model Trust Clause).
However, the author analyzes the AAA and ICC initiatives in detail in two forthcoming
articles. See S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the
Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, Enforceability] (comparing AAA and
ICC model trust clauses); S.I. Strong, Mandatory Arbitration of Internal Trust
Disputes: Improving Arbitrability and Enforceability Through Proper Procedural
Choices, 28 ARB. INT'L (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, Procedures] (analyzing
the effectiveness of AAA Trust Arbitration Rules). The AAA is currently in the process
of revising its rules, although the scope of those changes was not known at the time
this Article went to press.
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This type of practical and jurisprudential segregation cannot
continue. Instead, it is high time that these two areas of
specialization-trust law and arbitration law--came together to
address questions relating to the arbitration of internal trust disputes
through inclusion of an arbitral provision in the trust instrument.
Indeed, as discussed below, several recent developments in
arbitration law offer new solutions to some of the more intransigent
problems facing mandatory arbitration of trust disputes. 34 This
Article therefore aims to unite the two bodies of law in a way that is
useful to courts, commentators, and counsel in both fields.
The structure of the Article is as follows. First, Part II sets the
stage by describing the basic requirements for a trust as well as the
wide variety of commercial and other types of trusts that currently
exist. This analysis is important because it identifies some of the
qualities of trusts that can prove problematic for arbitration while
also dispelling the myth that trusts are used only in the testamentary
or estate-planning context. This discussion also provides those who do
not specialize in trust law with a basic understanding of the relevant
principles of law and practice, although there are some elements that
trust law experts may find intriguing as well.
Part III forms the core of the Article. This discussion introduces
the various problems that can arise when parties attempt to
incorporate arbitration provisions into trusts and analyzes whether
and to what extent mandatory trust arbitration is enforceable as a
matter of law. The focus here is on: (1) the potential for arbitration to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts impermissibly; (2) questions about
the operability and effectiveness of the arbitration provision itself; (3)
whether and to what extent the arbitration provision will be binding
on the party seeking to avoid arbitration; (4) proper representation of
parties, particularly those who may be unborn, unascertained, or
legally incompetent at the time the dispute arises; and (5)
arbitrability of internal trust disputes. 35 In considering these issues,
the text not only focuses on solutions that have been proposed as a
matter of trust law but also introduces several new ideas based on
arbitration law.
Part IV pulls the various strands of discussion together and
concludes the Article with some final observations. This Part also
contains several suggestions about future areas of research
concerning mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes.
Before beginning, it is important to describe the parameters of
the current analysis. First, this Article focuses on the enforceability of
mandatory arbitration provisions found in trusts. While there are a

34.
See infra notes 281-320, 322-378, 433-90 and accompanying text.
35.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 209 (discussing necessary
requirements for arbitrating future trust disputes).
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number of important issues to consider with respect to both external
trust disputes and internal trust disputes subject to a post-dispute
submission agreement, there is insufficient space to discuss those
matters here. 36 Therefore, this Article restricts itself to the question
of whether and to what extent parties to the trust can be bound by an
arbitration provision found in the trust itself.
Second, the discussion will not, for the most part, attempt to
differentiate between commercial and other types of trusts. This is
not because these distinctions are not important, for they very well
may be.3 7 Indeed, some jurisdictions treat business trusts as more
akin to corporations than to trusts, at least in certain contexts,38 and
it may be that commercial trusts could or should be considered more
39
amenable to mandatory trust arbitration than other kinds of trusts.

36.
For example, there is a large body of law concerning the rights of creditors
to attach or attack a trust, and eventually it would be useful to consider whether those
issues are amenable to mandatory arbitration. See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at
413-25 (discussing spendthrift provisions and other mechanisms that insulate trust
7.1, 16.1-19.2
assets from creditor claims); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
(discussing how parties can collaterally attack trusts).
37.
See David Fox, Non-Excludable Trustee Duties, 17 TR. & TRUSTEES 17, 26
(2011) (commenting on how commercial and traditional private trusts differ); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1870,
1877-78 (2010) (discussing how underlying nature of commercial and noncommercial
relationships affect fiduciary obligations). But see Flannigan, supra note 31, at 630-31
(addressing only commercial trusts).
38.
See Christensen, supra note 1, § 2 (noting that U.S. "[blusiness trusts,
although trusts for property law purposes, are taxed as corporations because they
1.133 (noting
conduct a business"); see also UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
that beneficiaries of commercial trusts in England may be treated differently than
beneficiaries of private family trusts).
Analogies in this regard could be drawn to mandatory arbitration of
39.
internal corporate disputes as a result of arbitration provisions found in the company's
corporate charter or bylaws. See Christian Borris, Arbitrability of Corporate Law
Disputes in Germany, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 55, 57 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al. eds.,
2011) (describing arbitrability of German corporate disputes); Olivier Caprasse,
Objective Arbitrability of Corporate Disputes-Belgium and France, in ONDERNEMING
EN ADR, supra, at 79 (discussing arbitrability of Belgian and French corporate
disputes); Gerard Meijer & Josefina Guzman, The International Recognition of an
Arbitration Clause in the Articles of Association of a Company, in ONDERNEMING EN
ADR, supra, at 130 (discussing the arbitrability of corporate law disputes under
international law). Another issue that may be particularly important in commercial
trusts involves the strong pro-arbitration policy reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006); Horton, supra note 2, at 1032, 1040-44. One
commentator has taken the view that most, if not all, trusts could or should be
governed by the FAA. See Horton, supra note 2, at 1070-73 (focusing particularly on
commercial trusts). This raises the question of whether the U.S. Supreme Court's
recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
(invalidating a California state law that was said to hinder arbitration under the FAA),
might require any state-law limitation on the arbitration of trust disputes to be struck.
Although some state courts apparently take the view that the FAA does not preempt
state law in at least some regards, see Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 9197 (Tex. 2011), numerous state statutes have been abrogated in the wake of AT&T
Mobility. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155,
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However, scholarly and judicial commentary has not yet begun to
distinguish between the arbitrability of the two types of trusts, and
proper consideration of this matter would require lengthy analysis.
Therefore, these issues are for the most part excluded, although some
matters are raised intermittently.
Third, trust law is becoming increasingly globalized, and this
Article introduces a number of international and comparative
concepts relating to the issues presented herein. In particular, the
discussion describes principles of both English and U.S. law as they
relate to trusts and arbitration. 40 However, this Article is not
intended to present a comprehensive comparative analysis of the two
jurisdictions. Instead, the aim is simply to use the two legal systems
as exemplars of the various problems and responses that can arise in
this area of law.
Having laid the foundation for the discussion, the analysis
begins with an introduction to basic principles of trust law, the
various types of trusts commonly used today, and the theories
underlying modern trust law.

II. AN

INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS AND TRUST LAW THEORY

Trusts constitute a very specialized field of law and practice,
with very few practitioners outside the probate bar ever having been
involved in drafting a trust or litigating a matter involving an
internal trust dispute.4 1 Indeed, most common law lawyers' only
experience of trusts comes through law school courses focused on

1159-61 (9th Cir. 2012); Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 233
(3d Cir. 2012); Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'l Ass'n, 673 F.3d 947, 959-61 (9th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 2012 WL 4327662 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2012); Green v. SuperShuttle Int'l, Inc.,
653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2011); Litman v. Cellco P'ship, 655 F.3d 225, 230-31 (3d
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1046 (2012); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648
F.3d 1205, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2011); S.I. STRONG, CLASS, MASS AND COLLECTIVE
ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013). While this
issue would be most likely to affect commercial trusts, noncommercial trusts would
also be affected to the extent they were governed by the FAA.
40.
These two countries have been chosen for several reasons. First, England
and the United States are leaders in both trust and arbitration law. As such, the
principles developed in those nations have persuasive effect elsewhere in the world. See
Miller, supra note 32, at 447 (discussing importance of North American trust law); see
also Wharburton, supra note 32 (discussing importance of trust law in England).
Second, much of the most probing analysis of mandatory trust arbitration comes from
England, although some of the concepts need to be adapted for use in the U.S. legal
arena. Third, the author is qualified as an English solicitor as well as a U.S. attorney
and has firsthand experience practicing in London, New York, and Chicago.
However, commercial lawyers may have experience litigating or arbitrating
41.
an external trust dispute. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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trusts in the testamentary context. 42 Lawyers trained in the civil law
tradition may not even have had this minimal amount of exposure to
law and
trusts, since trusts developed as a creature of the common
43
are still associated primarily with that legal tradition.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a
comprehensive outline of the law of trusts,44 it is nevertheless useful
to provide a brief introduction to this field of law so as to lay the
proper foundation for more detailed discussions of mandatory
arbitration of internal trust disputes. The following subparts will
therefore outline what a trust is as well as the types of trusts
currently in use. The discussion also summarizes some of the various
theories used to describe trusts, since those theories play an
important role in mandatory trust arbitration.
A. What Is a Trust?
The device now known as a trust originally developed in
medieval England as a means of safeguarding and transferring
wealth.4 5 Although trusts have changed over the years in both their
uses and forms, some factors have remained constant, including the
elements necessary to establish a trust. 46 While the specific
requirements associated with creating a trust vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, one internationally recognized set of criteria can be
found in the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and
on Their Recognition (Hague Convention on Trusts).47 That
instrument states that:
[T]he term "trust" refers to the legal relationships created-intervivos
or on death-by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed
under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a
specified purpose.

42.
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 165 (explaining that
trusts are primarily taught as will substitutes in U.S. law schools).
43.
See Hansmann & Mattei, supranote 1, at 435 (contrasting the role of trusts
in civil law and common law jurisdictions).
44.
More detailed reading on trusts and their civil law equivalents exists
elsewhere. See generally WILLIAM M. McGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES:
INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS (2010) (discussing U.S. trust law);
UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAw RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (David Hayton et

al. eds., 18th ed. 2010) (discussing English trust law); Henry Christensen III, Foreign
Trusts and Alternative Vehicles, 1902 PLI/CORP. 323 (Aug. 18-19, 2011) (discussing
civil law equivalents to the trust).
45.
See Langbein, Conrtractarian, supra note 1, at 632-43 (providing the
historical evolution of the trust).
46.
See id. at 632-43, 669-71; see also MCGOVERN ET AL., supranote 20, at 369
(describing U.S. trusts and noting that "[t]he word 'trust' is used for many property
arrangements that have little in common with each other apart from the fact that they
were historically enforced... in the Court of Equity"); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra
note 9, 1.95 (describing English trusts).
47.
See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 3.
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A trust has the following characteristicsa) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the
trustee's own estate;
b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the
name of another person on behalf of the trustee;
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is
accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance
with the terms of the trust and the special duties imposed upon him by
law.
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and
the fact that the trustee may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are
48
not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trust.

Thus, the three most important persons in a trust relationship
are the settlor (also called the donor), who creates and funds the
trust; the trustee, who holds legal title to the property, though only
for the benefit of the beneficiary; and the beneficiary, who holds
49
equitable title to the property and receives the benefits of the trust.
All trusts must have at least one settlor, trustee, and beneficiary,
although there may be more than one person in each role (for
example, there may be multiple settlors, multiple trustees, and
multiple beneficiaries or any combination thereof). In some cases, the
same person may act in multiple roles (for example, a settlor may also
be a trustee, and a trustee may also be a beneficiary).
Historically, trusts were often created to protect property from
creditors, a use which continues to this day. 50 Trusts were also
created as a means of ensuring competent administration of the
corpus of the trust in cases where the beneficiary might be incapable
of acting on his or her own behalf (as in cases involving a legal
impediment, such as minority) or might lack the necessary qualities
to act prudently (as in cases involving persons who were financially
unsophisticated or had a tendency toward profligacy). 5 1

48.
Id. art. 2; see also MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 374-81 (describing
8.1 (outlining the
the creation of trusts); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
language that is sufficient to create a trust).
49.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 370 (describing the elements
required to create a trust); Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 632 ("The
ordinary trust... entails a three-party relationship, in which the donor (settlor)
arranges with the trustee to divide the donee's interest between trustee and
beneficiary."). Protectors (called "enforcers" in England) may also be appointed, though
typically only in situations where the settlor wishes to establish an extra layer of
protection regarding the administration of the trust. See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON,
supra note 9,
8.157-8.167.
50.
See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 1, at 640-43 (describing how
trusts developed to safeguard property from creditors).
51.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 389, 417-20 (describing the use of
trusts to protect assets for minors and those who suffer from "improvidence, or
11.1, 11.77incapacity for self-protection"); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
11.78 (discussing protective trusts).
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B. Types of Trusts, Including Commercial Trusts
Trusts exist in a wide variety of forms. Although most trusts are
created intentionally (i.e., "express trusts"), trusts may also be
created by statute or by operation of law. 52 All express trusts can be
categorized as either a living (inter vivos) or testamentary trust, on
the one hand, and as either a revocable or irrevocable trust, on the
53
other.
Beyond these basic qualifications, trusts are typically defined by
their purpose. Many trusts (such as dynasty trusts, marital trusts, or
family trusts) are meant to pass on wealth within a family, with the
quintessential example being a trust created by a parent to benefit a
child after the parent's death. 54 However, trusts serve other purposes
as well. For example, some trusts are created entirely for charitable
purposes, 55 while others, such as asset-protection trusts or creditshelter trusts, appear to be primarily focused on garnering various
tax savings or deterring potential creditors from reaching trust
56
assets.
Although family-planning trusts are perhaps the most wellknown type of trust in the United States, they are not the most
common. Instead, "well over 90% of the money held in trust in the
United States" in recent years has been held "in commercial as

52.
Trusts created by operation of law include resulting trusts, constructive
trusts, and trusts created through bankruptcy. See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at
369-70; UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
3.1-3.11. These trusts are not
addressed in this Article, since these devices do not involve a written instrument that
can include an arbitration provision.
53.
A living or inter vivos trust comes into effect during the lifetime of the
settlor, whereas a testamentary trust comes into effect only after the death of the
settlor. Revocable trusts may be changed or terminated by the settlor, whereas
irrevocable trusts may not. This of course means that only living trusts may be
revocable. See McGOVERN ETAL., supra note 20, at 369, 381.
54.
See id. at 369-70 (discussing common reasons for using trusts); Langbein,
Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 178 (describing the use of trusts in family wealth
transfers).
55.
Charitable trusts are often subject to slightly different rules than private
trusts. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 436-50 (discussing the rules governing
charitable trusts). One distinctive aspect of charitable trusts is that they are typically
enforceable by the attorney general, since there are no identifiable beneficiaries who
can undertake that task. See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
8.158;
Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 631 (describing the distinct character of
charitable trusts). While this "public" aspect of charitable trusts may suggest that such
trusts may not be amenable to arbitration, some governmental entities such as the
U.S. Department of Justice and various state attorney general offices are embracing
arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). See Interagency
Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group, ADR.GOV, http://www.adr.gov/ (focusing
on increasing use of ADR in federal government). Therefore, it may be that charitable
trusts could nevertheless be made subject to mandatory arbitration.
56.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supranote 20, at 369-70 (describing spendthrift and
other asset-protection trusts).
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opposed to personal trusts. '57 Commercial trusts are not limited to
the United States but have become increasingly popular in other
jurisdictions as well. 58 Thus, it has been said that "the role of trusts
in intrafamily wealth transfers is today 'relatively trivial,"'
particularly when compared to the "enormously important" role of
trusts in the business context. 59
A brief summary of commercial trusts is useful to provide context
for later discussion of this often overlooked device.6 0 First, as a
definitional matter, a commercial trust (also known as a business
trust) constitutes "a trust that implements bargained-for exchange,"
in contrast to the kind of donative transfers that are more common in
a trust created to pass on family wealth. 61 Some, but not all,
62
commercial trusts are created by statute.
Commercial trusts are created for a variety of reasons. Some of
these rationales appear largely similar to those involving
noncommercial trusts and therefore suggest that the two kinds of
trusts should be treated similarly in most, if not all, regards. 63 For

57.
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166-67, 178 (citing figures
from the mid- to late-1990s).
58.
See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, Business Applications of the Express Trust, 36
ALBERTA L. REV. 630 (1998) (discussing the importance of commercial trusts in
Canada); Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166 (arguing the extensive use
of commercial trusts in the United States).
59.
Christensen, supra note 1, § 1.
See Miller, supra note 32, at 452 (explaining the inattention generally paid
60.
to business trusts).
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166-67 (contrasting
61.
commercial and noncommercial trusts).
62.
See, e.g., UNIF. STATUTORY TRUST ENTITY ACT prefatory note (2009), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ubta/2009final.htm (representing an example
of a commercial trust created by statute).
63.
There is some debate in the trust community as to the extent to which the
two kinds of trusts are or should be treated similarly. For example, the Restatement of
Trusts excludes business trusts from its consideration and focuses solely on trusts as
donative devices, stating that "[a]lthough many of the rules applicable to trusts are
applied to business trusts, yet many of the rules are not applied .... The business
trust is a special kind of business association and can best be dealt with in connection
with other business associations." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 1 cmt. B
(1959); see also Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97
IOWA L. REV. 215, 217 (2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 1, intro, note
(2003)). However, John Langbein states that "[n]either the text of the Restatement's
official comment, nor the reporter's note, supplies any authority for Scott's claim that
'many of the rules' of trust law do not apply to business uses of the trust." Langbein,
Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166 n.6. Other authorities take no position on this
issue. See David M. English, Representing Trust and Estate Beneficiaries and
Fiduciaries:The Uniform Trust Code, SK089 ALI-ABA 191, sec. IV (2005) (noting the
Uniform Trust Code (UTC) is not directed at commercial trusts but does not exclude
them from consideration, either). This kind of differential treatment is somewhat
disturbing, given the importance of commercial trusts to the trust industry, see
Christensen, supra note 1, at § 1, and may inappropriately skew the analysis regarding
the arbitrability of trust disputes by diminishing the emphasis on the commercial and
contractual nature of the majority of trusts in use today.
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example, both business and nonbusiness trusts provide protection
from insolvency and some forms of taxation, while also creating a
fiduciary regime that requires the application of fiduciary duties of
64
loyalty and prudence.
However, business trusts also have purposes that are entirely
unique to the commercial realm. For example, parties to commercial
trusts are able to take advantage of the trust's inherent flexibility
and create relationships or procedures that might be difficult or
impossible to achieve as a matter of corporate law, particularly with
respect to "matters of internal governance and... the creation of
beneficial interests. '6 5 "Transaction planners designing asset
securitization trusts especially welcome the freedom to carve
beneficial interests without regard to traditional classes of corporate
shares," creating a wide range of "so-called tranches, each embodied
66
in its own class of trust security."
Interest in commercial trusts has grown exponentially in recent
years due to the increased liberalization of laws regarding the use
and creation of such devices.6 7 However, commercial trusts "are a
woefully under-analyzed and underappreciated form of business
organization," despite their being "critically important" to various
capital markets.6 8 Indeed, many lawyers may be unaware of what
constitutes a commercial trust per se. As it turns out, there are a
wide variety of statutory and common law business trusts currently
in use,6 9 with some of the more common types including pension
trusts, investment or unit trusts (which include mutual funds, real
estate investment trusts (REITs), oil and gas royalty trusts, and asset
70
securitization trusts), and trusts relating to the issuance of bonds.
Notably, a number of these types of trusts have been subject to

64.
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 179-83, 189 (describing
why trusts are useful in the commercial context).
65.
Id. at 183 (explaining usefulness of trusts in the commercial context); see
also UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, 1.99.
66.
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 183 (citation omitted). "A
tranche is simply a slice of a deal, a payment stream whose expected return increases
with its riskiness." Id. at 183 n.109.
67.
See UNIF. STATUTORY TRUST ENTITY ACT (concerning liberalizing moves by
individual U.S. states); Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 187-88 (noting
liberalization of legislation regarding business trusts).
68.
Miller, supra note 32, at 444. For more information on these trusts, see
UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
1.135, 1.138; Langbein, Commercial Trusts,
supranote 1, at 168-76; Miller, supra note 32, at 447.
69.
For a list of the various types of trusts recognized by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code, see Christensen, supra note 1, § 2.
70.
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 168-76 (describing
various types of commercial trusts in the United States).
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arbitration of internal trust disputes in the United States and
71
elsewhere.
Interestingly, the increased use of the commercial trust has led
to a sharpening of the debate about the theoretical nature of trusts.
While the ideological divide currently reflected in the legal literature
mirrors a similar split seen in the early twentieth century, the issue
has become particularly pressing in light of the current discussion
about mandatory trust arbitration. Although theory can often seem
entirely divorced from the practice of law, this is one instance where
the manner in which a device is conceptualized can make a difference
72
in how it is treated in court.
C. The Theoretical Basis of Trusts
1.

The Donative Theory of Trusts

The first and perhaps most prevalent theory of trusts holds that
such devices are primarily donative in nature. This approach is
evident in both England and the United States, with one of the
leading treatises on English trust law stating that "[a] trust is not a
contract but a unilateral transfer of assets to a person prepared to
accept the office of trustee with the benefits and burdens attached to
'73
such office.
Although this statement would seem conclusive, the same
treatise also indicates that general principles of trust law and theory
can be overcome by statute. 74 In reaching this conclusion, the authors
specifically mention the Arbitration Act 1996, England's national
statute on arbitration, noting that the Act gives parties the ability to
contract out of judicial determinations of legal issues. 75 Thus, while

71.
See Hastings v. Wilson, 516 F.3d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing use
of arbitration in context of a pension trust); Bortrager v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas
Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing arbitration of dispute
regarding withdrawal liability under a pension benefit trust); Contract Servs. Emp.
Trust v. Davis, 55 F.3d 533, 535 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing use of arbitration in a case
involving an employee benefit trust fund); Reeves v. Tarvizian, 351 F.2d 889, 890-92
(1st Cir. 1965) (involving arbitration of claims relating to pension trust); Stender v.
Cardwell, No. 07-CV-02503-REB-MJW, 2009 WL 3416904, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 20,
2009) (involving arbitration of an umbrella partnership REIT (UPREIT)); see also Law
Debenture Trust Corp. v. Elektrim Fin. [20051 EWHC. 1412, [38]-[47] (Ch.) (Eng.)
(involving dispute relating to a trust).
72.
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 185-86 (describing
debate about whether commercial trusts should be framed as donative or contractual).
73.

UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,

11.83.

74.
See id.
11.1, 11.79.
75.
See Arbitration Act 1996, c.
23, § 69 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents
(detailing the process for
appealing an arbitral award to court); see also UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
11.79.
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the donative theory of trusts may predominate in England as a
general matter, it may have diminished applicability in cases
involving mandatory arbitration, having been superseded, as it were,
by statute.
The donative theory of trusts is also reflected in the United
States, most visibly in the Restatement of Trusts.76 Interestingly, U.S.
adoption of the donative theory of trusts is a relatively recent
innovation, appearing for the first time in the early days of the
twentieth century, when the first Restatement of Trusts was
published. 77 Prior to that time, courts and commentators in the
United States appear to have been more accepting of the contractual
78
aspects of trusts, at least as it applied to arbitration.
Interestingly, the donative theory of trusts does not have to be
considered antithetical to mandatory trust arbitration. Indeed, a
number of the reasons enunciated by Austin Scott, the reporter of the
first Restatement, as justifying the characterization of trusts as
donative could be seen as entirely consistent with mandatory
arbitration of internal trust disputes. 79 For example, Scott is said to
have embraced the donative theory of trusts because he was worried
that a more contractual approach would bring the enforcement of
trusts out of the realm of equity and into the common law.80 This was
problematic for Scott because "that fusion might remove the law of
trusts from the nurturing hand of the specialist equity bench, and
indeed, that fusion might cause trust litigation to be subjected to jury
trial. 8 1 "Thus, for Scott, having the Restatement deny the
contractarian character of the trust was a means of buttressing the
jury-free preserve of equity judges."8 2 Of course, another way to
remove a dispute from jury consideration and put it in the hands of a
decision maker with special expertise in trust law and procedure is to
83
put it into arbitration.

76.
See Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 166 (citing the
Restatement as characterizing trusts as "a branch of the law of gratuitous transfers").
See Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 627, 644-65 (describing the
77.
debate involving the contractarian and donative theories of trust).
See ACTEC, supra note 13, at 13 (noting early courts that found
78.
agreements to arbitrate future disputes enforceable).
Interestingly, the first Restatement is said to have adopted the donative
79.
approach to trusts not because that theory prevailed as a matter of jurisprudential
discourse (indeed, the contractarian approach had numerous supporters at that time,
including Frederic W. Maitland), but simply because that was the model favored by
Scott. See Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 627, 644-45 (noting Scott had long
favored the donative approach to trusts).
80.
See id. at 648-50 (noting that Scott's fear did not come to pass).
Id. at 648.
81.
Id. at 649.
82.
83.
See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (considering benefits of
arbitration of trust disputes).
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One of the few U.S. decisions to consider the theoretical nature of
84
trusts in the context of arbitration is Schoneberger v. Oelze.
Although the decision has been superseded by statute, the case
nevertheless provides a useful demonstration of how legal theory
85
applies in practice.
Schoneberger arose out of claims for breach of trust and related
torts brought by the beneficiaries of two related family trusts against
the trustees.8 6 The trusts contained a provision stating that "[a]ny
dispute arising in connection with this Trust, including disputes
between Trustee and any beneficiary or among Co-Trustees" was to
be arbitrated.8 7 The beneficiaries initially filed their suit in court, but
the trustees moved for arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration
clause in the trusts constituted "provisions in a written contract" in
conformity with statutory requirements for arbitration, or,
alternatively, that the beneficiaries "were equitably estopped from
objecting to arbitration as they were affirmatively seeking benefits
under the Trusts. 8 8 The beneficiaries alleged in response that "the
arbitration provisions were unenforceable because the Trusts were
not contractual agreements" and that, "as non-signatories to the
Trust documents, they had never agreed to arbitrate their claims
against the defendants. 8 9
In deciding in favor of the beneficiaries, the Arizona Court of
Appeals held that 'the duties of a trustee stem from duties implied
by law' and the relationships that arise out of a trust 'are not
contractual."' 90 Therefore:
The legal distinctions between a trust and a contract are at the
heart of why [the beneficiaries] cannot be required to arbitrate their
claims against the defendants. Arbitration rests on an exchange of
promises.... In contrast, a trust does not rest on an exchange of
promises. A trust merely requires a trustor to transfer a beneficial

84.
See 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that trusts were not written
contracts requiring arbitration), superseded by statute, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410205 (2012), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011) (confirming that Schonebergerwas superseded by statute
to the extent that the case required consent as a precondition to arbitration).
85.
Several other U.S. courts have adopted the Schonebergeranalysis, but most
of those decisions have been subject to vigorous dissents or have been appealed to
higher courts. See Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 614-15 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing
Shoneberger), rev. granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011); Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305,
310-11 (Tex. App. 2011) (discussing Schoneberger), rev. granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 487
(Tex. June 8, 2012); see also In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 409-10 (D.C. 2006)
(adopting Schoneberger analysis in the context of wills); Robsham v. Lattuca, 797
N.E.2d 502 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the trusts
at issue were not enforceable as contracts).
86.
Schoneberger,96 P.3d at 107-80.
87.
Id. at 1080.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 1080-81.
90.
Id. at 1082 (citations omitted).
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interest in property to a trustee who, under the trust instrument,
relevant statutes and common law, holds that interest for the
beneficiary. The "undertaking" between trustor and trustee "does not
stem from the premise of mutual assent to an exchange of promises"
91
and "is not properly characterized as contractual."

2.

The Contract Theory of Trusts

Just as the donative theory of contract law has its champions, so,
too, does the contractual theory. Thus, for example, one of the leading
commentators on U.S. trust law has said that:
[A]lthough the typical trust implements a donative transfer, it
embodies a contract-like relationship in the underlying deal between
the settlor and the trustee about how the trustee will manage the trust
assets and distribute them to the trust beneficiaries. The difference
between a trust and a third-party beneficiary contract is largely a
92
lawyers' conceptualism.

Under this approach, the trust is viewed as "a deal, a bargain about
how the trust assets are to be managed and distributed. '9 3 Therefore:
When... we enforce a trust, even the conventional donative or
personal trust, we are already in the realm of contract-like behavior.
That is why not much turns on the distinction between donative and
commercial trust. In the commercial setting, the typical wealth-holder,
instead of transferring property for his widow and orphans, is an
investor buying shares in an asset pool for the investor's own benefit. In

91.
Id. at 1083 (citation omitted). Interestingly, the Arizona court was
influenced as much by the precise language of the state statute on arbitration as it was
by judicial precedent characterizing trusts as donative instruments. The statute
indicates that:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1501 (2003); see also Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083 (focusing on
the word "contract"). Some judges have noted that arbitration statutes contemplating
arbitration "agreements" rather than "contracts" may yield different results. See
Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 312-13 (Tex. App. 2011) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(explaining that an "agreement" is broader than a "contract"), rev. granted, 2012 Tex.
LEXIS 487 (Tex. June 8, 2012). This suggests that parties may be able to determine
whether a particular jurisdiction has adopted a contractual or donative approach to
trusts by considering whether claims against a trustee must be framed in terms of
breaches of trust or fiduciary duty or whether they may be classified as breaches of
contract. Compare Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1082-83 (stating "[a] trustee who fails to
perform his duties ... is not liable to the beneficiary for breach of contract" (citations
omitted)), with Stender v. Cardwell, No. 07-cv-02503, 2009 WL 3416904, at *2 (D.Colo.
Oct. 20, 2009) (involving breach of contract of an UPREIT).
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 185 (citation omitted).
92.
Langbein, Contractarian,supranote 1, at 627.
93.
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either case, the wealth-holder places property at the trustee's disposal
94
in reliance upon the safeguards of the trust form.

Certainly, when the trust is used to fulfill "commercial usages,
the contractarian character of the trust is transparent,"95 a
conclusion that suggests it may be particularly appropriate to enforce
a mandatory arbitration provision in a commercial trust.96 However,
the contractual theory of trusts can apply in most noncommercial
contexts as well, since even if the contractarian approach is
considered "unsuitable for the two-party declaration of trust, . . . such
an observation in no way invalidates the contract approach to the
more traditional three-party trust where the grantor does not act as
'97
the trustee.
The contract theory of trusts is attractive to proponents of
mandatory trust arbitration for a variety of reasons. 98 While these
issues will be discussed further below, it is nevertheless interesting to
note that prior to the adoption of the first Restatement of Trusts, U.S.
courts appear to "have had little difficulty upholding testamentary
arbitration clauses," often doing so "by drawing analogies to contract
law." 99 Furthermore, several recent judicial opinions appear to adopt
this approach. For example, in Stender v. Cardwell, a federal district
court allowed arbitration of various claims associated with the breach
of a declaration of trust in an umbrella partnership REIT. 10 0
Although the analysis was somewhat cursory, the court framed the

94.
Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 186.
95.
Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 631.
96.
Indeed, several courts have already done so. See San Juan v. Corporaci6n
para el Fomento Econ6mico de la Ciudad Capital, 597 F. Supp. 2d 247, 248-49 (D. P.R.
2008) (holding the parties to their agreement to abide by certain arbitration rules);
Robin v. Doran, No. 392456, 2010 WL 728558, at *1 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 3, 2010)
(enforcing mandatory arbitration provision in bylaws of condominium trust); see also
supra note 71 (listing cases in which internal trust disputes related to commercial
trusts were subject to arbitration).
97.
Bruyere & Marino, supra note 15, at 362; see also Langbein, Contractarian,
supra note 1, at 627, 645 (describing trusts in contractual terms). The two-party
declaration trust, also known as a self-declarative trust, arises when a settlor declares
him or herself to be the trustee of certain identified property for the benefit of another
person rather than naming another person to act as trustee. See MCGOVERN ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 374; UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
12.7-12.13. Notably,
self-declarative trusts are never used in the commercial context and are rare in the
noncommercial realm. See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 374-75; Langbein,
Contractarian,supranote 1, at 672 (suggesting self-declarative trusts to be "little used"
because they eliminate the management services of third-party trustees, which is what
most modern settlors want from a trust).
98.
See infra notes 260-320 and accompanying text (considering contract
theory of trusts as a matter of arbitration law).
99.
ACTEC, supra note 13, at 13.
100.
See Stender v. Cardwell, No. 07-cv-02503, 2009 WL 3416904, at *2 (D. Colo.
Oct. 20, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs' claim for breach of a contract remained subject to
arbitration despite plaintiffs' amended complaint mentioning claims for breach of other
contracts).

2012]

ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES

1179

action as a breach of contract, rather than a breach of fiduciary duty,
thus suggesting more of a contractual approach rather than a
donative approach. 1° 1 Other courts have also upheld arbitration
provisions found in commercial trusts based on contractual
rationales.102
Contract-based analyses also appear in the context of family
trusts. Thus, for example, the court in In re Ismailoff ruled that an
arbitration provision found in an irrevocable inter vivos trust was
"enforceable at the election of any one of the four trustees.' 10 3 In re
Ismailoff is particularly interesting because the opinion states that
the settlor "executed an agreement with her four children (trustees)
creating an irrevocable inter vivos trust."1 0 4 The reference to "an
agreement" suggests either that the settlor drafted a trust that
incorporated certain contractual elements not normally found in
trusts or that the court simply characterized a standard inter vivos
trust as being contractual in nature. 10 5 Given the sparseness of the
published opinion, it is impossible to know which situation actually
arose. Nevertheless, the decision demonstrates that judges are willing
to view trusts in a contractual light, even if it is unclear whether
settlors need to adopt any special drafting techniques to help achieve
06
that outcome.'
Contract theories do not appear as attractive to English courts or
commentators. Indeed, there are no known advocates of that
particular approach to trusts, as a general proposition. Nevertheless,
a settlor of an English trust might be able to create contractual
obligations in a trust if
a settlor, on behalf of himself and the beneficiaries deriving their
interests through him, expressly contracts in the trust instrument with
the trustee, on behalf of itself and its successors in title, that in
consideration of undertaking the office of trustee (for the benefit of the

101.
See id. ("Plaintiffs in this putative class action lawsuit assert, inter alia,
that defendants breached a contract-to wit, a declaration of trust.").
102.
See San Juan v. Corporaci6n para el Fomento Econ6mico de la Ciudad
Capital, 597 F. Supp. 2d 247, 248-49 (D.P.R. 2008) (deferring to arbitrator to decide
procedural disputes in arbitration on the basis that the parties' contract to settle
dispute through arbitration was enforceable).
103.
In re Ismailoff, No. 342207, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 50211(U), at *1 (Sur. Ct.
Nassau Cnty. Feb. 1, 2007).
104.
Id. at *2.
105.
See Strong, Enforceability, supra note 33 (discussing drafting techniques to
assist in overcoming problems associated with the need for a contract); see also infra
notes 260-320 and accompanying text (describing and evaluating the interpretation of
trusts based on their contractual qualities).
106.
Further reading is available on how best to draft an enforceable arbitration
provision in a trust. See infra note 499 (providing a list of sources regarding "best
practices" in drafting of trust arbitration provisions).
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settlor, the beneficiaries and itself) any breach of trust claim against
107
the trustees shall be referred to arbitration.

Thus, English law may permit parties to overcome certain
theoretical difficulties through careful drafting.'0 8 Furthermore, even
though this approach currently seems to be limited to claims
associated with breach of trust, it might be possible to extend the
technique to address other sorts of internal disputes. 10 9 Settlors of
U.S. trusts might also be able to use similar techniques to increase
the enforceability of a mandatory trust provision in a trust governed
by U.S. law.
While the contractual theory of trusts is often seen in the United
States as being in conflict with the donative theory, not every country
experiences this kind of jurisprudential tension. Instead, a number of
jurisdictions-particularly certain civil law nations that have adopted
their own domestic version of the trust-view trusts through an
exclusively contractual lens, often upholding mandatory arbitration
provisions in trusts as a matter of course. 110
3.

Other Theories of Trusts

Although U.S. commentary focuses primarily on the contractual
and donative theories of trusts, several other theories also exist. For
example, a court or arbitrator might rely on the intention theory of
trusts, which views "the intention of the settlor as the law of the
trust."11' 1 Though somewhat similar to the contractual theory of
trusts, this approach suggests that "[t]he relative weight of the rights
at issue in a will [or trust] dispute" favor upholding the settlor's
intent vis-A-vis arbitration, since the settlor's "right to dispose of her
property as she sees fit is indisputably superior to the right of an
intestate heir or beneficiary under a prior will [or trust] to receive the

107.
UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, 11.84.
108.
This is just one of the ways a settlor can increase the enforceability of a
mandatory arbitration provision through appropriate language in the trust. See Strong,
Enforceability, supra note 33 (discussing various ways to improve the enforceability of
an arbitration provision through proper drafting).
See infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text (weighing the pros and cons
109.
of the UTC's suggestions for which disputes could go to arbitration).
110.
See Figueroa, supra note 1, at 704-05 (describing Latin American
jurisdictions that view arbitration from a contractual perspective); see also FRANZ T.
SCHWARZ & CHRISTIAN W. KONRAD, Austria, in THE VIENNA RULES: A COMMENTARY ON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRIA 1, 19-20 (2009); Christian Duve, Arbitration
of Corporate Law Disputes in Germany, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW
IN PRACTICE 957, 1002 (Karl-Heinz Bbckstiegel et al. eds., 2007) (discussing German
views regarding the contractual nature of arbitration agreements); Koch, supra note
33, at 195-96 (discussing Germany, Spain, Bolivia, Honduras, Peru, and Malta).
Bosques-Hernindez, supra note 17, at 8; see also Stephen Wills Murphy,
111.
Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 627, 652-57 (2011).
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testator's [or settlor's] property. '112 While any conditions imposed
under this theory "have to be lawful and not contrary to public
policy ....
an arbitration clause, generally speaking, is not against
1 13
public policy."
Decision makers might also consider "the benefit approach,
which means that the beneficiaries of a trust ha[ve] to take the whole
disposition including conditions and restrictions imposed by the
settlor." 114 Rather than characterizing a conveyance as contractual or
donative, this theory views trusts in a more equitable light,
essentially estopping beneficiaries from accepting some, but not all, of
the benefits of a trust. Interestingly, the concept of estoppel is also
available in arbitration law, 115 which suggests that this theory might
be particularly appropriate in cases involving mandatory arbitration
of trust disputes. Indeed, one U.S. court has apparently already relied
on estoppel to extend the effects of an arbitration provision in an
external contract to include matters internal to the trust.116
Having described various background matters concerning trusts,
it is time to consider issues relating directly to the arbitration of trust
disputes. These matters are taken up in the following Part.

III. ARBITRATION

OF TRUST DISPUTES

A. Benefits of Arbitration
Arbitration is well-known as offering many benefits to parties.
However, it is important to consider whether and to what extent
these positive attributes also extend to trust disputes, since it would
be unwise to adopt a procedure that is ill-suited to the types of claims
that are expected to arise. 1 17 Indeed, specialists in arbitration agree

112.
Spitko, supra note 17, at 299.
Bosques-HernAndez, supra note 17, at 11; see also Charles Lloyd &
113.
Jonathan Pratt, Trust in Arbitration, 12 TR. & TRUSTEES 4, 18 (2006) (describing how
arbitration is no longer subject to certain policy-based criticisms).
114.
Bosques-Hernindez, supra note 17, at 8.
115.
See infra notes 270-80, 299-304 and accompanying text (analogizing
deemed acquiescence and conditional transfer to estoppel).
116.
See Zisman v. Lesner, No. 6:08-cv-1448, 2008 WL 4459029, at *3-4 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 29, 2008) (holding that equitable estoppel would allow an arbitration
provision to bind a nonparty to the arbitration agreement).
117.
Other commentators and working groups have also considered these
matters. See ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES, 19 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB,

BULL. 9, explanatory notes 1-2 (2008), availableat http://www.iccdrl.com (search "ICC
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes" and follow "Commission Report" hyperlink)
(suggesting that advantages of arbitration are as relevant in trust disputes as they are
in other kinds of disputes); ACTEC, supra 13, at 5 (considering whether informal
means of dispute resolution would be superior to litigation of trust disputes); BosquesHernindez, supra note 17, at 6 (considering the advantages of arbitration in estate
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that although arbitration offers significant advantages over litigation,
arbitration may not be appropriate in every dispute. 118
First, parties are said to favor arbitration because it is faster and
more cost-effective than litigation." 9 This is an equally important
issue for settlors and trustees who are increasingly troubled by the
120
amount of time and money that is spent on hostile trust litigation.
Controversies involving international trusts may be particularly at
risk for increased litigation costs, since many offshore trusts are
located in jurisdictions that give rise to extensive discovery disputes
and lengthy appeals, including appeals to the Privy Council in
London. 121 Since arbitration limits the availability of both discovery
and judicial appeals, arbitration seems well-suited to the needs of
122
parties to trust disputes.
Second, parties often prefer arbitration because it offers a
123
private and confidential means of resolving legal controversies.
Interestingly, settlors and trustees may have an even higher desire
for these protections than actors in other fields do. For example,
settlors in both the testamentary and commercial contexts often
adopt the trust form precisely because a trust provides more privacy
than any of the other alternatives. 1 24 One would naturally expect

planning compared to litigation); Buckle & Olsen, supra note 8, at 649 (discussing
reasons that arbitration might not be the best mechanism for addressing certain types
of trust disputes).
118.
See BORN, supra note 10, at 13-15 (warning against making blanket
choices in favor of either arbitration or litigation, since both mechanisms have
strengths and weaknesses depending on the circumstances).
119.

See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION
1-28 to -30 (2003) (agreeing with the assumption that arbitration is
generally quicker than litigation in national courts, but noting that arbitration is not
necessarily more cost-effective than court proceedings).
120.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 203-04 (discussing size and scope of
hostile trust litigation).
121.
See Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 40 (explaining causes of discovery
expenses in offshore trust litigation). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
hears appeals from Crown dependencies, such as Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of
Man, as well as various Commonwealth nations and overseas territories, including
popular jurisdictions for offshore trusts such as the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. See Role of the JCPC,JUDICIAL COMM. OF THE
PRIVY COUNCIL, http://www.jcpc.gov.uk/about/role-of-the-jcpc.html (last visited Sept. 2,
2012).

122.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 1876-78 (noting that the scope of disclosure is
less than the scope of discovery); LEW ET AL., supra note 119, 1-20 (explaining that
arbitral awards are subject to limited grounds of review).
123.
See LEW ET AL., supra note 119,
1-26 to -27 (recognizing that one of the
advantages of arbitration is its confidential process). Notably, privacy and
confidentiality are not guaranteed as a matter of national or international arbitration
law, which means the parties must make specific provision for these attributes in their
arbitration agreement. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2253.
124.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 370 (noting that settlors choose
trusts because of their private and confidential nature); Frances S. Foster, Trust
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settlors to want the game degree of confidentiality in their dispute
resolution processes. Professional trustees have also been said to
prefer the privacy of arbitration because public forms of dispute
resolution can damage not only the trustees' own personal
reputations but also the reputation of the trust industry as a
125
whole.
Although arbitral concepts of privacy and confidentiality may be
attractive to parties to trust disputes, there are some potential
problems in this regard. Trust controversies are considered to proceed
in rem, which means that a broad range of actual and potential
parties may seek to join or be joined to the action. 126 The possibility of
multiparty proceedings could create potential difficulties with respect
to both the provision of notice and the opportunity to participate in
the arbitration. While there are ways of addressing both these
issues, 127 parties to trust disputes need to be aware of possible
deviations from the common expectation of arbitral privacy,
28
confidentiality, and bilateral proceedings.'
Third, parties in other fields often choose arbitration because of
its procedural flexibility. 12 9 Party autonomy is equally valued in trust
cases, since many settlors choose the trust form precisely because of
its structural flexibility. Given that many settlors are already
predisposed toward autonomy, it would be unlikely for them not to
want to exercise a similar amount of control over the procedures used
to resolve any disputes associated with the trusts they have
created.' 3 0 Parties to international disputes may be particularly
attracted to this aspect of arbitration, since settlors and beneficiaries
are often ill at ease with judicial procedures used in the countries
where offshore trusts are located and would appreciate a dispute

Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 563, 610-11, 615 (2008) (describing scope, nature,
and reason for privacy of trusts).
125.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 204-05 (explaining that publicly
litigated claims can negatively affect the reputations of both trust professionals and the
trust industry).
126.
See Horton, supra note 2, at 1036 (explaining that "all affected individuals"
must be given "a chance to be heard" in resolution of probate matters).
127.
See Strong, Procedures, supra note 33 (manuscript at 60-63) (discussing
ways of addressing various challenges associated with multiparty arbitration).
Notably, confidentiality, privacy, and bilateral proceedings are not required
128.
elements of arbitration. See generally Gary B. Born & Claudio Salas, The U.S. Supreme
Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DiSP. RESOL. 21, 41-42
(2012) (noting arbitration need not be bipartite); S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration
"Change the Nature" of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First
Principles,17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 246 n.220 (2012).
129.
See LEW ET AL., supra note 119, 1-11 (noting that "[plarty autonomy is the
ultimate power determining the form, structure, system and other details of the
arbitration").
130.
See Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 650, 662 (explaining that
party autonomy "is not wholly unrestrained" in trust law).
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resolution process that provides procedural predictability and
131
familiarity.
Again, however, potential problems exist. For example, some
courts and commentators have suggested that the lack of procedural
formality that is said to typify arbitration 132 could lead to violations
of the substantive or procedural rights of the parties to a trust
dispute. 133 Special concerns arise with respect to unborn,
unascertained, or legally incompetent beneficiaries. 1 34 However,
these concerns appear largely misplaced given the wide range of
procedural protections that exist under contemporary rules of
arbitration. 3 5 Furthermore, it is always possible to modify existing
arbitral processes to meet the unique needs of parties to trust
disputes.136
Fourth, commercial actors often use arbitration so that they can
choose a decision maker who holds particular expertise in the subject
matter at issue. 137 Given that trust law can be quite specialized as a
matter of both procedural and substantive law, settlors would be
expected to value this particular attribute of arbitration at least as
13 8
much as parties to other types of disputes do.
Interestingly, this may be one area where certain members of the
trust bench and bar are unaware of precisely how beneficial

131.
See Wuistemann, supra note 1, at 41-42 (explaining that settlors,
beneficiaries, and trust companies typically prefer an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction
to an unfamiliar jurisdiction's dispute resolution process).
132.
This is something of a misconception, since many arbitrations, especially
those in the international realm, reflect a high degree of procedural formality. See
BORN, supranote 5, at 1744, 1746 (describing how international arbitration procedures
can closely resemble commercial court proceedings in major matters).
133.
See In re Revocation of Revocable Trust of Fellman, 604 A.2d 263, 265-67
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (concluding that arbitration may not be appropriate to determine
the competency of a settlor); Horton, supra note 2, at 1076 (suggesting some claims
may not be appropriate for arbitration).
134.
See infra notes 399-432 and accompanying text.
135.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 1763-64 (describing range of procedural
protections in arbitration).
136.
Some arbitral institutions take the view that their existing rules are
sufficiently flexible to address any trust-related issues, while other organizations have
created special rules dedicated to trust arbitrations. See AAA WILLS AND TRUSTS
ARBITRATION RULES (2009), availableat http://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET
FILE&dDocName=ADRSTG_004135&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased
(providing model rules for trust arbitrations); ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST
DISPUTES, 19 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 9, explanatory notes 4-6 (2008), available at
http://www.iccdrl.com (search "ICC Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes" and follow
"Commission Report" hyperlink) (noting that the ICC's Rules of Arbitration are
sufficiently flexible for trust disputes); Strong, Procedures,supra note 33 (manuscript
at 5) (discussing AAA's specialized rules of trust arbitration).
137.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 78-81, 1364-65 (noting that parties to an
arbitration typically choose experts in specific disciplines to serve on the arbitral
tribunal).
138.
See Spitko, supra note 17, at 296-97 (discussing how settlors and testators
may value a decision maker with particular expertise).
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arbitration can be. For example, concerns have occasionally been
raised about the competence of arbitrators vis-A-vis trust disputes,
particularly with respect to whether arbitrators are able to handle
the kind of complex, multiparty claims commonly associated with
trusts. 13 9 As it turns out, these criticisms are remarkably similar to
those made in the early days of arbitration, when hostility to
anything other than judicial resolution of disputes was rife. 140 Over
the years, the arbitral community has created numerous methods of
addressing these types of concerns, which means that it is unlikely
that trust arbitration will run into any difficulties with respect to the
competence of arbitrators. 14 1 Instead, parties to trust arbitration are
much more apt to reap the benefits associated with an arbitral regime
that has had decades to grow and mature.
The preceding four points apply equally to both national and
international disputes. However, parties to international disputes
have a fifth and final reason to prefer arbitration over litigation.
Enforcement of foreign judgments is a difficult and notoriously
unpredictable undertaking, since it is based primarily on principles of
comity. 1 42 Parties to arbitration have a much easier time enforcing
foreign arbitral awards because the process is almost exclusively
governed by various multilateral treaties, the most prominent of
which is the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
143
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).
These international conventions reflect a strong bias in favor of
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards, which allows
parties to an international trust arbitration to obtain final resolution
of their disputes much more quickly, efficiently, predictably, and cost-

139.
See id.; Wtistemann, supra note 1, at 35, 40-41. Other concerns relate to
whether the appointment mechanism will guarantee the absence of any bias or
procedural unfairness and whether arbitrators are bound to apply the law. See
Wiistemann, supra note 1,. at 40-41.
See ACTEC, supra note 13, at 4-7 (discussing the "blinding prejudice" to
140.
arbitration in contemporary trust and estates practice); BORN, supra note 5, at 78-81,
1364-65 (outlining the types of arguments made against arbitration in the early days
of the procedure);.
141.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 78-81, 1364-65 (noting that a party's ability to
choose the arbitrators ensures the decision makers are "competent, experienced and
available").
142.
See id. at 91-101 (discussing the relative ease with which arbitral awards
may be enforced internationally).
143.
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York
Convention]. The New York Convention, which currently has 147 state parties,
revolutionized global commerce by creating a neutral, reputable, predictable, and
effective means of resolving international legal disputes. See Status: 1958-Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) [hereinafter New York Convention Status].
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144
effectively than parties to an international trust litigation can.
Both the United States and England are parties to the New York
Convention, as are many of the more popular jurisdictions for
offshore trusts (including Jersey, Guernsey, Bermuda, the Bahamas,
and the Cayman Islands), either as independent contracting states or
145
as territories of a contracting state.
However, some potential problems again arise. Parties hoping to
benefit from the New York Convention's pro-enforcement regime
must first ensure that the dispute in question is covered by the
Convention. 146 Claims regarding the internal operations of a trust
might experience some difficulties in this regard if a particular
jurisdiction does not consider trust disputes to be (1) commercial in
14 7
nature or (2) capable of settlement by arbitration.
The first issue, commerciality, is disposed of relatively easily,
since most, if not all, trusts can be considered "commercial" as a
matter of arbitration law. 148 Commercial trusts obviously pass
149
muster, since they are expressly created for business purposes.
However, most noncommercial trusts would likely fall within the
prescribed definitions as well, since many jurisdictions' definitions of
commercial activity are so broad as to cover almost any transaction
involving money. 150 Therefore, parties should be aware of this
requirement but should not be unduly concerned by it.
The second concern-namely, whether a trust dispute is capable
of settlement by arbitration-is much more complicated. The issue
here relates to the concept of arbitrability, which considers which
disputes can be heard in arbitration and which are reserved to the
exclusive purview of the courts. 15' This concept is central to the

144.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 91-101 (noting pro-enforcement bias of the New
York Convention).
145.
See New York Convention Status, supra note 143 (listing the 147 state
parties to the New York Convention).
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. I (describing the scope of
146.
application of the New York Convention).
147.
See id.arts. 1(3), 11(1), V(2)(a) (noting the applicability of the New York
Convention to commercial disputes and to disputes that are "capable of settlement by
arbitration").
148.
Notably, this requirement only applies in cases where the state party has
made an express declaration limiting its obligations under the New York Convention to
cases involving commercial disputes. See id. art. 1(3) (declaring that any state may
"apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the
State making such declaration"). Approximately one-third of the state parties to the
New York Convention have made a declaration limiting their obligations under the
Convention to commercial disputes. See id.; BORN, supranote 5, at 261 n.295.
See supranotes 69-70 and accompanying text.
149.
See Horton, supra note 2, at 1068-73 (concluding that almost all wills and
150.
trusts involve interstate commerce).
151.
See Stefan Michael Krill, The "Arbitrability"of Disputes Arising from
Commercial Representation, in
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debate about mandatory trust arbitration and is discussed in detail
below.152
Despite several areas of potential concern, arbitration appears to
be as attractive to parties to trust disputes as to parties in other
areas of law. As a result, it is not surprising that many settlors favor
mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes. 153 However, several
problems arise in this regard. First among these is the fact that
trustees appear to have more power to initiate arbitration than
settlors do under existing law. This issue is discussed in the next
subpart.
B. Trustees'Powersto Arbitrate
Although the contemporary debate about mandatory arbitration
of trust disputes sometimes makes the process sound as if it is a
recent innovation, arbitration of trust disputes has long been
permitted in both England and the United States, frequently as a
result of statutes that either implicitly or explicitly permit the trustee
to enter into arbitration agreements with respect to matters external
to the trust. 154 While arbitration agreements with external third
parties have sometimes led to the arbitration of internal trust
disputes, 155 at this point the paradigm for trust-related arbitration

PERSPECTIVES 317,
16-7 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009)
(defining arbitrability as those disputes amenable to arbitration). The term is used in
this Article in its international sense. In the United States, arbitrability refers not only
to the question of what issues are reserved to the courts as a matter of law but also to
matters relating to the scope of the arbitration agreement as a matter of party intent.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 767 (describing the nonarbitrability doctrine).
152.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, arts. II(1), V(2)(a) (limiting
applicability of the New York Convention to disputes involving matters "capable of
settlement by arbitration"); see also infra notes 434-90 and accompanying text.
See von Segesser, supra note 13, at 21 (describing the privacy and
153.
confidentiality of arbitration as a major advantage over litigation); Wiistemann, supra
note 1, at 33-34 (noting disagreement as to whether arbitration is appropriate for trust
disputes under English law).
154.
See Horton, supra note 2, at 1033-38 (describing the history of
testamentary arbitration); see also Bruyere & Marino, supra note 15, at 355-56, 362
(discussing trustees' power to resolve trust disputes through mediation and
arbitration); David J. Hayton, Problems in Attaining Binding Determinationsof Trust
Issues by Alternative Dispute Resolution, in PAPERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ESTATE AND TRUST LAW-2000, supra note 13, at 11, 11 (discussing trust disputes
that "involve the beneficiaries, whether such disputes concern the internal trusteebeneficiary relationship or the claims of third parties to impeach the trust"); Gail E.
Mautner & Heidi L.G. Orr, A Brave New World: Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution
Procedures Under the Uniform Trust Code and Washington's and Idaho's Trust and
Estate Dispute Resolution Acts, 35 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 159, 159 (2009)
(discussing the UTC's nonjudicial dispute resolution procedures).
155.
For example, arbitration of an external trust dispute under an arbitration
agreement with a third party could permit or require arbitration with a beneficiary in
cases where the trustee has a conflict of interest that might affect the trustee's ability
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involves a matter arising out of a bilateral commercial relationship
between the trust and some external third party, such as an agent or
advisor.
Although detailed consideration of external trust disputes is
beyond the scope of this Article, there are two reasons why it is
necessary to undertake a brief discussion of statutes commonly used
to allow the trustee to arbitrate with third parties. First, some of this
legislation is ambiguous as to whether it refers only to arbitration
initiated by trustees or whether it applies equally to arbitration
mandated by the trust agreement itself. 156 Since some courts could
interpret the statutes as providing a basis for mandatory arbitration
of internal trust disputes, it is useful to at least introduce the various
provisions.
Second, this type of legislation suggests the possible scope of
issues that might be amenable to arbitration arising out of arbitral
clauses found in trust instruments. This conclusion is based on the
fact that legal issues that are subject to arbitration in one context
157
cannot be said to be inherently nonarbitrable in another.
Therefore, courts considering the enforceability of arbitration
provisions found in trusts may be able to rely on these statutes to
158
help determine whether certain issues are arbitrable.
A few examples should be sufficient to demonstrate the range of
legislation that is currently in force. One approach, found in the
Uniform Trust Code (UTC), 159 simply indicates that "interested

or inclination to proceed with an arbitration against the third party. See In re
Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888-89 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2006) (allowing a
beneficiary to represent the trust in an arbitration when a conflict of interest arose
with the trustee). Arbitration of internal trust matters may also result in cases where
(1) a side agreement that includes an arbitration provision has been explicitly
incorporated by reference into a trust or (2) a side agreement that includes an
arbitration provision explicitly refers to disputes arising out of an associated trust. See
Decker v. Bookstaver, No. 4:09-CV-1361, 2010 WL 2132284, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. May 26,
2010) (enforcing an arbitration provision found in an account agreement); New S. Fed.
Sav. Bank v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (granting plaintiffs
motion to compel arbitration where a home loan was accompanied by a deed of trust
rider); Meijer & Guzman, supra note 39, at 148 (discussing incorporation by reference
in the context of arbitration provisions found in a company's articles of association).
156.
See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
157.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633 (1985) (noting that courts cannot claim that certain matters are "inherently
insusceptible to resolution by arbitration, as these same courts have agreed that an
undertaking to arbitrate ...[such] claims entered into after the dispute arises is
acceptable").
158.
See infra notes 434-90 and accompanying text.
159.
See
UNIF.
TRUST
CODE
(amended
2010),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ trust code/utc-final rev2OlO.pdf (providing a
"national codification of the law of trusts"). The UTC has been adopted by twenty-four
U.S. states in whole or in part. See Trust Code, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trust Code (last visited Sept. 29, 20120) (listing
the states that have enacted the UTC).
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persons may enter into a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement
with respect to any matter involving a trust."1 60 Although such
agreements are "encouraged," they are "valid only to the extent that
[they do] not violate a material purpose of the trust and include[ ]
terms and conditions that could be properly approved by the court
'16 1
under this [Code] or other applicable law.
The range of arbitrable issues described under the UTC is quite
broad and includes:
(1) the interpretation or construction of the terms of the trust;
(2) the approval of a trustee's report or accounting;
(3) direction to a trustee to refrain from performing a particular act
or the grant to a trustee of any necessary or desirable power;
(4) the resignation or appointment of a trustee and the
determination of a trustee's compensation;
(5) transfer of a trust's principal place of administration; and
162
(6) liability of a trustee for an action relating to the trust.
Notably, a number of these items relate to internal matters of
trust construction and administration. As such, the UTC extends the
concept of arbitrability of trust disputes from straightforward
contract matters involving external third parties to those involving
key issues of substantive trust law.
However, the UTC fails to address some important concerns. For
example, the drafters were purposefully vague when it came to
163
describing how these sorts of nonjudicial agreements could arise.
Because the term "interested persons" is defined as meaning "persons
whose consent would be required in order to achieve a binding
settlement were the settlement to be approved by the court,"164 the
UTC provides no guidance as to whether the settlor can require
mandatory arbitration through inclusion of an arbitration provision
165
in the trust.

160.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 111(b).
161.
Id. § 111(c); id., cmt.
162.
Id. § 111(d); see also id., cmt.; Mautner & Orr, supra note 154, at 161
(discussing § 111 of the UTC as it relates to nonjudicial dispute resolution).
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 111, cmt. (failing to define an "interested person"
163.
with specificity).
164.
Id. § 111(a).
The UTC contains a second provision regarding the arbitration of trust
165.
disputes, but that language is also ambiguous with regard to mandatory trust
arbitration. The reference appears in the section describing the trustee's specific
powers and states that the trustee has the ability to "resolve a dispute concerning the
interpretation of the trust or its administration by mediation, arbitration, or other
procedure for alternative dispute resolution." Id. § 816(23). However, the powers listed
in § 816 are not necessarily exclusive to the trustee and were included merely as a
convenience to parties, who were understood to want a single section compiling specific
powers found elsewhere in the UTC. See id. § 816 cmt. (concluding that "the demand of
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Other sections of the UTC are equally unhelpful in this regard.
For example, the UTC appears to reserve certain activities to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court, which could be taken to mean that
arbitration of these matters is prohibited. 166 However, there is more
than one way to read exclusive jurisdiction clauses when considering
questions of arbitrability. 167 Furthermore, the commentary published
with the UTC explicitly states that "[s]ettlors wishing to encourage
use of alternate dispute resolution may draft to provide it" and refers
interested parties to the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules for sample language. 168 This of
course suggests that mandatory arbitration is possible under the
UTC, at least with respect to some issues.
Although the UTC is not perfect, it nevertheless constitutes a
significant step forward with regard to the arbitration of trust
disputes. However, some individual U.S. states go even further. For
example, the states of Washington and Idaho have enacted statutory
provisions indicating that:
The "matters" that may be addressed and resolved through a
nonjudicial procedure are broadly defined and include any issue,
question, or dispute involving: (i) the determination of any class of
creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin, or other persons
interested in an estate, trust, nonprobate asset, or with respect to any
other asset or property interest passing at death; (ii) the direction of a
personal representative or trustee to do or to abstain from doing any act
in a fiduciary capacity; (iii) the determination of any question arising in
the administration of an estate or trust or with respect to any
nonprobate assets or any other asset or property interest passing at
death, including, without limitation, questions relating to the
construction of wills, trusts, community property agreements, or other
writings, a change of personal representative or trustee, a change of the
situs of a trust, an accounting from a personal representative or
trustee, or the determination of fees for a personal representative or
trustee; (iv) the grant to a personal representative or trustee of any
necessary or desirable power not otherwise granted in the governing
instrument or given by law; and (v) the amendment, reformation, or
conformation of a will or trust instrument to comply with statutes and

third parties to see language expressly authorizing specific transactions justified
retention of a detailed list").
166.
See id. § 111(e) (declaring that "[a]ny interested person may request the
court to approve a nonjudicial settlement agreement"); see also id. § 105(b)(13)-(14)
(discussing the court's power to take action "in the interests of justice").
167.
See infra notes 434-90 and accompanying text.
168.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816(23) cmt.; see also AAA WILLS AND TRUSTS
ARBITRATION RULES (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GETFILE&dDocName=ADRSTG_004135&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased
(providing specialized rules for arbitration of trust disputes). The author has analyzed
the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules and the AAA's proposed model arbitration
clause elsewhere. See Strong, Enforceability, supra note 33 (analyzing the AAA Wills
and Trusts Arbitration Rules); Strong, Procedures, supra note 33 (discussing the AAA
Model Trust Clause). The AAA is in the process of revising its rules, which may affect
the model clause as well.
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regulations of the Internal Revenue Code in order to achieve
169
qualification for deductions, elections, and other tax requirements.

This language is obviously quite expansive. However, the
Washington and Idaho statutes suffer from the same problem as the
UTC, namely ambiguity with respect to who may invoke these
provisions.170
English law takes a somewhat different approach to nonjudicial
settlement of trust disputes. While most U.S. statutes focus on the
type of claims that may be settled by arbitration-thus leaving open
the question of whether the arbitration agreement in question may be
made only by the trustee after the creation of the trust or whether the
settlor can include enforceable arbitration provisions in the trust
itself-English law explicitly states that powers relating to
nonjudicial dispute resolution are limited to the trustee. Thus, the
Trustee Act 1925 states that trustees may
compromise, compound, abandon, submit to arbitration, or otherwise
settle any debt, account, claim, or thing whatever relating to the
testator's or intestate's estate or to the trust;
and for any of those purposes may enter into, give, execute, and do
such agreements, instruments of composition or arrangement, releases,
and other things as to [the trustee or trustees] seem expedient, without
being responsible for any loss occasioned by any act or thing so done by
him or them if he has or they have discharged the duty of care set out
in section 1(1) of the Trustee Act 2000.171

Although the English statute is limited as to who may authorize
the arbitration, the language is quite broad with respect to the types
of claims that can be made in arbitration ("any debt, account, claim,
or thing whatever relating to ... the trust").172 This suggests that
most, if not all, trust-related issues are inherently arbitrable in
England, a position that may be very useful if English courts come to
recognize that settlors have the power to require arbitration of
173
disputes relating to trusts.
One question that arises with respect to provisions that explicitly
or implicitly authorize only the trustee to initiate arbitration is
whether the trustee's discretion in that regard can or should be
influenced by an express direction in the trust indicating that the
trustee must seek to arbitrate any and all disputes arising out of or in

Mautner & Orr, supra note 154, at 163; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-8169.
101, 15-8-103 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.96A.010, 11.96A.030 (West 2006).
These two statutes also speak merely of the types of issues that may be
170.
arbitrable, not how arbitration can arise. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-8-101, 15-8-103
(discussing resolution of trust-related disputes through nonjudicial means); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.96A.010, 11.96A.030 (same).
Trustee Act, 1925, § 15(f) (U.K.), amended by Trustee Act, 2000 (U.K.),
171.
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/15-16/19.
Id. § 15.
172.
See supra notes 75, 212-13 and accompanying text.
173.
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connection with the trust. 174 As it currently stands, statutes
regarding nonjudicial settlement procedures do not seem to include
any requirement that the trustee be acting at the settlor's direction,
although a trustee would of course have to follow an explicit
instruction from the settlor in this regard if such a requirement were
included in the trust. 175 Thus, whether a particular trust dispute is
made subject to arbitration currently appears to be largely a matter
of discretion on the part of the trustee. This appears somewhat
anomalous, since it means that trustees have more power to initiate
arbitration than settlors do. While this approach may be consistent
with what is often a significant grant of discretion given to trustees
under most trusts and as a matter of trust law, 176 it appears
somewhat out of step with the fundamental concept that trusts are to
177
be interpreted so as to effectuate the desires of the settlor.

174.
One practice that has not apparently been tested is whether the trustee
could, immediately upon taking office, attempt to obtain a stand-alone pre-dispute
arbitration agreement involving all of the beneficiaries and covering some or all of the
types of internal trust disputes that could arise. This technique would appear to
comply with principles of trust law that allow arbitration of trust disputes that are
subject to an arbitration agreement that exists outside of the trust itself. While various
difficulties could arise, including whether and to what extent such an agreement could
reflect the consent of unborn, unascertained, or legally incompetent beneficiaries, there
may be ways to bind such persons to the agreement through use of special or virtual
representatives or legal guardians. See infra notes 399-432 and accompanying text. If
trustees could be held to this sort of duty, it might be one way to give effect to the
settlor's intent regarding the use of arbitration. See Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass'n
of S. Nev. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 941 P.2d 486, 491 (Nev. 1997) (construing a
clause to impose a nonmandatory duty of arbitration on trustees).
175.
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, 43.1 (describing the duty of a
trustee to obey the directions of the settlor unless deviation is sanctioned by an
appropriate authority).
176.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 565 (explaining that the UTC
grants broad powers to trustees); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supranote 9,
57.1-63.10
(describing the nature and limits of a trustee's power, discretion, and duties).
177.
See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 385 ("The UTC tries to effectuate
the settlor's intent to the maximum extent possible."); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra
note 9,
43.1-43.2 (describing the trustee's duty to follow the settlor's directions and
detailing the narrow circumstances in which a trustee may deviate from those terms);
Bosques-Herndndez, supra note 17, at 10 (quoting the Restatement (Third) of Property:
Wills and Other Donative Transfers to establish the primacy of the settlor's intent); see
also supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (elaborating on the concept of the
intent of the settlor being the most important guidepost in trust law). Notably, even if
courts did take the view that trustees could be bound by an explicit direction in the
trust requiring a trustee to attempt to arbitrate any disputes relating to the trust, that
would still provide no guarantee that arbitration would result in any particular case,
since the settlor's instructions would not bind anyone other than the trustee. Therefore,
the settlor's desire for arbitration could be thwarted if any party opposed arbitration.
This is precisely opposite to the result that would be obtained under mandatory
arbitration, where arbitration proceeds unless all parties agree otherwise. See In re
Ismailoff, No. 342207, 2007 WL 431024, at *1 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Feb. 1, 2007)
(noting that a mandatory arbitration clause in a trust was enforceable at the election of
any one of the parties).
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C. Settlors'Powersto Compel Mandatory Trust Arbitration
1.

Legislation in Favor of Mandatory Trust Arbitration

These sorts of limitations on settlor autonomy have led a number
of jurisdictions to enact legislation explicitly recognizing the
enforceability of a mandatory arbitration provision located in the
trust instrument itself For example, in 2008, Arizona passed a law
stating that "[a] trust instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive
and reasonable procedures to resolve issues between the trustee and
interested persons or among interested persons with regard to the
administration or distribution of the trust. 17 8 This enactment, which
was promulgated in response to the decision in Schoneberger v. Oelze
179
denying the enforceability of an arbitration clause found in a trust,
is to be construed broadly to include "any matter involving the trust's
administration, including a request for instructions and an action to
declare rights."'8 0
Florida has also made statutory provision for the arbitration of
many, though not all, types of trust disputes. That enactment, passed
in 2007, indicates that:
(1)
A provision in a will or trust requiring the arbitration of
disputes, other than disputes of the validity of all or a part of a will or
trust, between or among the beneficiaries and a fiduciary under the will
or trust, or any combination of such persons or entities, is enforceable.
(2)
Unless otherwise specified in the will or trust, a will or
trust provision requiring arbitration shall be presumed to require
binding arbitration under s. 44.104.181

Legislative reforms have also taken place outside the United
States.18 2 For example, Guernsey, one of the leading jurisdictions for

178.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2012).
179.
See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that the arbitration clauses contained in the documents establishing trusts did
not bind the beneficiaries of those trusts because the beneficiaries never agreed to the
arbitration clauses, since trusts, unlike contracts, are not based upon the exchange of
promises), superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2012), as
recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598, at *2 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Feb. 22, 2011) (holding that § 14-10205 superseded Schoneberger and requires all
parties interested in a trust to abide by any reasonable mandatory arbitration
provision in that trust).
180.
Jones, 2011 WL 601598, at *3 (emphasis omitted) (citing § 14-10201 of the
Arizona Revised Statutes to support a broad interpretation of the word
"administration" in § 14-10205); see also infra note 193 and accompanying text
(describing the contours of judicial involvement in trust administration).
181.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.401 (West 2010). See generally FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 44.104 (West 2012) (regarding arbitration).
182.
Several civil law nations have enacted legislation that appears to permit
arbitration of trust disputes. For example:
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offshore trusts, enacted a statute in 2007 discussing the resolution of
certain actions by alternative dispute resolution (ADR), including
arbitration.1 8 3 That law states that:
(1) Where

-

(a) the terms of a trust direct or authorise, or the Court so
orders, that any claim against a trustee founded on breach of
trust may be referred to alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"),
(b) such a claim arises and, in accordance with the terms of the
trust or the Court's order, is referred to ADR, and
(c) the ADR results in a settlement of the claim which is
recorded in a document signed by or on behalf of all parties,
the settlement is binding on all beneficiaries of the trust, whether or
not yet ascertained or in existence, and whether or not minors or
persons under legal disability.
(2) Subsection (1) applies in respect of a beneficiary only if

-

(a) he was represented in the ADR proceedings (whether
personally, or by his guardian, or as the member of a class, or
otherwise), or
(b) if not so represented, he had notice of the ADR proceedings
and a reasonable opportunity of being heard,
and only if, in the case of a beneficiary who is not yet ascertained or in
existence, or who is a minor or person under legal disability, the person
conducting the ADR proceedings certifies that he was independently
represented by a person appointed for the purpose by a court of law.
"Notice" in paragraph (b) means 14 days' notice or such other
period as the person conducting the ADR proceedings may direct.

Austrian arbitration law recognizes.., ways of granting arbitrators the
authority to decide a dispute by arbitration. Section 581(2) ZPO
[ZivilprozeBordung or Code of Civil Procedure] grants such an authority to
arbitral tribunals that are set up in a manner permitted by law, either by
testamentary disposition or by other legal transactions that are not based on
the agreement of the parties. Authority is also granted to tribunals provided for
by articles of incorporation.
SCHWARZ & KONRAD, supra note 110 (citations omitted). Germany takes a similar
approach, in that:
[Section] 1066 ZPO [ZivilprozeBordung or Code of Civil Procedure] requires
arbitral tribunals to be legitimized by a testamentary disposition or other noncontractual dispositions. Thus, [§] 1066 ZPO encompasses situations in which
an arbitration clause has a binding effect on an individual who is not a
signatory of an arbitration agreement and did not agree to a contractual
arbitration agreement.
Duve, supra note 110, at 1003.
183.
See The Trusts (Guernsey) Law, 2007, c. 2, § 63, available at
http://www.guernseylegalresources.gg/article/97619/Trusts-Guernsey-Law-2007
(detailing the arbitrability of trust disputes); see also Buckle & Olsen, supra note 8, at
652-55 (discussing Guernsey legislation regarding arbitration and mediation of trust
disputes).
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(3) A person who represents a beneficiary in the ADR proceedings
for the purposes of subsection (2)(a) is under a duty of care to the
beneficiary.
(4) For the avoidance of doubt, the ADR proceedings need not be
conducted in Guernsey or in accordance with the procedural law of
Guernsey.
(5) In this section early
neutral
"ADR"
includes
conciliation,
mediation,
evaluation, adjudication, expert determination and arbitration, and
"proceedings" includes oral and written proceedings. 1 8 4

Although the statute relates only to a limited range of claims
(i.e., claims brought against a trustee for breach of trust), it
specifically contemplates the possibility that the arbitration can be
mandated through a provision included in the trust instrument
itself.1 8 5 The statute, which has extraterritorial application, also
expressly indicates that beneficiaries of the trust may be bound by
the outcome of the arbitration.' 8 Similar reforms may soon follow in
other offshore jurisdictions as various nations seek to obtain a
18 7
competitive advantage in the battle for trust-related business.
Indeed, the Bahamas are currently in the process of enacting
legislation that is even broader than that currently in place in
88
Guernsey.
2.

Elements Required for Mandatory Trust Arbitration Under
Common Law Principles

As useful as these types of statutes are, they are still relatively
rare, at least in common law jurisdictions. Most legislation relating to
the arbitration of trust disputes is either ambiguous as to who has
the ability to initiate arbitration or gives that power only to the

184.
The Trusts (Guernsey) Law, 2007, c. 2, § 63.
185.
See id. (allowing use of arbitration provision in trusts).
186.
See id. (detailing conditions in which the results of ADR will bind trust
beneficiaries).
187.
See Neil Hartnell, Trustee Act's Reform 'Bold, Innovative,'TRIB. (Bah.), Oct.
25, 2011, at 1B, available at http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00084249/03124 (discussing pending
amendments to Bahamian trust law designed to make Bahamian trusts more
appealing); see also Nadia J. Taylor & David Brownbill, Arbitration of Trust Disputes:
The New Statutory Regime in the Bahamas, 18 TR. & TRUSTEEs 358, 358-62 (2012)
(discussing new statutory scheme in the Bahamas).
188.
See
Trustee
(Amendment)
Bill
2011,
§ 18,
available at
http://www.bacobahamas.com/PDF/Trustee%20(Amendment)%2Bill%202011%20-%
2015%20April%202011.pdf; see also Hartnell, supra note 187 (discussing pending
amendments to Bahamian trust law, including an amendment that would allow
arbitration of trust disputes); Taylor & Brownbill, supra note 187 (discussing statutory
scheme in the Bahamas).
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trustee.1 8 9 Courts are therefore left with little guidance on how to
address matters relating to mandatory trust arbitration.
Fortunately, commentators have been busy in this area of law,
providing numerous critiques of the various issues. Much of the
analysis comes from outside the United States and thus has yet to be
considered in the context of U.S. law.
The literature tends to follow a relatively standard framework
and considers whether:
(1) the court's jurisdiction is being ousted in an unacceptable
fashion;
(2) the clause purporting to be an arbitration clause is an
agreement that is both (a) operable, effective and capable of being
performed and (b) covers the dispute at issue;
(3) the clause is binding on the party seeking to avoid arbitration;
(4) all interested parties, including unascertained, unborn, and
legally incompetent beneficiaries, are properly represented in the
proceeding; and
190
(5) the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable.
These five factors overlap to a considerable extent, 191 so it is
impossible to conduct a rigorously segregated assessment of each
separate element. Nevertheless, it is useful to track the standard
form of analysis, so as to better understand the various challenges to
mandatory arbitration from a trust law perspective. Furthermore, by
following the preestablished structure, it is possible to consider new
ways that arbitration law might contribute to the debate about the
propriety of mandatory trust arbitration. Therefore, each of the five
factors will be introduced separately below.
a.

No Impermissible Ouster of the Court's Jurisdiction

Courts have traditionally exercised uniquely broad powers over
the administration of trusts, 192 making concerns about the possible
ouster of judicial jurisdiction particularly pressing. Indeed, many
nonspecialists may be surprised to learn about the extent of the
courts' control over trust-related issues. For example, it has been said
that:

189.
See supra notes 154-77 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that
govern arbitration of trust disputes).
190.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 209 (outlining factors for determining
whether an arbitration provision in a trust should be enforceable).
191.
See id. (listing the factors and noting that they are intertwined with each
other).
192.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 552-55 (discussing scope of
judicial authority over trust administration); Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at
662 (detailing the role of the judiciary in trust administration).
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Trust procedure law may be described as a three-tier structure. The
routine phase is periodic judicial accounting. The accounting informs
the beneficiaries, enabling them to enforce their rights. The accounting
also provides closure for trustees on current installments of these longduration undertakings. Because, however, judicial accountings can be
costly and clumsy, drafters sometimes prefer to alter the default regime
in favor of nonjudicial accountings.
The second procedural level, for situations of uncertainty or
dispute, is judicial instruction. The trust tradition has been precocious
in allowing the parties, typically the trustee, early resort to
authoritative judicial guidance.
Finally, if litigation arises, it is tried to the judge, sitting without a

jury.

193

Most, if not all, of the existing analysis regarding mandatory
arbitration of trust disputes has focused on the third type of dispute,
which is of course most analogous to arbitration. However, significant
and somewhat different questions arise with respect to the
arbitration of accounting and instruction procedures. The following
discussion therefore begins with an analysis of arbitration as a
litigation substitute, since some of the issues raised in that context
are equally applicable to matters raised with respect to the other two
types of trust procedures. The text then goes on to address special
concerns relating to judicial accounting and instruction.
i.

Arbitration as a Litigation Substitute

In order to determine whether arbitration impermissibly ousts
the jurisdiction of the court, it is necessary to understand the basis
for the courts' extensive powers over trust-related matters. Several
possible rationales exist. One stems from a concern that allowing the
dispute to be resolved through any other means could disadvantage
one or more of the parties, typically through the nonapplication of a
mandatory provision of law.' 94 However, an evaluation of the
principles motivating mandatory rules of trust law suggests that none
of these rules would be offended by arbitration. This is because:
Apart from the anti-dead-hand rules, the mandatory rules of trust law

have a prevailingly intent-serving purpose. They facilitate rather than
prohibit; their policy is cautionary and protective. These rules force the
settlor to be precise about the tradeoffs between benefiting the trustee
and benefiting the beneficiary; hence they aim to clarify and channel,

193.

Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 662 (citation omitted); see also

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 202 (amended 2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shareddocs/trustcode/utcfinal-rev2010.pdf (describing judicial jurisdiction over
trustees and beneficiaries); McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 552-55 (describing

courts' involvement in trust administration).
194.

See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 215-17 (discussing an instance in

which an arbitration provision that purported to remove statutorily granted
jurisdiction of the courts was held to be invalid); Krbll, supra note 151,
16-5, 16-8 to
-65 (discussing how mandatory statutory protections affect the arbitrability of disputes
in various jurisdictions).
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rather than to defeat the settlor's intent. Trust terms that would excuse
bad faith, or dispense with fiduciary obligation, or conceal the trust
from its beneficiaries would make the trust obligation illusory,
effectively allowing the trustee to loot the trust .... The intent-serving
mandatory rules merely require a settlor who has such an improbable
intent to articulate it unambiguously, in order to prevent the settlor
from stumbling into that result through misunderstanding or
imposition. Accordingly, apart from the anti-dead-hand rules, the
mandatory rules of trust law have only the modest aspiration of truth
195
in labeling.

Anti-dead-hand rules can be set aside as having little, if
anything, to do with arbitration, since they typically focus on (1)
issues relating to future interests, as reflected in the Rule Against
Perpetuities and similar provisions that give effect to the desire to
promote the alienability of land, and (2) the principle that the trust
must benefit the beneficiaries. 196 Rules requiring the settlor to
indicate clearly his or her intentions regarding the relationship
between the trustee and the beneficiaries are also not hindered by
arbitration, not only because arbitration does not affect the balance of
power between parties (instead providing only an alternative means
of dispute resolution), but also because arbitration clauses already
197
need to be clear to be enforceable as a matter of arbitration law.
Therefore, an arbitration provision that clearly reflects the settlor's
desires would not appear to oust the jurisdiction of the court in any
impermissible manner vis-a-vis the various mandatory rules of law.
Instead, arbitration would actually effectuate the intent of the settlor
in accordance with the central aim of trust law, which holds that
courts are meant to give effect to the intent of testators and settlors,
unless doing so would contravene positive law or public policy. 198
Another rationale relating to the broad jurisdictional powers of
the court focuses on the idea that access to the courts is necessary as
a means of helping protect the beneficiaries from overreaching from
the trustee. Thus, for example, it is usually "a non-excludable feature

John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L.
195.
REV. 1105, 1126-27 (2004). Some concerns exist about whether and to what extent
arbitration can be used to eliminate the trustee's fiduciary obligations. These issues are
considered at length in Strong, Procedures,supra note 33.
196.
See Langbein, supra note 195, at 1110 n.33 (discussing rationales for antidead-hand rules, including the desire to account for the desires of the beneficiaries of
the trust).
197.
Indeed, some commentators have noted that the requirement for clarity is
higher with respect to arbitration agreements than with respect to other types of
agreements. See BORN, supra note 5, at 585 (discussing rationales for the requirement
that arbitration agreements be in writing).
43.1(1) (describing the
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
198.
trustee's duty to fulfill the terms of the trust and the very limited circumstances in
which a trustee or a court may deviate from those terms); Janin, supra note 11, at 528
(discussing the tension that arises when a testator includes an arbitration provision in
a will).
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of a trust that the trustee's administration of the fund must be,
directly or indirectly, subject to the supervision of the court." 199
When considering the scope and corpus of the trustee's
accountability, trust law often speaks of the "irreducible core" duties
of a trustee. 200 Core duties typically cannot be delegated to another
person without express authorization in the trust instrument, 20 1
which means that courts and commentators must consider whether
mandatory arbitration of trust disputes 2 impermissibly infringes on
20
the trustee's rights and responsibilities.
Notably, commentators have concluded that:
[T]here is nothing in the concept of the irreducible core that necessarily
precludes compulsory arbitration. The principle is that the trustee must
be sufficiently accountable so that his status as the non-beneficial
owner of the assets vested in him is practically real. Seen solely from
the point of the irreducible core concept, effective accountability does
not mean that the trustees can be accountable only to the court rather
than to some other body which has power to enquire into the trustees'
administration of the fund and to require them to abide by the terms of
203
the trust instrument.

Furthermore, objections from the beneficiaries "would only have
weight if the beneficiaries were denied any effective means of

199.
Fox, supra note 37, at 22.
200.
The definition of the irreducible core duties of a trustee varies by
jurisdiction. See id. at 26 (noting that different jurisdictions apply different mandatory
rules to trusts).
51.1-51.42 (describing the
201.
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
limitations on a trustee's power to delegate responsibility and the duties of care that
accompany such delegations). This may be more of an English law concept, since U.S.
law typically adopts a relatively liberal stance toward the delegation of trustee duties.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 561 (discussing the contours of a trustee's
power to delegate and the changes in that power as the law has evolved).
202.
Interestingly, this concern may be related to the fact that historically,
trustees often acted as arbiters of certain types of disputes, such as those arising
between beneficiaries. See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 211-15 (discussing cases in
which executors or trustees attempted to act as arbitrators); Fox, supra note 37, at 24
(discussing nondelegable trustee duties). Therefore, some of the early hostility toward
arbitration of internal trust disputes may have been based on the fact that when
trustees acted as arbitrators, they were either (1) acting as judges in their own cause
and/or (2) limiting or eliminating the court's ability to review the propriety of the
trustee's decisions and actions, since arbitral awards are subject to only limited forms
of review. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (discussing the boundaries of
judicial review of arbitral awards). Most, if not all, of these concerns disappear in
contemporary forms of arbitration because a trustee would never be permitted to act as
an arbitrator in a dispute arising out of the trust in question. Instead, arbitrators must
be entirely independent of both the parties and the dispute. See INT'L BAR ASS'N [IBA],
GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION explanation
to general standard 2(d) (2004) (stating that the requirement that an arbitrator be
disinterested in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding is nonwaivable), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications-IBA-guides and-free-materials.aspx
#conflictsofinterest (follow "English" hyperlink); BORN, supra note 5, at 1465-92
(discussing concepts of arbitrator neutrality and independence).
203.
Fox, supranote 37, at 24.
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enforcing their interests against the trustees. If the ADR procedure
had effective machinery for enforcing the outcome of the
determination against the trustees, then it seems that this objection
'20 4
would not hold.
Issues relating to the impermissible ouster of the court could also
appear to stem from concerns about overreaching on the part of the
settlor.2 0 5 For example, it is said that settlors "cannot deprive the
beneficiary of his right to apply to the court about the proper
administration of the trust, or for directions about the construction of
the trustee's powers and how they should be exercised. '206 However,
concerns about overreaching by the settlor appear to be more properly
addressed as an arbitrability issue rather than a concern about the
20 7
ouster of the court's jurisdiction and are therefore discussed below.
When considering the concept of the irreducible core, courts not
only look at whether "there remains a sufficient inner core of duties
owed to the beneficiaries to enable a trust to subsist," they also
consider whether there is anything about the trust that
impermissibly ousts "the jurisdiction of the court to determine
matters of law. '208 There are several ways to consider this issue. One
focuses on whether the matter in question falls under a provision in
the trust or probate code that appears to grant exclusive jurisdiction
to the courts. This type of concern goes to the question of arbitrability
20 9
and is discussed below.
Another way to analyze this type of issue would be to look at the
governing arbitration law to determine whether and to what extent it
permits questions of law to be decided in arbitration.2 10 For example,
the English Arbitration Act 1996 states that parties can appeal an
arbitral award on a question of law.21 1 However, parties may

204.
Id. at 25; see also ACTEC, supranote 13, at 13-14 (discussing situations in
which courts have deemed arbitration of trust-related disputes to be contrary to public
policy, including situations involving trustees who have an interest in the outcome).
205.
See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)
(noting a settlor "may not unilaterally strip trust beneficiaries of their right to access
the courts absent their agreement"), superseded by statute, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410205 (2012), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598, at
*2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011).
206.
Fox, supra note 37, at 23 (footnote omitted).
See infra notes 433-90 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrability
207.
issues in trust arbitration); see also Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083-84 (holding that a
settlor cannot bind beneficiaries to arbitration without their agreement).
208.
UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, 48.1(3).
209.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 215-17 (discussing exclusive
jurisdiction of probate courts); see also infra notes 433-90 and accompanying text
(discussing arbitrability of trust disputes).
210.
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
11.1, 11.79 (suggesting some
trust-related disputes can be decided pursuant to an arbitration statute).
c.
23,
§ 69
(Eng.),
available at
211.
Arbitration
Act
1996,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents; see also BORN, supra note 5, at
2646-47 (explaining the limitations on the power of English courts to review arbitral
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expressly contract out of this particular provision, thus prohibiting
judicial appeal on questions of law. 212 Experts in English trust law
have suggested that this aspect of the Arbitration Act 1996 acts as a
permissible ouster of the jurisdiction of the court on matters of trust
law.

2 13

Other national and international laws clearly prohibit courts
from reviewing questions of law that have been decided by an arbitral
tribunal in any circumstances. 214 Thus, for example, parties to an
international dispute may not object to enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award under the New York Convention on the grounds that
the arbitrators misapplied or ignored the law. 215 A similar result
arises in countries that have based their national arbitration statutes
on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
216
(Model Arbitration Law).
Interestingly, the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is silent on
whether parties may appeal an arbitral award on a question of
law. 217 Although most courts and commentators take the view that
judicial appeals on points of law violate the principle of arbitral
finality,2 18 some U.S. judges have been known to vacate an arbitral
award if the arbitral tribunal was believed to have decided the issue

awards); BRUCE HARRIS ET AL., THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996: A COMMENTARY 332-42
(3d ed. 2003) (discussing § 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996).
212.
See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69 (allowing parties to opt out of their
statutory right to appeal an arbitral award).
213.
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
11.1, 11.79 (offering the
Arbitration Act 1996 as an example of a statute that permits institutions other than
the courts to decide questions of law in a trust dispute); see also Arbitration Act 1996, c.
23, § 69 (allowing parties to contract out of the arbitration appeals process).
214.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 2638-55, 2865-70 (discussing widespread
limitations on judicial review of arbitral awards under national and international law).
215.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. V (enumerating the
situations in which a court may decline to enforce an international arbitration award).
216.
See UNCITRAL
MODEL
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, 18th Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
(June 21, 1985), revised by Rep. of the U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, 39th Sess.,
June 17-July 7, 2006, Annex I, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess.,
Supp. No. 17 (2006) [hereinafter MODEL ARBITRATION LAW] (enumerating the
situations in which a court may refuse to enforce a domestic arbitral award); BORN,
supra note 5, at 2562-64, 2865-69 (discussing the narrowly construed, specifically
enumerated grounds for annulling an arbitral award under the Model Arbitration Law
and the New York Convention).
217.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006); see also BORN, supra note 5, at 2639-46
(noting FAA's silence regarding review on a question of law). Very few U.S. state
statutes address this issue, either. See LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION §§ 39:13, 39:16 (2011) (discussing U.S. state law regarding vacatur of an
arbitral award).
218.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 64-65 (noting that a key benefit of international
arbitration is the ability to obtain a final decision from the arbitral panel).
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in manifest disregard of the law. 21 9 This creates an interesting
situation for mandatory trust arbitration, since the doctrine of
manifest disregard could be seen as providing a judicial escape valve
that would overcome any concerns about arbitration impermissibly
ousting the court's jurisdiction over trust-related matters.
However, the analysis does not end there. In 2008, the U.S.
Supreme Court questioned the continued viability of the doctrine of
manifest disregard in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
only to suggest two years later in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp. that the doctrine may still survive. 2 20 This has
created some confusion in the arbitral community, although it has
resulted in few practical problems, since the doctrine of manifest
disregard has always been very narrowly drawn and has been
221
successful only on very rare occasions.
However, judicial foreclosure of manifest disregard of law as a
means of overturning arbitral awards does not create any special
problems for mandatory trust arbitration. Instead, the decision to
eliminate that ground of review simply demonstrates a policy choice
in favor of arbitral finality, similar to that taken in other jurisdictions
that hold that the parties to arbitration may agree to forego the right
to judicial appeal of the merits of a dispute. 222 Since there is no
reason to believe that U.S. courts would, could, or should take a view
of arbitral finality in trust disputes that is different than that taken
in any other kind of dispute, the elimination of the doctrine of
manifest disregard as a matter of U.S. arbitral law should not affect
the development of mandatory trust arbitration in any way.
Even though arbitration law typically forbids courts from
reviewing the substance of an arbitral award, courts may
nevertheless review an arbitral award for procedural improprieties
relating to the arbitral process. 223 Although these grounds are

219.
See Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 407 (2d Cir.
2009) (discussing the contours of the doctrine of "manifest disregard" in U.S.
arbitration law); BORN, supra note 5, at 2639-46 (explaining the doctrine of manifest
disregard and the uncertainty surrounding its continued validity).
220.
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3
(2010) (explicitly refusing to rule on whether the manifest disregard standard remains
valid); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) (indicating that
the grounds for vacatur enumerated in the FAA constitute the only means of vacating
an arbitral award under federal law).
221.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 2639-46 (discussing the case law concerning
manifest disregard and noting the standard is extremely high).
222.
While parties in England must specifically contract out of that right, the
principle remains the same. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents (providing that parties can seek
judicial review of arbitral awards on questions of law unless the arbitration agreement
indicates otherwise).
223.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 2638-55 (explaining the scope of judicial review
in arbitration).
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described as "limited," they cover many important procedural rights
and give courts the ultimate authority over the enforcement of an
224
arbitral award.
Interestingly, arbitration's longstanding emphasis on procedural
rather than substantive review should not create any problems for
mandatory trust arbitration because most, if not all, of the trust
community's concerns about the impermissible ouster of the courts
225
appear to be based on the need to ensure procedural fairness.
These reservations can be addressed in one of two ways: either the
procedure in question must ensure that the trustee is accountable to
some neutral external agent,22 6 or the settlor must demonstrate that
he or she took adequate care in setting up alternative dispute
resolution procedures in the trust instrument. 227 Critically, neither of
these processes is undermined by arbitration, given the availability of
judicial review of arbitral proceedings after the conclusion of the
arbitration. 228 For these reasons, commentators have concluded that
arbitration agreements do not oust the jurisdiction of the court in an
impermissible manner but instead "merely postpone the involvement
22 9
of the court until after an arbitration has been carried out.
ii.

Special Issues Regarding Judicial Accounting and Instruction

The preceding discussion focused on whether arbitration
constitutes an impermissible ouster of the courts at the final stage of
a dispute. However, judicial jurisdiction over trusts also encompasses
two other procedures: "periodic judicial accounting," which "informs
the beneficiaries, enabling them to enforce their rights" and "provides
closure for trustees on current installments of these long-duration
undertakings," as well as "judicial instruction," which gives "the
parties, typically the trustee, early resort to authoritative judicial
guidance" in "situations of uncertainty or dispute. '2 30 Neither of these

224.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (detailing when an arbitral award may be vacated);
Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, §§ 67-68 (describing the grounds for judicial review of
arbitral awards); New York Convention, supra note 143, art. V (detailing the
circumstances in which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award); BORN, supra
note 5, at 2649-55, 2865-70 (discussing the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards).
See Fox, supra note 37, at 25 (discussing the modern policy of allowing
225.
courts to review arbitration and trust administration decisions to ensure that the
arbitrators and trustees acted in good faith, regardless of the content of the documents
empowering the arbitrators and trustees).
226.
See id. at 24 (explaining that trustees must be accountable to an outside
party to ensure that trustees do not use trust assets for their own benefit).
227.
See Langbein, supra note 195, at 1126-27 (explaining that the main
purpose of trust law is to ensure that the settlor's wishes are clearly expressed so that
they may be properly carried out, almost regardless of what those wishes might be).
See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (discussing scope of judicial
228.
review of arbitral awards).
Lloyd & Pratt, supra note 113, at 18.
229.
230.
Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 662 (footnotes omitted).
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two matters has been specifically discussed in the legal literature on
mandatory trust arbitration, and the courts appear split on how to
address such matters. For example, one court invalidated an
arbitration provision found in a side agreement with an external
third-party advisor on the grounds that arbitration would
"unacceptably divest the court of continuing jurisdiction in this
matter,"2 3 1 while another court upheld arbitration in somewhat
similar circumstances but retained the power to hear questions of
232
interpretation of the contract under a split-jurisdiction clause.
The first procedure-judicial accounting-could give rise to
difficulties because it may contemplate a continuing supervisory role
for the adjudicator, and arbitration does not typically provide longterm oversight of ongoing relationships. 23 3 Instead, arbitration is
used to resolve discrete disputes. However, the same can be said of
courts: in most instances, courts do not provide continuing oversight
of private relationships, but instead adjudicate individual cases or
controversies. Trust law constitutes a limited exception to this
general rule, allowing courts in some jurisdictions to provide
oversight to trusts on a continuing basis. 23 4 In other jurisdictions,
beneficiaries may apply to the court for an order requiring the trustee
23 5
to provide an accounting.
At first, these procedures might appear problematic for
arbitration. However, possible solutions exist within the current
arbitral regime. For example, some fields-most prominently, the
construction industry-use dispute review boards (also known as
dispute resolution boards) to resolve issues that may arise between
parties to a long-term contract. 236 Members of the review board are
appointed at the beginning of the parties' contractual relationship
and continue in that capacity for the duration of the contract,

231.
Estate of Proceeding for the Appointment of a Guardian for Charlotte
Radcliffe, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2007, at 36 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. July 13, 2007).
232.
See Radian Ins., Inc. v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 638 F. Supp. 2d
443, 458 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (involving a commercial trust with a split-jurisdiction clause).
233.
Not all jurisdictions require continuing supervision from the courts,
although some do. See UNIF. STATUTORY TRUST ENTITY ACT § 201(b), cmt. (2009),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edufbll/archives/ulc/ubta/2009final.htm ("Contrary
to the trust statutes in some States, the Uniform Trust Code does not create a system
of routine or mandatory court supervision.").
234.
See id. § 201(b) (stating that "[a]trust is not subject to continuing judicial
supervision unless ordered by the court").
235.
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, 1 56.1, 87.2-87.6 (noting that
trustees may be ordered by the court to provide the amount and status of trust
property at the beneficiary's request). Duties of accounting exist with respect to
commercial as well as other types of trusts. See id. 1 56.65 (noting scope of duty to
account).
236.
See Rebecca Golbert, The Global Dimension of the Current Economic Crisis
and the Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 11 NEV. L.J. 502, 517-18 (2011)
(noting that dispute resolution boards are widespread in the construction field).
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allowing panelists to gain an ongoing familiarity with the parties and
the nature of their relationship, while also providing a quick and costefficient means of resolving small disputes before they escalate into
something more serious. Although some dispute review boards only
operate in an advisory capacity, other panels render binding
decisions 237
Trusts often reflect the same kind of relational characteristic
seen in long-term commercial contracts, 238 and a similar type of
standing dispute resolution mechanism could be used in the trust
context to deal with ongoing issues such as judicial accounting.
Because the members of the board would be either appointed by a
neutral body (such as an arbitral institution) or by both proponents of
the trust or accounting procedure (i.e., the trustee) and those whose
interests would be expected to be adverse to the trust or the
accounting procedure (i.e., the beneficiaries), such a process would
comply with contemporary requirements for procedural fairness and
2 39
would allow the trustee to be held accountable to the beneficiaries.
The second procedure-judicial instruction-runs into potential
difficulties because arbitration typically does not involve the granting
of advisory opinions. 240 However, several possible solutions again
arise under existing arbitration law. For example, some countries,
most notably England, allow courts to make determinations on
preliminary points of law without robbing the arbitral tribunal of its
jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute.2 41 Alternatively, courts
could view requests for judicial instruction as akin to requests for
declarative or injunctive relief. This latter option would be very
useful, since numerous countries allow arbitrators to render awards
242
providing for these kinds of remedies.
Some concerns could arise relating to the fact that parties could
seek instructions from the arbitral tribunal on numerous occasions.
However, there is no requirement that arbitration be used only once

237.
See Standard ICC Dispute Boards Clauses, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADRDisputeBoards/Standard-ICC-Dispute-Boards-Clauses/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2012) (offering clauses
for both binding and nonbinding decisions).
238.
See Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 631, 654 (stating that "[miost
trusts are well understood as relational contracts" that "contemplate[ ] long duration").
239.
See Michael A. Marra, The Construction Industry Guide to Dispute
Avoidance and Resolution, 567 PLIIREAL 525, 541-42 (2009) (noting neutrality of
dispute resolution board members and outlining selection process); see also supra notes
199-204 and accompanying text (discussing trustee accountability in arbitration).
240.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 247 (stating that arbitrators resolve actual, not
hypothetical, disputes).
241.
See Arbitration
Act 1996, c. 23,
§ 45
(Eng.),
available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents (noting scope of judicial power to
address a preliminary point of law).
242.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 2478-79 (noting that arbitrators have broad
remedial powers).
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by a particular set of parties. Instead, certain long-term contracts
may give rise to a number of different arbitral proceedings over the
course of the parties' relationship. Decisions may be rendered by the
same tribunal (under the auspices of a standing dispute review board
or through the reappointment of the same arbitrators that heard the
first matter) or by a series of different tribunals. 243 However, in
either case, arbitrators must take care to ensure that an award
constitutes final resolution of either the entire issue or of a particular
matter that can be severed from other outstanding issues, so that the
2 44
award will be considered immediately enforceable.
Another possibility is that requests for judicial instruction could
be framed as requests for interim or provisional relief. Again, most
jurisdictions allow arbitrators to render awards providing for this
type of remedy. 24 5 Framing requests for judicial instruction in this
light could lead to an interesting analytical quirk. Arbitration law has
traditionally considered courts and arbitral tribunals to exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over requests for interim or provisional
relief 2 4 6 Although requests are supposed to go to the arbitral tribunal
whenever possible, the arbitral community decided that courts should
retain the ability to hear these matters, so as to avoid hardship to the
parties in cases where the tribunal has not yet been appointed or the
request for relief exceeds the powers of the tribunal, as in cases where
an order has to be directed to a third party. 24 7 If requests for judicial
instruction are considered to be a type of provisional or interim relief,
judges would still be able to hear certain urgent matters if it were

243.
If the parties contemplate a series of related disputes over the lifetime of
the trust, it may be beneficial to consider whether and to what extent a later tribunal
can consider arguments or facts presented in the first arbitration, lest problems arise
with respect to confidentiality and the preclusive value of that earlier proceeding or
any combination thereof. See infra notes 249-56 and accompanying text (discussing
ability of an arbitrator to resolve discrete matters in ongoing arbitration).
244.
Partial final awards are permitted as a matter of arbitration law and are
subject to immediate enforcement. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 47(2)(b) (stating
the tribunal may make an award as to part of the claims submitted to it for decision);
BORN, supra note 5, at 2430-33 (distinguishing partial final awards from other types of
interim or interlocutory awards).
245.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 1946-61 (describing the modern trend
confirming the power of arbitrators to issue provisional relief); see also Arbitration Act
1996, c. 23, § 39 (noting the arbitral tribunal's power to order relief on a provisional
basis).
246.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 1972-73, 2050 ("[A] request for provisional
measures ... may properly be directed to a national court, as well as to an arbitral
tribunal.").
247.
See id. (noting that many institutional rules allow applications for
provisional relief from national courts prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal
and in "appropriate circumstances" or "exceptional cases").
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necessary to do so. 248 Since jurisdiction is concurrent, arbitration
cannot oust the jurisdiction of the court.
Taken together, these observations suggest that arbitration does
in any impermissible ouster of judicial jurisdiction with
result
not
respect to accounting or instruction procedures. This conclusion is
bolstered by Roehl u. Ritchie, a 2007 decision from the California
Court of Appeal that involved the arbitration of an accounting
procedure. 24 9 The arbitrator there had rendered a series of awards
pursuant to an arbitration provision contained in a family trust, with
the precise issue at bar being whether and to what extent the
arbitrator was able to amend or correct a prior award in a subsequent
2 50
award.
In answering that question, the court demonstrated no
conceptual difficulty with allowing an arbitrator to address a series of
ongoing accounting issues involving a trust.2 51 To the contrary, the
court noted that the utilization of "a multiple incremental or
of
successive award process as a means, in an appropriate case, 252
finally deciding all submitted issues" was entirely proper.
Furthermore, the court noted that:
"[T]he ongoing and changing nature of trust administration" may
require ongoing proceedings "for instructions, to settle accounts, to fix
compensation ...[and] to allow, compromise or settle claims." The
arbitrator did not abuse his discretion in fashioning a remedy to resolve
25 3
ongoing matters relating to Trust administration costs and fees.

This conclusion appears appropriate. If provisions regarding
judicial oversight of trust disputes are primarily intended to "make
the trustees realistically accountable for the administration of the
254
then
trust and the beneficiaries' interest practically enforceable,"
arbitration is as capable of fulfilling that function in controversies
The arbitral community has recently developed a variety of procedures by
248.
which parties can obtain expedited arbitral relief on matters that must be addressed
prior to the constitution of the full tribunal, thus offering additional alternatives to
parties seeking immediate provisional relief. See id. at 1971-72 (discussing the
procedures for obtaining urgent provisional relief adopted by the ICC, the Netherlands
Arbitration Institute, and the London Court of International Arbitration).
See Roehl v. Ritchie, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 190 (Ct. App. 2007) (noting scope
249.
of arbitrator's duties), declined to extend by Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011); see also Zisman v. Lesner, No.
6:08cv1448Or131DAB, 2008 WL 4459029, *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2008) (involving a
request for accounting); In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887-88 (Sur. Ct.
Nassau Cnty. 2006) (same).
See Roehl, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 190-98 (discussing series of arbitral awards).
250.
See id. (noting that arbitration awards may contemplate future
251.
proceedings).
Id. at 194 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
252.
Id. at 195; see also Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 48 (Eng.), available at
253.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents (noting tribunal's power to create
remedies).
Fox, supra note 37, at 26.
254.
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involving judicial accounting or instruction as it is in matters that
resemble litigation. The parties' access to justice is adequately
protected, 25 5 and courts retain the ultimate ability to review arbitral
awards for violations of the parties' procedural rights. 256 Therefore,
arbitration does not appear to unacceptably oust the court's
jurisdiction for any of the three types of judicial procedures that can
arise with respect to trusts.
b.

An Arbitration Clause That is Operable, Effective, and Capable
of Performance

The second issue to consider involves the arbitration provision
itself. For a mandatory arbitration clause found in a trust to be
enforceable, "the clause purporting to be an arbitration
clause... [must be] an agreement which is not inoperable, ineffective
or incapable of being performed. '25 7 Furthermore, there must
"actually [be] a dispute within the scope of the clause." 258
The second of these two requirements is easily disposed of.
Issues regarding the scope of an arbitration agreement have long
been decided by arbitrators pursuant to the doctrine of competencecompetence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz), which describes the ability of an
arbitral tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction. 259 As a result,
allowing arbitral tribunals to determine whether a particular dispute
falls within the scope of an arbitration provision found in a trust does
not seem problematic in any way.
The first of these two requirements-i.e., the need to establish
that the arbitration clause that appears in the trust is operable,
effective, and capable of being performed-gives rise to much more
significant concerns. Most courts and commentators consider these
issues solely from the perspective of national law. However, recent
developments in international arbitration suggest some new solutions
to some of the more intransigent problems in this area. The following
discussion considers the relevant concerns under both national and
international law, although it should be noted that some of the
innovations in the international realm affect domestic disputes as
well.

255.
See ACTEC, supra note 13, at 15 (discussing constitutional issues in
arbitration).
256.
See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (discussing scope of judicial
review of arbitral awards).
257.
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 209.
258.
Id.
259.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 852-83 (discussing doctrine of competencecompetence).
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Solutions Suggested Under National Law

260
Because arbitration is considered "a creature of contract,"
many jurisdictions require an arbitration agreement to reflect certain
contractual qualities. 261 Therefore, if the language invoking
arbitration is located within a larger document, as would be the case
with mandatory arbitration provisions in trusts, then that larger
document must typically meet the formal requirements for a
2 62
contract.
Trusts run into two difficulties in this regard. First, trusts are
typically only signed by the settlor, not by other parties.2 63 Second,
trusts do not involve the exchange of consideration, which is
problematic in jurisdictions that hold that "[a]rbitration rests on an
exchange of promises."2 64 Although the signature and consideration
requirements have proven fatal to mandatory arbitration of trusts on
occasion, 265 courts and commentators have identified a number of
ways to overcome both problems. However, the approach varies
according to the party's relationship to the trust.
Issues relating to trustees are the simplest to address. In these
situations, a settlor can explicitly create a contractual relationship
with the trustee, either using language in the trust itself or a side
agreement. 26 6 Although the problem of consideration remains, that

See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The
260.
Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 476 (1987) (discussing the
consensual nature of arbitration).
See BORN, supra note 5, at 640-42 (noting contractual elements of
261.
arbitration). This approach is not universal. Some states, such as Spain, have been said
to have "abandoned] the traditional strictly contractual or bilateral approach of the
arbitration." Bosques-Hern~ndez, supra note 17, at 10; see also Koch, supra note 33, at
196 (noting extent of adherence to contractual notion of arbitration).
See BORN, supra note 5, at 661-64 (discussing contractual elements of
262.
arbitration). Interestingly, the analysis could turn on whether the arbitration statute
in question requires an "arbitration contract" or an "arbitration agreement," which
ostensibly encompasses a broader range of relationships. See Rachal v. Reitz, 347
S.W.3d 305, 313-14 (Tex. App. 2011) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (describing the
differences between an "agreement" and a "contract"), rev. granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS
487 (Tex. June 8, 2012).
Oral trusts are permitted in some cases, but are increasingly rare. See
263.
12.1 (noting that an oral declaration is
UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
sufficient to create a trust in certain situations).
Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded
264.
by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2012), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No.
1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011).
See Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 612-13 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding a
265.
trust was not a contract and therefore could not give rise to an enforceable arbitration
agreement), rev. granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011); Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 309 (Tex.
App. 2011) (holding that proof of agreement to arbitrate was insufficient due to lack of
a signature and that consideration is a fundamental element of every valid contract);.
The trustee then can be required to sign the document in question. See
266.
Strong, Enforceability, supra note 33 (manuscript at 19) (describing how to draft an
enforceable arbitration provision in a trust). One U.S. case involves the situation where
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concern can be addressed in one of three ways, by either (1) paying
the trustee for his or her efforts (indeed, it is rare for a trustee to act
gratuitously these days); 267 (2) deeming the trustee to have consented
to the terms of the trust when he or she accepted the trust
appointment; 2 68 or (3) concluding that there is no need for mutual
consideration in cases involving an agreement to arbitrate in the
26 9
context of a trust.
Issues relating to beneficiaries are more difficult to resolve, since
beneficiaries neither sign the trust instrument nor accept any
burdens thereunder. However settlors could attempt to draft a trust
deed
in such a way that benefiting from the trust would be deemed an
agreement to submit trust disputes to arbitration. By accepting the
gifts or invoking any rights under the trust deed, the beneficiaries
would be deemed to agree to settle any dispute in accordance with the
270
arbitration agreement contained in the trust deed.

the trustee-who was also a beneficiary-signed a deed of trust that included an
arbitration provision. See Lo v. Aetna Int'l Inc., No. 3:99CV195, 2000 WL 565465, *1-2
(D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2000) (holding Lo could not be bound to the arbitration agreement
in her capacity as as a beneficiary). However, the case was governed by Hong Kong
law, and no Hong Kong authority was submitted suggesting "that by signing in her
capacity as Trustee, [Lo] legally bound her and all other beneficiaries to arbitration. In
the absence of any legal authority, the Court decline[d] to conclude that Ms. Lo's
signature as Trustee reflected her agreement to arbitrate this dispute" as beneficiary.
Id. at *4.
267.
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, 54.1 (describing instances in
which a trustee may charge for his or her time); Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1,
at 639 (discussing the historical need for legislation to ensure trustee compensation).
268.
See ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES, 19 ICC INTL CT. OF
ARB. BULL. 9 (2008), available at http://www.iccdrl.com (search "ICC Arbitration
Clause for Trust Disputes" and follow "Commission Report" hyperlink) (declaring that
trustees shall be deemed to have agreed to provisions of an arbitration clause by
accepting to act under the trust); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
11.83;
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 218 (noting that accepting the office of trustee leads to
certain corresponding rights and burdens); Wtistemann, supra note 1, at 44 (noting
that if an arbitration agreement in a trust states that, by accepting office, the trustees
and protectors are deemed to have agreed to an arbitration agreement, the agreement
will likely cover any future trustees or protectors).
269.
See New S. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 643 (S.D. Miss.
2006) (noting that "[m]utuality of obligations is not required for a contract to be
enforceable under Mississippi law. Accordingly, this court is not persuaded that the
agreement to arbitrate contained in the Deed of Trust is deficient"); Horton, supra note
2, at 1050 (suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court has described the FAA "as
facilitating goals that do not require an arbitration clause to be moored within a
'contract' or to be a 'contract' itself').
270.
Wtistemann, supra note 1, at 45. This approach has been embraced by the
ICC. See ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES, 19 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB.

BULL. 9 (2008), available at http://www.iccdrl.com (search "ICC Arbitration Clause for
Trust Disputes" and follow "Commission Report" hyperlink) ("As a condition
for.., receiving any benefit.., under the trust, any person ...shall be deemed to
have agreed to settle all disputes arising out of or in connection with the trust in
accordance with this arbitration clause.").
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This technique is known in England as "deemed acquiescence,"
whereby beneficiaries who receive some sort of benefit under the
trust are considered bound by the terms of the instrument, including
any mandatory arbitration clause contained therein. 271 Under this
doctrine, "any beneficiary (even an unborn or unascertained one) who
derives his entire interest in the trust from the settlor, and whose
rights and obligations under the trust are hence determined by
the
2 72
trust deed, is deemed to acquiesce to the arbitration provision."
The United States has adopted a similar approach under a
theory known as "conditional transfer. '2 73 Under this doctrine,
provisions found in the trust are binding on beneficiaries to the
extent that the beneficiary's "rights" in the corpus of the trust are
seen as "wholly derivative" of the settlor's "right to pass her property
to the persons of her choosing. ' 274 The settlor is considered capable of
conditioning receipt of any benefits on compliance with arbitration
provisions contained in the trust because the beneficiary's "rights" in
275
the trust are contingent on the wishes of the settlor.
These theories are not limited to the United States and England.
Courts in civil law countries such as Switzerland have used similar

271.
Buckle & Olsen, supra note 8, at 655-56; see also David Hayton, Future
Trends in InternationalTrust Planning,13 JORDANS J. INT'L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 55, 72
(2006) (explaining how deemed acquiescence allows unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries to enter an agreement). This approach relies in part on language found in
the Arbitration Act 1996 stating that an arbitration agreement binds any person
claiming "through or under" a party to the agreement. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23,
§ 58(1), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents; see also id.
§ 82(2) (defining a party to an arbitration agreement as including "any person claiming
under or through a party to the agreement"); Lawrence Cohen & Joanna Poole, Trust
Arbitration-Is It Desirable and Does It Work? 18 TR. & TRUSTEES 324, 328 (2012)
(arguing that § 82(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 includes a beneficiary of a trust). Thus
it has been said that:
A trust beneficiary may only claim under or through the settlor, who is himself
party to and bound by the arbitration clause. As the beneficiary can have no
better title to the trust property than the settlor, he must be equally bound by
the arbitration clause and taken to have acquiesced to the arbitration
agreement.
Hwang, supra note 1, at 84.
272.
Buckle & Olsen, supra note 8, at 655-56.
273.
Am. Cancer Soc'y, St. Louis Div. v. Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d 858, 864 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981) (noting "a beneficiary takes only by benevolence of the testator, who
may attach lawful conditions to the receipt of the gift"); Tennant v. Satterfield, 216
S.E.2d 229, 232 (W. Va. 1975) (stating the general rule that a beneficiary who accepts
benefits under a will is bound to adopt the whole content of the will).
274.
Spitko, supra note 17, at 300.
275.
See id. (discussing derivative or contingent rights).

1212

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45:l157

techniques to bind beneficiaries to arbitration provisions found in the
2 76
trust instrument.
As useful as deemed acquiescence and conditional transfer are,
they do not eliminate all concerns relating to the operability and
effectiveness of an arbitration provision found in a trust. Because
these doctrines are derived from the settlor's consent to arbitration,
difficulties can arise in situations where the settlor's consent to the
trust, and therefore to arbitration, is in doubt (i.e., in cases that
challenge or deny the existence of the trust altogether).2 77 This issue
278
is discussed below.
Interestingly, deemed acquiescence and conditional transfer
resemble certain theories used in arbitration law to consider whether
the benefit or burden of an arbitration agreement can or should be
extended to various nonsignatories. Arbitration law allows courts and
arbitrators to extend an arbitration agreement to nonsignatories in
cases involving "agency (actual and apparent), alter ego, implied
consent, 'group of companies,' estoppel, third-party beneficiary,
guarantor, subrogation, legal succession and ratification or
assumption. 2 7 9 Deemed acquiescence and conditional transfer could
easily be analogized to implied consent, estoppel, or third-party
beneficiaries in the arbitral context. Legal succession and ratification
might also apply in cases involving a successor trustee or protector.
While this analysis suggests a useful overlap between trust law and
arbitration law, caution should nevertheless be exercised, since U.S.
courts appear somewhat split as to the application of arbitral
principles regarding nonsignatories in the context of a trust
0
dispute.28
ii.

Solutions Suggested Under International Law

Although the techniques suggested above may be sufficient to
eliminate concerns about the effectiveness and validity of an
arbitration provision arising in a trust, certain international

276.
See Wustemann, supra note 1, at 45-46 (noting that under Swiss law, a
beneficiary may be required to accept benefits subject to certain conditions, such as an
arbitration provision).
277.
See Horton, supra note 2, at 1073-74 (noting that the scope of an
arbitration provision is limited to parties who have agreed (or can be deemed to have
agreed) to be bound by its terms).
278.
See infra notes 329-78 and accompanying text.
279.
BORN, supra note 5, at 1137; see also Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]e have recognized five theories for binding
nonsignatories to arbitration agreements: 1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption;
3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel.").
280.
Compare Zisman v. Lesner, No. 6:08.cv-1448-Orl-31DAB, 2008 WL
4459029, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2008) (discussing exceptions allowing
nonsignatories to compel arbitration), with Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 613
(Ct. App. 2011) (holding an arbitration provision in a trust was unenforceable because

beneficiaries did not consent to its terms), rev. granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011).
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developments relating to form requirements in arbitration shed
additional light on these issues. Form requirements in arbitration
exist as a matter of both national and international law, and serve
two different purposes. "First, some form requirements are relevant
to the validity of an arbitration agreement: if these requirements are
not satisfied, then the agreement to arbitrate is invalid. Second, other

'form requirements' are in reality jurisdictional conditions that must
be satisfied in order for a particular legislative instrument ... to

apply .... 28 1 Both of these types of requirements must be considered
in cases involving mandatory trust arbitration.
The analysis begins at the international level. According to the
New York Convention:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
282
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.

That provision goes on to indicate that "[tlhe term 'agreement in
writing' shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of
letters or telegrams. 28 3
If a trust is a contract, then the requirements of the New York
Convention are obviously met by an arbitration provision found in the
trust.284 However, the New York Convention does not define what "a
contract" is, which means the issue will be determined by reference to
domestic law. This is of course problematic, given the uncertainty
regarding the contractual nature of trusts.28 5 Debate also exists as to
whether the New York Convention requires a contract containing an
286
arbitration provision to be signed by the parties in question.

281.
BORN, supra note 5, at 581.
282.
New York Convention, supranote 143, art. II(1).
283. Id. art. 11(2).
284.
See id. (defining the term agreement in writing to include an arbitral clause
and an arbitration agreement).
285.
See supra notes 92-110, 260-69 and accompanying text.
286.
See U.N. Comm. on Int'l Trade Law, Settlement of Commercial Disputes:
Preparationof Uniform Provisionson Written Form for ArbitrationAgreements,
1114, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/WG.II/WP.139 (Dec. 14, 2005) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Note]
(noting differing levels of adherence to the New York Convention's form requirements);
S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an 'Agreement in Writing" in InternationalCommercial
Arbitration? Conflicts Between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration
Act, 48 STAN. J. INTL L. 47, 72-74 (2012) (discussing signature requirement under
domestic and international law). One U.S. court has decided that a trust does not fall
under the New York Convention because of problems relating to the absence of
signatures. See Lo v. Aetna Int'l Inc., No. 3:99CV195 JBA, 2000 WL 565465, at *4 (D.
Conn. Mar. 29, 2000) (holding a party who had signed a trust including an arbitration
agreement in her capacity as a trustee could not be held to have agreed to arbitrate in
her capacity as beneficiary).
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Although the New York Convention's definition of "an agreement
in writing" appears clear on its face, certain problems have arisen in
practice. 28 7 For example:
It has been repeatedly pointed out by practitioners that there are a
number of situations where the parties have agreed to arbitrate (and
there is evidence in writing about the agreement), but where,
nevertheless, the validity of the agreement is called into question
because of the overly restrictive form requirement. The conclusion
frequently drawn from those situations is that the definition of writing,
as contained in... [various] international legislative texts, is not in
conformity with international contract practices and is detrimental to
the legal certainty and predictability of commitments entered into in
288
international trade.

Concerns about "overly restrictive form requirement[s]" would
also seem relevant in the context of trust arbitration, since strict
application of contractual requirements currently bars arbitration of
disputes in situations where the settlor's intent to require arbitration
is clear. 289 The question therefore is whether the international
arbitral community's proposed solution to the problem of "overly
restrictive form requirements" could be usefully applied directly to
international trust disputes and, by analogy, to domestic disputes.
As it turns out, efforts undertaken by the international
community may in fact be helpful to mandatory trust arbitration. The
issue has been addressed as follows. In 2006, UNCITRAL published a
recommendation directed at the various state parties to the New York
Convention
(UNCITRAL
Recommendation), 290
stating
that
UNCITRAL "[r]ecommends that article II, paragraph 2, of the [New
York Convention] be applied recognizing that the circumstances
described therein are not exhaustive. 2 91 This means that the term
"agreement in writing" can be considered to include more than just an
"arbitral clause in a contract" or a standalone "arbitration agreement,

287.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. II.
288.
U.N. Secretary-General, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Possible
Uniform Rules on Certain Issues Concerning Settlement of Commercial Disputes:
Conciliation,Interim Measures of Protection, Written Form for Arbitration Agreement,
7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9VWG.II/WP.108/Add.1 (Jan. 26, 2000) [hereinafter UN SG
Report]; see also UNCITRAL Note, supra note 286, 17 (highlighting diverse national
approaches to form requirement).
289.
UN SG Report, supra note 288, at 7; see also Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 610, 614-15 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding a trust was not a contract and therefore
the arbitration provision contained in the trust was unenforceable), rev. granted, 257
P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011); Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. App. 2011)
(describing the distinctions between a trust and a contract under Texas law), rev.
granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 487 (Tex. June 8, 2012).
290.
See UNCITRAL, Rep. on its 39th Sess., June 19-July 7, 2006, Annex II,
U.N. Doc. A/6/17 [hereinafter UNCITRAL Recommendation].
291.
Id.
1; see also New York Convention, supra note 143, art. 11(2) (defining
an "agreement in writing").

2012]

ARBITRA TION OF TRUST DISPUTES

signed by the parties. '292 Instead, the UNCITRAL Recommendation
29 3
encourages widespread relaxation of existing form requirements.
Because the UNCITRAL Recommendation is suggestive rather
2 94
than mandatory, it need not be applied by national courts.
However, the Recommendation should nevertheless be given serious
consideration by judges in the United States and elsewhere, since
established principles of international law indicate that courts
construing an international treaty should take into account "'the
postratification understanding' of signatory states," which would
29 5
include documents such as the UNCITRAL Recommendation.
The UNCITRAL Recommendation applies to all arbitration
agreements and awards falling under the New York Convention and
is therefore relevant to most, if not all, international trusts. 296 There
are two times when courts will have the opportunity to consider the
UNCITRAL Recommendation in the context of a trust dispute: (1) at
the initial stage of the dispute, when a party seeks to enforce an
arbitration agreement, and (2) at the end stage, when a party seeks to
enforce an award under the Convention. 297 That means that courts
facing either a motion to compel arbitration or a motion to enforce an
arbitral award under the New York Convention can rely on the
UNCITRAL Recommendation to adopt a flexible, pro-arbitration
approach to the definition of an "agreement in writing. '298
Having said that, the UNCITRAL Recommendation does not
provide any detailed information about what can be considered an
"agreement in writing" under this more expansive reading of the New

292.
New York Convention, supranote 143, art. 11(2) (defining an "an agreement
in writing").
293.
See infra notes 305-20 and accompanying text.
294.
However, early reports suggest that the UNICTRAL Recommendation has
been well-received in a number of countries. See Strong, supra note 286, at 78-79 ("The
UNCITRAL Recommendation has been well-received by a variety of countries, either
resulting in affirmative reforms or the reinforcement of existing approaches to article
11(2).").
295.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(a), adopted and
opened for signatureMay 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (discussing the relevance of "any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions"); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008);
UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 290 (recommending proper means of
interpreting the New York Convention's writing requirement).
296.
Of course, the arbitration would have to take place in a New York
Convention contracting state for the Convention to apply, but with 147 state parties,
that is very likely. See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. 1(1), II(1)
(designating the scope of application of arbitration agreements under the Convention);
New York Convention Status, supra note 143 (listing states that have ratified or
acceded to the New York Convention).
297.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. I(1), 11(1) (noting points at
which the "agreement in writing' definition applies).
298.
Id. art. II(I); see also UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 290 ("[I]n
interpreting the Convention, regard is to be had to the need to promote recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards ....).
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York Convention. 2 99 Nevertheless, some guidance may be sought from
a report put together by a UNCITRAL working group in 2005, just
prior to the formal approval of the Recommendation.3 0 0 That report
indicated that a number of countries allowed parties to rely on part
performance (estoppel) and incorporation by reference to offset the
30 1
strict application of the writing requirement, among other things.
This suggests that the concepts of deemed acquiescence and
conditional transfer (which incorporate principles of estoppel) could
fall within the expansive approach to form requirements advocated by
the UNCITRAL Recommendation, thus allowing international trust
arbitration to benefit from the pro-enforcement bias of the New York
Convention. 30 2 Indeed, this appears somewhat consistent with
existing U.S. precedent, since one U.S. court has already used
principles of equitable estoppel to overcome the technical absence of a
"writing" in a trust-related dispute.3 0 3 Incorporation by reference has
based on
also been used to allow arbitration of internal trust30 matters
4
an arbitration provision found in a side agreement.
Parties and courts seeking additional guidance on how to
interpret the UNCITRAL Recommendation can also look to the 2006
version of the Model Arbitration Law for assistance. 30 5 UNCITRAL
was working on the revisions to the model law at the same time it
was drafting the UNCITRAL Recommendation and clearly intended
the two documents to be read together. 30 6 Indeed, it appears that the
UNCITRAL Recommendation was meant to liberalize form
requirements in the international realm, while revisions to Article 7
of the Model Arbitration Law were meant to have a similar effect at
30 7
the national level.

299.
New York Convention, supra note 143, art. II(2); UNCITRAL
Recommendation, supra note 290.
300.
See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 286.
301.
See id.
16-21.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. II (describing form
302.

requirements under the New York Convention); UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra
note 290 (recommending that the form requirements of the New York Convention be
considered "not exhaustive").
303.
See Zisman v. Lesner, No. 6:08-cv-1448-Orl-31DAB, 2008 WL 4459029, at
*3-4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2008) (discussing nonsignatories' use of equitable estoppel as
a means of compelling arbitration under a trust).
304.
Decker v. Bookstaver, No. 4:09-CV-1361, 2010 WL 2132284, at *3-4 (E.D.
Mo. May 26, 2010) (compelling arbitration of a trust dispute based on an arbitration
provision found in a side agreement).
305.
See generally MODEL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 216.
See G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc.
306.
A/61/453 (Dec. 18, 2006) (noting that the similarities between the revised Model
Arbitration Law and the UNCITRAL Recommendation help promote uniformity in
international commercial arbitration).
8-9, 35-37 (discussing the
307.
See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 286,
objectives of the New York Convention and Article 7 of the Model Arbitration Law).

2012J

ARKBI TRA TION OF TRUST DISPUTES

1217

Article 7 of the revised Model Arbitration Law contains the
definition of an arbitration agreement and therefore addresses the
same issues as Article I of the New York Convention. 30 8 Notably,
UNCITRAL proposed two different alternatives with respect to the
revised version of Article 7, and both include certain innovations that
30 9
could affect mandatory trust arbitration.
For example, both Option I and Option II of the revised version
of Article 7 of the Model Arbitration Law eliminate the need for the
parties to have signed the arbitration agreement in question.3 10 This
obviously removes one of the primary problems facing mandatory
trust arbitration, particularly with respect to disputes involving
31 1
beneficiaries.
However, Option II goes even further in its relaxation of form
requirements, stating that an "'[alrbitration agreement' is an
agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain
disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in
3 12
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
Because Option II does not mention the need for the arbitration
provision to appear in a contract, jurisdictions adopting this provision
would likely have few, if any, problems enforcing a mandatory
arbitration provision found in a trust.
The most direct benefits of the relaxed form requirements in the
revised Model Arbitration Law will be felt by parties to an arbitration
proceeding in a jurisdiction that has adopted the 2006 version of the
Model Arbitration Law.3 13 Although neither the United States nor
England have adopted the Model Arbitration Law, seven U.S. states

308.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. 11(2) (defining an
"agreement in writing"); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 186, 8 (discussing efforts made
by the Working Group to reconcile the provisions of the Model Arbitration Law and the
New York Convention); MODEL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 216, art. 7 (defining
"arbitration agreement").
309.
See MODEL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 216, art. 7 (defining "arbitration
agreement").
11-12 ("By requiring either a
310.
See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 286,
signature or an exchange of documents, the form requirement ensures that the parties'
assent to arbitration is expressly recorded."); MODEL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note
216, art. 7 (defining "arbitration agreement"); Meijer & Guzman, supra note 39, at
143-45 (describing the effect of the two versions of the Model Arbitration Law on the
writing requirement).
See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
311.
MODEL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 216, art. 7, option II.
312.
313.
The Model Arbitration Law has been adopted, in whole or in part, by sixtysix countries, not including a number of territories and dependencies. See Status:
1985-UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, with
Amendments as Adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitralen
uncitral texts/arbitration1985Modelarbitrationstatus.html. (last visited Oct. 17,
2012). Seventeen of the sixty-six countries have adopted the 2006 version of the Model
Arbitration Law. See id.
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have. 3 14 However, the impact of the Model Arbitration Law extends
315
beyond arbitrations seated in a Model Arbitration Law jurisdiction.
Under Article VII(1) of the New York Convention, parties to an
international arbitration may take advantage of any national law
that provides an easier route to enforcement than that set forth in the
Convention. 3 16 Notably, this includes provisions regarding form
requirements. 317 Therefore, parties seeking to enforce an arbitral
award in a jurisdiction that has adopted the 2006 version of the
Model Arbitration Law will also be able to rely on these relaxed form
requirements.

318

The innovations reflected in the UNCITRAL Recommendation
and the Model Arbitration Law bode well for the future of both
commercial and trust arbitration. 319 However, settlors should
nevertheless exercise caution and make sure that any arbitration
provisions located in a trust comply with currently existing rules
regarding form requirements and operability of the arbitration
agreement. This can be particularly challenging in international
disputes, since drafters need to "ensure that formal and substantial
validity requirements for a valid 'arbitration agreement' are met32for
0
both the lex arbitriand law governing the arbitration agreement.

314.
See id. (referring to the 1985 version of the Model Arbitration Law). One
U.S. state, Florida, has adopted the 2006 version of the Model Arbitration Law. See id.
315.
See MODEL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 216, art. 35 (discussing the scope
of the "recognition and enforcement" of the Model Arbitration Law).
316.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. VII(1) ("The provisions of
the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral
agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into
by the Contracting States .... ). In fact, the second paragraph of the UNCITRAL
Recommendation reinforces the importance of this provision, stating that UNCITRAL
[r]ecommends also that article VII, paragraph 1, of the [New York Convention]
should be applied to allow any interested party to avail itself of rights it may
have, under the law or treaties of the country where an arbitration agreement
is sought to be relied upon, to seek recognition of the validity of such an
arbitration agreement.
UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 290.
24-36 (discussing national laws
317.
See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 286,
regarding form requirements).
318.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. VII(1) (allowing parties to
rely on national law to enforce an arbitration agreement or award); MODEL
ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 216, art. 7 (defining arbitration agreements).

319.
See SCHWARZ & KONRAD, supra note 110 (describing form requirements
under Austrian law); Duve, supra note 110, at 1002 (describing form requirements
under German law). See generally UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 290;
MODEL ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 216.
320.
Hwang, supra note 1, at 84; see also Meijer & Guzman, supra note 14, at
125 (discussing choice of law concerns relating to validity of arbitration agreements). It
is also wise to consider the law of the state where enforcement of the award will likely
take place. See Martin Platte, An Arbitrator'sDuty to Render EnforceableAwards, 20 J.
INT'L ARB. 307, 313 (2003) ("If and when the parties draw the tribunal's attention to a
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An Arbitral Clause That is Binding on the Party Seeking to
Avoid Arbitration

The third issue to discuss is whether an arbitration clause found
in a trust can be considered binding on the party seeking to avoid
arbitration. 3 2 ' Rather than focusing on the form of the arbitration
provision, this concern focuses on whether there is adequate consent
to support arbitration. This question can be considered from two
perspectives: that of the settlor and that of parties other than the
settlor. Each is addressed in turn.
i.

Settlor Consent

In some ways, it may seem strange to ask whether a settlor has
consented to arbitration, since the settlor is the one who created the
trust with the mandatory arbitration provision in the first place.
However, settlor consent is essentially what is at issue when a party
challenges a trust on grounds such as undue influence, lack of
capacity, fraud, duress, forgery, or mistake, since the claim is that
neither the underlying document (i.e., the trust) nor the arbitration
agreement found in the trust ever came into effect. 32 2 Challenges to
trusts based on incapacity and similar concerns are made relatively
frequently, so this is a concern that will arise with some regularity.
The first thing to note is that those who seek to impeach an
arbitration provision in a trust based on a challenge to the trust itself
may only do so if the challenge denies the existence of the trust in its
entirety. 323 If a party bases its claim on any portion of the trust, then
the arbitration clause will remain in effect, since it is impossible to
make a claim under the trust while simultaneously denying its
324
validity.
Some commentators distinguish clearly between the arbitration
of challenges to the trust and the arbitration of disputes arising
under the trust, stating that:
[A]n arbitrator whose authority to adjudicate a ...[trust] dispute
derives from a clause in the . . [trust] itself should have no authority to

specific jurisdiction as a likely place of enforcement, the tribunal should consider the
law of this place as well.").
321.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 209 (listing requirements for courts to
consider in deciding if an arbitration provision in a trust is enforceable).
See Horton, supra note 2, at 1040, 1060 (discussing questions relating to
322.
settlor competence); Katzen, supra note 14, at 123 ("[When the consent of the donor is
uncertain, as is typically the case in will contests, the validity of the will or trust
document becomes an issue.").
323.
See Horton, supra note 2, at 1063-64 (comparing a trust with an
arbitration clause with a gift that can either be given up entirely or accepted with
"strings attached").
324.
See id. at 1074-75 (stating that a person should not be able to bring a claim
under a trust while simultaneously attempting to invalidate its arbitration clause).
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decide a claim that the ... [trust] is invalid on grounds of improper
execution, lack of mental capacity, undue influence or testamentary
fraud. Such a view would give the arbitrator the sole authority to
interpret the ... [trust's] provisions but not to hear challenges to
325
the ... [trust's] validity.

This approach is consistent with the analytical approach used
outside the context of mandatory arbitration, in that courts faced
with claims of undue influence, lack of capacity, fraud, duress, and
mistake in other areas of trust law are just as likely to invalidate the
entire trust as they are to sever the offending provision.3 26 Indeed,
one court considering arbitration of a trust dispute appears to have
adopted precisely this type of all-or-nothing approach after it was
"faced with an arbitration agreement in which no single provision
[could] be stricken to remove the unconscionable taint." 327 Because
the impropriety was said to permeate the entire arbitration
agreement, the court struck the arbitration provision in its
3 28
entirety.
This approach would, of course, be highly problematic if it were
applied to mandatory trust arbitration, since claims regarding lack of
capacity, fraud, duress, or mistake could routinely invalidate
arbitration provisions found in trusts. However, this is another area
where arbitration law might provide a useful framework for analysis.
Courts and commentators considering arbitration in other areas
of law recognized early on that the effectiveness of the arbitral regime
would be put in jeopardy if parties could avoid arbitration simply by
alleging that lack of capacity, fraud, duress, forgery, or mistake not
only invalidated the substantive agreement but also impeached any

325.
Spitko, supra note 17, at 303; see also Katzen, supra note 14, at 123-24
("Courts dealing with this issue in the context of contracts have presumed the validity
and enforceability of an arbitration clause, despite challenges to the contract in its
entirety, unless the arbitration clause is specifically contested.").
326.
See Katzen, supra note 14, at 123-24 (claiming that "courts often void
entire testamentary instruments, or, at a minimum, the dispositive sections" when it is
too difficult to separate clauses that were created through improper means from those
that were not).
327.
Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 385 (Ct.
App. 2001).
328.
See id. ("We do not believe justice would be served by an effort to save the
arbitration agreement by removing post hoc offending provisions .. "). Notably, the
precedential value of this decision is somewhat dubious, since the dispute involved a
loan secured by a deed of trust on real property, an arrangement which some
jurisdictions consider to be akin to a mortgage. See AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL., THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES: A TREATISE COVERING THE LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND
ALLIED SUBJECTS AFFECTING TRUST CREATION AND ADMINISTRATION: WITH FORMS § 29
(3d ed. 2007). However, it has been said that "[m]ost of the rules that apply to ordinary
trusts also apply to deeds of trust." Id.
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arbitration agreement located within the underlying contract.3 2 9 The
arbitral community therefore developed the principle of separability,
which, in general terms, states that challenges to the validity or
existence of the contract in which an arbitration agreement is found
do not affect the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement
itself.330 This proposition holds true even in cases where the claims
question the quality or existence of the consent of the signatories, as
is the case in challenges based on lack of capacity, fraud, duress,
33 1
forgery, and mistake.
While the basic principle of separability can be stated succinctly,
the doctrine's precise parameters vary somewhat according to
national law. Some countries take the view that the only time a claim
will be heard by a court is if the party challenges the validity of the
arbitration agreement itself (as opposed to the document in which the
agreement is found) or if the party has specifically given the issue of
validity to the court.33 2 Other jurisdictions-most particularly the
United States-make further distinctions in their application of the
33 3
principle of separability.
The separability analysis in the United States is based on two
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.3 34 and Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v.
3 35
The essential holding of Prima Paint is that "claims of
Cardegna.
fraudulent inducement, directed at the underlying contract and
capable of rendering it voidable, [do] not impeach the arbitration
clause contained in that contract. '3 36 Buckeye Check Cashing
extended this basic principle to "cases involving claims that the
underlying contract was void or illegal. 3 3 7 Thus, "a challenge to the

329.
See LEW ET AL., supra note 119,
6-9 to -22, 9-68 to -74 ("Separability
protects the integrity of the agreement to arbitrate and plays an important role in
ensuring that the parties' intention to submit disputes is not easily defeated.").
330.
See id.
6-9 ("The essence of the doctrine is that the validity of an
arbitration clause is not bound to that of the main contract and vice versa.").
331.
See id.
6-9 to -22.
332.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 322-43, 359-91 (discussing international
adherence to the doctrine of separability).
333.
One way in which the United States differs from other countries is in the
way it intermingles the analysis of separability and jurisdictional competence. See id.
(discussing the difference between "issues of substantive validity" of the arbitration
agreement and "issues of competence-competence," and the allocation of jurisdictional
authority between arbitrators and U.S. courts.).
334.
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
335.
546 U.S. 440 (2006).
336.
BORN, supranote 5, at 363.
337.
Id.; see also Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 440 (holding that an
arbitrator may decide the overall illegality of a contract containing an arbitration
clause).
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validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the
338
arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator."
Although Buckeye Check Cashing expressly held that the
analysis was to be the same regardless of whether the underlying
contract was said to be void or voidable, "U.S. courts have adopted
different approaches to the effects of the separability presumption
depending on whether (a) the validity, legality, or continued
effectiveness of the underlying contract is challenged; or (b) the
existence of the underlying contract is challenged. ' 33 9 The first
category of cases-which includes matters concerning "fraudulent
inducement, fraud, lack of consideration, illegality. .. [and]
mistake"-can be heard by the arbitrator, 340 although the decision to
give the issue to the arbitral tribunal does not constitute a final
determination of the merits of the issue, since the arbitrators may
ultimately decide that the challenge successfully impeaches the
arbitration agreement. 34 1 Instead, this aspect of separability simply
reflects a decision about jurisdictional competence and who-the
court or the arbitrator-is to hear the argument about the
substantive validity of the arbitration agreement. 342 This is also the
approach used for trust-related disputes that do not involve
343
challenges to the capacity of the settlor.
Cases involving challenges to the existence of the underlying
contract are more difficult, since Buckeye Check Cashing only
addressed contract validity and not the question of whether any
agreement between the parties was ever concluded. 344 As it currently
stands, no consensus exists in the United States as to whether
"claims of lack of capacity or authority, directed at the underlying
contract, also necessarily impeach the associated agreement to
arbitrate." 345 A similar amount of discord exists with regard to the
question of who-the court or the arbitral tribunal-has the
jurisdictional authority to decide issues relating to the continued
existence of an arbitration agreement found in a contract that has
been challenged on grounds such as lack of capacity or authority, lack
of consent, duress, or forgery. 346 This means that a court could order
the parties to arbitration to decide whether the arbitration agreement

338.
Buckeye Check Cashing,546 U.S. at 449. This holding applies "regardless of
whether the challenge is brought in state or federal court." Id.
339.
BORN, supra note 5, at 365.
340.
Id. at 367-69.
341.
See id. at 365-69 (discussing procedural aspects of arbitrability
determination).
342.
See id. (discussing jurisdictional competence).
See id. (explaining that challenges to validity of a contract as a whole must
343.
be heard by an arbitrator when there is an arbitration clause).
See id. at 370-71 (discussing Buckeye Check Cashing).
344.
Id. at 372.
345.
346.
See id. at 372-73 (discussing jurisdictional issues).
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never came into
exists even in cases where the underlying contract
347
existence, although the opposite is also possible.
The unpredictability of this approach has led to numerous
criticisms, 348 and these issues will doubtless continue to develop over
the coming years. However, the question for this Article is what
34 9
effect, if any, the U.S. separability analysis has on trust disputes.
Only a few courts have addressed this issue, but the decisions already
demonstrate the same kind of difficulties that arise in disputes
outside the trust context.
So far, three alternatives appear to exist. First, some courts take
the view that the standard separability analysis does not apply to
trust disputes. For example, Spahr v. Secco considered what effect, if
any, the alleged mental incapacity of the settlor might have on the
arbitration of a. dispute related to the trust. 350 After reviewing
relevant precedent regarding separability, the court concluded that:
[T]he analytical formula developed in Prima Paint cannot be applied
with precision when a party contends that an entire contract containing
an arbitration provision is unenforceable because he or she lacked the
mental capacity to enter into the contract. Unlike a claim of fraud in
the inducement, which can be directed at individual provisions in a
contract, a mental capacity challenge can logically be directed only at
351
the entire contract.

Because challenges based on lack of mental capacity "naturally
go[] to both the entire contract and the specific agreement to
on
arbitrate in the contract," the court decided that disputes based
352
mental incapacity should be heard in court, not in arbitration.
While the court's analysis was clear, the decision in Spahr was
handed down prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckeye Check
Cashing and may therefore no longer be good law. 3 53 However, if
allowed to stand, this approach would negate the concept of
separability in trust disputes. 354 Courts adopting this view would
likely not only refuse to enforce an arbitration provision found in a

347.
See id. at 374, 379-80 (considering pros and cons of having a court decide
the issue, as opposed to the arbitral tribunal).
See id. at 378-80 (discussing problems associated with the lack of a
348.
predictable approach).
See Horton, supra note 2, at 1082-86 (considering separability issues in the
349.
context of trust arbitration).
The arbitration provision in question was in an external agreement rather
350.
than the trust itself, but the decision is instructive as to how capacity issues may be
addressed in internal disputes. See Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1268-69 (10th Cir.
2003).
Id. at 1273 (citations omitted).
351.
Id.
352.
See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006)
353.
(considering the parameters of the separability analysis); Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1273.
See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1273 (holding that the court, not the arbitrator, has
354.
the authority to determine the capacity of the settlor).
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trust whenever a challenge was made to the mental capacity of the
settlor, but would also refuse to order arbitration of trust disputes in
355
cases involving duress and forgery.
However, this is not the only possible approach to separability.
Other courts appear inclined to adopt the standard separability
analysis. For example, in Regions Bank v. Britt, the court was asked
to decide whether and to what extent an arbitral tribunal could
consider trust-related claims that purportedly affected a party's
statutory succession rights. 356 Although this challenge was not based
on the alleged incapacity of the settlor, it did attack the underlying
validity or existence of the trust in which the arbitration provision
was found. 35 7 Ultimately, the court found that the issue could be, and
more properly should be, heard in arbitration, based on the rule in
PrimaPaint.358 Interestingly, the court here explicitly distinguished
between issues involving substantive validity and jurisdictional
competence, and gave the question of substantive validity to the
359
arbitrator.
A third approach to the issue of separability is exemplified by
Weizmann Institute of Science v. Neschis, which considered whether
and to what extent an arbitral award rendered in Liechtenstein
should be given preclusive effect in a U.S. court proceeding involving
claims that were very similar to those determined in the

355.
Challenges to the validity of the arbitration agreement based on mistake
and fraud would appear to fall into the category of challenges that could be heard by
the arbitrator in the first instance. See BORN, supra note 5, at 365-69 (noting a large
body of U.S. decisions requiring arbitration of challenges involving "fraudulent
inducement, fraud, lack of consideration, illegality, adhesion or unconscionability, the
failure of a condition precedent, mistake and expiration or termination" (footnotes
omitted)).
356.
See Regions Bank v. Britt, No. 4:09CV61TSL-LRA, 2009 WL 3766490, at
*2 & n.2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 10, 2009). In this case, a husband argued that an arbitration
agreement found in a deed of trust signed by his wife was invalid because it
encumbered marital property without his consent. Id. While some distinctions could be
drawn on the grounds that the dispute involved a deed of trust on real property, an
arrangement which some jurisdictions consider to be akin to mortgages, commentators
have indicated that "[m]ost of the rules that apply to ordinary trusts also apply to
deeds of trust." HESS ET AL., supra note 328, § 29.
357.
Regions Bank, 2009 WL 3766490, at *2 & n.2.
358.
See id. at *2 n.2 (discussing Prima Paint). A Michigan state court also
recently concluded in the context of a will dispute that parties may "conduct[ I binding
common-law arbitration of probate disputes, including the question of testamentary
capacity." In re Nestorovski Estate, 769 N.W.2d 720, 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). While
this Article focuses on arbitration of trust disputes rather than arbitration of wills,
some courts may approach the two types of disputes in a similar manner. See id. at
723-32 (considering precedents involving both trusts and wills); see also In re
Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 409-10 (D.C. 2006) (considering authority discussing both
trusts and wills).
359.
See Regions Bank, 2009 WL 3766490, at *2 n. 2 (discussing arbitrability
issues).
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arbitration. 360 One of the issues raised in the arbitration involved the
mental capacity of the settlor, who was alleged to have been suffering
from Alzheimer's disease at the time she established several
361
foundations (stiftung), which are Liechtenstein's version of a trust.
The arbitration provision in question was located in the charter
362
establishing the foundation.
At no point did the court in Weizmann Institute take the position
that issues of settlor capacity could not be heard in arbitration.
Instead, the judge refused to hear argument on matters relating to
the mental capacity of the settlor, based on principles of collateral
estoppel. 363 This suggests that a per se rule barring arbitration of
trust disputes involving the mental capacity of the settlor would not
364
necessarily be appropriate, despite the analysis in Spahr v. Secco.
Other nations have separability analyses that are considerably
less complicated than that used in the United States. For example,
the English approach to separability is embodied in the Arbitration
Act 1996, which states that:
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement
which forms or was intended to form part of another agreement
(whether or not in writing) shall not be regarded as invalid, nonexistent or ineffective because that other agreement is invalid, or did
not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that
365
purpose be treated as a distinct agreement.

This provision could very well be interpreted as covering an
arbitral clause found in a trust, since there is no requirement that the
underlying agreement be valid or effective as a contract or even be in
writing. 36 6 Recent judicial statements also suggest that questions
regarding settlor capacity can and should be heard in arbitration,
particularly in the context of commercial trusts. For example, Lord
Hoffman of the House of Lords (the highest court in England prior to

360.
See 421 F. Supp. 2d 654, 674-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (examining preclusive
effect of Liechtenstein arbitral judgment). At the time of the decision, Liechtenstein
was not a state party to the New York Convention, although that has since changed.
See id. at 674-75; New York Coavention Status, supra note 143.
361.
See Weizmann, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (discussing circumstances
underlying arbitration).
362.
See id. at 664, 667-68 (discussing charter).
363.
See id. at 676-83 (holding that the issue of the settlor's mental capacity
was barred from relitigation because it was already decided by the arbitral tribunal).
364.
See id. (holding parties were collaterally estopped from relitigating
arbitrators' decision regarding the settlor's mental capacity); see also Spahr v. Secco,
330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the court, not the arbitrator, had
authority to determine mental capacity of the settlor).
365.
Arbitration
Act
1996,
c.
23,
§7
(Eng.),
available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uldukpga/1996/23/contents (outlining English approach to
separability); see also id. § 5.
366.
See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 211, at 56-58 (discussing contractual
elements of arbitration under the Arbitration Act 1996).
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the formation of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in
October 2009)367 recently opined that:
[T]he construction of an arbitration clause should start from the
assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have
intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they
have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal.
The clause should be construed in accordance with this presumption
unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were
3 68
intended to be excluded from the arbitrator's jurisdiction.

Lord Hope of Craighead took a similar view, noting that no
international transaction, particularly of the type at issue in the case
at bar, "is complete without a clause which identifies the law to be
applied and the methods to be used for the determination of
disputes. '369 While these statements were made regarding claims of
bribery in the context of an external trust dispute involving a
commercial trust, and thus may be limited in terms of their
applicability to internal trust disputes, the decision nevertheless
provides a useful enunciation of the English view of separability,
particularly in the context of commercial relationships. 370 The
decision is also consistent with a similarly commercial interpretation
that was applied several years earlier in a dispute involving the
construction of an arbitration provision found in the trust deed of a
37 1
business trust.
Other states appear to view separability in much the same light.
For example, the German approach to separability has been said to
be analogous to that of England. 372 Liechtenstein also appears to
have adopted a pro-arbitration approach to matters of separability,
3 73
even in cases involving the mental capacity of the settlor of a trust.
When contemplating issues of separability going forward, courts
should consider whether it is appropriate to adopt a different
approach for challenges to trusts, or whether consistency should be

367.
See
History-The
Supreme
Court,
THE
SUPREME
COURT,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uklabout/history.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2012)
(explaining that the Supreme Court replaced the House of Lords as the highest court in
the United Kingdom on Oct. 1, 2009).
368.
Premium Nafta Prods. Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co., [2007] UKHL 40, [13]
(Lord Hoffman), on appeal from Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov, [2007] EWCA
Civ 20, [2007] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 891.
369.
Id. at [26] (Lord Hope of Craighead).
370.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 380-84 (discussing evolution of the English view
of separability).
371.
See Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Elektrim Fin. B.V., [2005] EWHC 1412,
[2]-[3], [39]-[47] (Ch) (analyzing business trust deed in light of commercial principles
to hold that trust provided for arbitration of disputes even though one party was
allowed to opt for litigation).
372.
See Premium Nafta, [2007] UKHL [141 (noting similarities between English
and German approaches to separability).
373.
See Weizmann Inst. of Sci. v. Neschis, 421 F. Supp. 2d 654, 678-79
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (upholding principle of separability).
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the goal regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. Certainly if
trusts are seen as reflecting contractual qualities, then a unified
approach to separability would appear most appropriate, with no
distinction as to the subject matter of the dispute.
However, it does not necessarily follow that a nonuniform
approach to separability would be acceptable even if trusts were
considered to be primarily or even exclusively donative in nature.
Separability is based on principles of consent, and it should not
matter whether that consent is unilateral in nature (as it would be
under a donative theory of trusts, where only one person-the
settlor--can be said to have "consented" to the trust arrangement) or
multilateral3 74 (as would be the case under a more contractual
approach, wherein each of the various parties is said to have actually
or constructively agreed to the trust scheme). 375 The only relevant
question is whether the consent at issue is sufficient to support
arbitration or whether there are enough doubts about the nature and
quality of consent that the arbitration agreement should be
impeached.
Adopting an approach to separability that is consistent across
subject matters would appear particularly appropriate given the large
376
and increasing number of commercial trusts that are in use today.
It has been suggested that commercial trusts are best analyzed
through a contractual lens, 37v and any disparate treatment of
commercial trusts based on a donative rationale would not appear in
line with contemporary commercial practices. This is especially true
in jurisdictions such as England, where separability is considered in
378
light of the reasonable expectations of a rational commercial actor.
Notably, a rule that required consistency in the application of the
principle of separability regardless of the subject matter of the
dispute would not necessarily lead to the arbitration of all trust
disputes. Instead, such a determination would simply defer the
question to preexisting principles of national arbitration law. While
this could lead to some disputes about the validity of an arbitration
provision found in a trust being heard in arbitration and others being
heard in court, this would simply reflect what happens elsewhere in
that jurisdiction. Furthermore, application of the standard

374.
Although internal trust disputes may be bilateral, they often involve more
than two parties. See supra notes 17, 127-29, 139 and accompanying text (discussing
multiparty issues).
375.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 351 (discussing separability in bilateral and
multilateral contexts).
376.
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
377.
See Langbein, Contractarian,supra note 1, at 630-31 (stating that "[t]he
flexibility of the trust ... has encouraged transaction planners to use the trust in a
wide variety of commercial settings" and that "the contractarian character of the trust
is transparent" in such situations).
378.
See supra notes 368-69 and accompanying text.
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separability analysis would still support the notion that an arbitral
clause found in the trust can be considered binding vis-A-vis the party
against whom the arbitration is brought.
ii.

Consent of Parties Other Than the Settlor

Consent issues are not limited to concerns relating to the settlor.
In fact, the more commonly analyzed question is whether a
mandatory arbitration provision can be considered binding on persons
3 79
other than the settlor (i.e., trustees and beneficiaries).
The analysis here is similar in ways to that regarding the
validity, effectiveness, and operability of the arbitration provision
itself.380 An arbitral clause in a trust is considered operable with
respect to trustees and protectors to the extent that those persons
agree to act under the terms of the trust, whether that agreement is
381
reflected in the trust itself or in an accompanying document.
Arbitral provisions are considered operable vis-A-vis beneficiaries
through application of the concepts of deemed acquiescence and
3
conditional transfer. 82
Although these techniques are used to satisfy certain formal
requirements regarding the operability and effectiveness of an
arbitration provision, that is no bar to their also being used to
demonstrate how and why various parties can be said to have
consented to the arbitration agreement. Arbitration law adopts a
similar methodology with respect to nonsignatories, using the same
theories not only to identify which parties can be held to the terms of
the arbitration agreement but also to excuse imperfect compliance
38 3
with form requirements.
Because conditional transfer and deemed acquiescence have not
been well-tested in the context of mandatory arbitration, 38 4 settlors
often seek alternative means of binding various parties to the
arbitration. 38 5 One mechanism that has been discussed by a number

379.
See, e.g., Wuistemann, supra note 1, at 36 (discussing whether arbitration
provisions in trusts can bind beneficiaries without their consent).
380.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 209 (listing factors relevant to whether
an arbitration provision in a trust will be considered enforceable).
381.
See Wiustemann, supra note 1, at 44 (stating that "[trustees and protectors
assume their responsibilities," including those relating to arbitration, "under the terms
of the trust deed").
382.
See id. at 45-46 (stating that invoking rights or receiving benefits of the
trust could serve as an agreement to abide by the arbitration agreement).
383.
See Strong, supra note 128, at 219-20 (discussing means of bringing
nonsignatories into an arbitration).
384.
See Buckle & Olsen, supranote 3, at 655-56.
385.
See Strong, Enforceability, supra note 33 (manuscript at 25-26) (stating
how settlors can bolster the effectiveness of conditional transfers).
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of commentators involves the use of a forfeiture or in terrorem
386
provision.
In terrorem provisions typically state that any party who
challenges a trust or will forfeits any rights he or she may have under
the instrument. In the context of mandatory arbitration, forfeiture is
triggered by a challenge to the use of arbitration to resolve a
particular dispute. 38 7 Although such language obviously provides a
strong incentive for beneficiaries to agree to arbitration, in terrorem
388
clauses are problematic for several reasons.
First, in terrorem provisions are by no means universally
embraced, even as a general matter. Indeed, courts often refuse to
enforce such provisions if a party has probable cause to bring the
claim. 389 Second, in terrorem clauses are particularly suspect in the
context of mandatory arbitration, since threatening to revoke a
benefit under the trust through a forfeiture provision could be seen as
"vitiat[ing] the freedom of will required to contract, and so render the
[arbitration] agreement voidable." 390 Third, an in terrorem provision
could be considered an impermissible attempt to oust the jurisdiction
of the court and hence be void ab initio.3 91 Therefore, while some
commentators take the view that requiring a legatee or beneficiary to
"forfeit her interest should she decline to respect the testator's wishes
with respect to arbitration of will [or trust] contests should not
discourage any truly meritorious ...contest[, since sluch a contest
may still be brought,"392 the consensus appears to be that settlors

386.
See Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reducing Estate and Trust Litigation
Through Disclosure, In Terrorem Clauses, Mediation and Arbitration, 9 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 237, 245-47, 259-61 (2008) (discussing the use of in terrorem clauses
to prevent disputes among heirs); Katzen, supra note 14, at 125-27 (explaining how in
terrorem or no contest clauses can be used to encourage arbitration of disputes among
beneficiaries); Wtistemann, supra note 1, at 46-47 (stating that trustees may be given
the power through forfeiture or in terrorem clauses to exclude beneficiaries who refuse
to submit to arbitration).
387.
See Blattmachr, supra note 386, at 259-61 (explaining that use of a
mandatory arbitration clause could result in an interested party forfeiting any benefits
under the trust if the party neglected or refused to engage in arbitration).
388.
See id. at 245-48, 259-61 (identifying various problems with in terrorem
clauses); Katzen, supra note 14, at 125-27 (stating that no contest clauses do not bind
parties when consent to arbitration is an issue).
389.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-517, 3-905 (2006), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upc/final2005.htm (denying enforceability of
no contest clauses if the challenger has probable cause); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 (2003) (stating that no contest
clauses are enforceable unless the challenger has probable cause).
390.
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 221.
391.
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, 11.1 (stating that a trust is
void under English law if created for the illegal purpose of "ousting the jurisdiction of
the courts or operating in terrorem to induce the beneficiary not to apply to the courts"
(footnote omitted)).
392.
Spitko, supranote 17, at 298.
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should avoid trying to force beneficiaries into arbitration through use
393
of a forfeiture clause.
An interesting concept that has not been explored is the possible
use of an incentive in connection with an arbitration agreement
concluded by the trustee after the creation of the trust but before the
dispute arises. This sort of arbitration would be mandatory in that
the trustee would be required to seek pre-dispute arbitration
agreements with other potential parties to an internal trust dispute
(i.e., any actual or potential beneficiaries, as well as any current or
successor trustees and protectors) by virtue of a direction in the trust.
However, the arbitration provision could also authorize the trustee to
make an immediate payment to these parties in consideration of the
agreement. While this approach is not precisely the same as the type
of mandatory trust arbitration that is the topic of the current Article,
it does (1) effectuate the intent of the settlor, at least to some
degree; 394 (2) create explicit bilateral contracts that would meet any
necessary form requirements; 3 95 and (3) avoid concerns about
vitiating the beneficiaries' consent, since it acts as a positive, rather
396
than negative, incentive to arbitrate.
Although this is an interesting proposition, it is somewhat
problematic in that it creates an additional, unnecessary, and
potentially expensive hurdle for settlors to overcome before their
wishes vis-A-vis arbitration can be effectuated. It may very well be
that a settlor does not want to make provisions for a beneficiary if
that person does not want to resolve any disputes in arbitration, and
it seems contrary to established principles of trust law to require the
settlor to put that condition in a document other than the trust for
that condition to be given effect. This approach would also give the
trustee more power to initiate arbitration than the settlor, which is
again contrary to basic principles of trust law.3 97 Since this option is
problematic as both a practical and jurisprudential matter, it is
therefore better to rely on deemed acquiescence and conditional
398
transfer as an appropriate means of binding all parties.

393.
See UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, 11.1 (suggesting in terrorem
provisions should be avoided).
394.
Nevertheless, some actual or potential parties could decline to enter into
the agreement, even with the incentive payment.
395.
See supranotes 260-320 and accompanying text.
396.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 221 (noting in terrorem clauses could
be seen to "vitiate the freedom of will required to contract").
397.
See supranotes 175-77 and accompanying text.
398.
Judicial application of deemed acquiescence and conditional transfer may
be strengthened by language in the trust referring to those doctrines. See Strong,
Enforceability, supra note 33 (providing draft language).
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Proper Representation

The fourth concern relating to mandatory arbitration of trust
disputes involves the need to ensure that all interested parties are
properly represented in the proceedings. 399 Here, the issue is how
best to protect the rights of beneficiaries who may be unascertained,
40 0
unborn, or legally incompetent at the time the dispute arises.
Issues of this nature may appear somewhat unusual to lawyers
who do not routinely work with trusts, since very few areas of law
require courts or arbitrators to consider the rights of persons who are
not actually present in the dispute. One of the few exceptions is the
class action and its corollary, the class arbitration, wherein a few
named individuals bring a claim on behalf of a large number of
unidentified others. 40 1 While trust disputes are not representative in
nature, they do share some attributes with class claims, 40 2 most
prominently their ability to determine the rights of persons not
40 3
actually present.

399.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 209 (identifying factors to be
considered when determining whether an arbitration provision in a trust is
enforceable).
400.
See id. at 222 (discussing the procedural requirements of representation in
an arbitration clause for incapacitated persons, minors, and persons who are
unascertained or unborn).
401.
See Strong, supra note 128, at 213-19 (discussing the nature of
representative relief in arbitration). A new large-scale procedure known as mass
arbitration has recently developed in the investment realm and uses more of an agency
model than a representative model. See S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of
"Regulatory Arbitration"--Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International
Investment Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing arbitration involving
60,000 claimants).
402.
For example, trust disputes could grow to rival class suits with respect to
size, particularly in cases involving commercial trusts. See Strong, supra note 128, at
212 (comparing the criteria for numerosity in class arbitration to the rules governing
class actions).
403.
This is not to say that a trust dispute could not result in a class claim,
including possibly a class arbitration. For example, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Hollingsworth, a number of Subway franchisees brought a class action in state court
against various Subway franchising entities, including the trustees of the Subway
Franchisee Advertising Fund Trust (SFAFT), alleging "various breaches of fiduciary
duty and conspiracy claims relating to the alleged mismanagement and
misappropriation of contributions to the SFAFT." Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 79 (D. Conn. 1996). The various franchise agreements
included a provision requiring arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of
or relating to this contract or the breach thereof." Id. Although the SFAFT did not have
an arbitration provision itself, the court considered the claims against the SFAFT to
have arisen out of or be related to the franchise agreement and concluded that the
trust claims were arbitrable. See id. at 84-85. As a result, the dispute was ordered into
arbitration. See id. at 86. The claims were most likely heard on a bilateral basis, since
the dispute arose in 1996, prior to the expansion of class arbitration in the mid- to late
2000s. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 459-60 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (remanding a class arbitration action to allow an arbitrator to determine if a
contract silent on the issue of class arbitration allowed for such arbitration); Strong,
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However, rather than addressing the collective nature of trusts
through class relief, courts consider trust proceedings to be in rem,
with decisions binding "all persons having adequate notice, whether
or not they actually participate in the proceeding." 40 4 This process
requires a court or arbitral tribunal to give special consideration to a
number of related factors, such as who should have notice of a trust
proceeding, how notice must be given to those persons, and what sort
of procedures must be used to protect the rights of all interested
40 5
parties, regardless of whether they are present or not.
The first task-identifying who should be given notice of a trust
dispute-requires a careful reading of the trust document, as well as
a detailed knowledge of the context in which the trust operates. For
example, some beneficiaries may not be identified in the trust by
name. Although this practice may seem unusual to nonspecialists, it
has long been condoned by trust law for several reasons. For example,
a trust may endure for a very long period of time, which means that
settlors may need to identify beneficiaries by class so as to ensure
40 6
that all relevant persons are captured within the trust provisions.
Alternatively, a settlor may want to give the trustee the discretion to
determine who a beneficiary should be or whether a disbursement
under the trust is even proper. 40 7 Requiring all these elements to be
outlined in the trust itself would mean that the trust would have to
be constantly amended to take changing circumstances into account.
In some cases, it would be impossible to provide the requisite amount
of detail. 40 8 Either way, one of the major benefits of the trustflexibility-would be severely limited or destroyed.

supra note 128, at 205-11 (discussing the expansion of class arbitration as a result of
Bazzle). Had the dispute arisen today, it might have been heard as a class arbitration.
See id. at 269-70 (noting class arbitration has survived recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions); S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating
Internationally Enforceable Awards When Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of
Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1055-83 (2009)
(discussing how class arbitrations can arise even in cases where the contract is silent
as to class treatment).
404.
Janin, supra note 11, at 529.
See Strong, Procedures,supra note 33 (manuscript at 48-49) (discussing
405.
various means of providing notice in in rem-type arbitrations).
406.
An example might be a trust for the benefit of "my grandchildren," not all of
whom may be born at the time the trust is created. See Strong, Procedures, supra note
33 (manuscript at 50 n.208).
407.
An example of the first type of provision might be a trust for the benefit of
"any student in the town of Littleton who needs financial assistance to attend
university." An example of the second type of provision might be a trust indicating
disbursements to "any of my grandchildren, if they need financial assistance." See id.
(manuscript at 51 n.211) (providing examples of trust provisions).
For example, a trust that requires disbursement "to those of my
408.
grandchildren who are alive ten years after my death" could not reliably name all such
persons, since beneficiaries could enter the class (through birth) or depart from the
class (through death) after the settlor has passed away but before the disbursement
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It is also possible that potential parties to a trust dispute are not
apparent from the face of the trust instrument. Instead, these
persons' interests in the dispute arise as a matter of law, typically
either marital or succession law. 40 9 Although this issue may be
considered most often in the context of private family trusts, marital
410
and succession rights can also affect commercial trusts.
In either case, a court may be able to identify these potential
parties by relationship but may not be able to bring any actual, living
persons into the dispute because these persons are unascertained,
411
unborn, or legally incompetent at the time the trust dispute arises.
In litigated disputes, the issue has been resolved by allowing the
court "to appoint a person to represent the interests of such
beneficiaries," although "even then, any compromise of the litigation
has to be approved by the court. '412 In England, the person named to
protect the beneficiaries' claims, called a "special representative,"
cannot have any independent interest in the dispute itself.4 13 Other
jurisdictions, such as the United States, either appoint an

was made. There might also be grandchildren who are living at the time the trust is
created but who may not be known to the settlor. See id. (manuscript at 50 n.208).
409.
Many legislatures have limited a decedent's ability to pass on his or her
estate. In some jurisdictions, these laws involve "forced heirs" and can include children
and other relatives. See MCGOVERN, supra note 20, at 30 (discussing forced heir
statutes); Bosques-Hern~ndez, supra note 17, at 23 (discussing "forced heirship," which
does not allow testators to deviate from statutory schemes regarding succession "as a
matter of public policy"); Perrin, supra note 1, at 657-59 (discussing the ability of heirs
to assert their "forced heirship" rights in inter vivos trusts and testamentary trusts);
Wistemann, supra note 1, at 45-46 (comparing forced heirship under U.S. and Swiss
law). In other countries, the primary concern is for the settlor or decedent's surviving
spouse, who is entitled to what is often called an "elective share" of the settlor's estate
if the amount passing under a will or broader testamentary scheme is insufficient. See
MCGOVERN, supra note 20, at 160-71 (comparing the policies and procedures for
allocating assets of surviving spouses in different countries and states).
410.
See Regions Bank v. Britt, No. 4:09CV61TSL-LRA, 2009 WL 3766490, at *2
n.2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 10, 2009) (involving marital rights allegedly affected by a deed of
trust).
411.
For example, a trust provision benefitting "those of my grandchildren
who are alive ten years after my death" will be known to affect all of the settlor's
grandchildren who are alive ten years after the settlor's death. However, if a
dispute involving the trust arises three years after the settlor's death, there may be
some potential beneficiaries who are yet unborn or who are minors. Strong,
Procedures, supra note 33 (manuscript at 50 n.208). Alternatively, a trust that
provides a $500 cash award to the valedictorian of Littleton High School for the
next twenty years will involve identifiable beneficiaries (since there will be one
such person a year for the remainder of the term of the trust), even though future
beneficiaries cannot be specifically ascertained at the time a particular dispute
arises. See id. at 51 n.211 (providing examples of instances where unascertained
persons were and were not able to benefit from a trust).
412.
Buckle & Olsen, supra note 8, at 649-50 (quoting David Hayton, Major
Trends in the Trust World: Part 2, 2 PCB 122, 125 (2007)).
413.
See Hayton, supra note 271, at 71 (discussing how in England,
representatives must not have any independent interests in the dispute and must be
appointed and approved by the court).
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independent representative, similar to a special representative, or
allow an existing beneficiary who shares the absent beneficiary's
interests to protect the absent beneficiary's claims in a practice
known as "virtual representation. '414 Minors and other legally
incompetent persons (such as the mentally incapacitated) may have
legal representatives, typically referred to as guardians, already in
place. 415 The question therefore becomes whether these sorts of
representative mechanisms can be used in arbitration.
The answer may depend on whether the trust instrument
specifically describes the representative mechanism that is to be
used. For example, it has been said that:
There appears to be no reason why the court would not grant a stay [of
litigation] to the trustee on the sole ground that the beneficiary is not
properly represented in the arbitration. If the arbitration provision is
properly drawn to provide for adequate representation, then the child
4 16
[or other beneficiary] should be bound to take the benefit of it.

In drafting such a provision, the settlor should be sure to
"provide how incapacitated, unascertained and unborn beneficiaries
can come (or be brought) forward to make their claims .... The
arbitral tribunal could determine who should be served with notice of
the arbitration, in the same way as, in court proceedings, a judge
can." 417 Furthermore, "[t]o avoid problems the trust deed should
provide for payment of.. . [special or virtual representatives] out of
'418
the trust fund.
Trustees who are not given explicit powers to appoint special or
virtual representatives could attempt to do so based on their residual
discretionary powers to resolve trust disputes. This approach has not
been frequently discussed by commentators and may therefore be
more open to debate. However, any efforts by trustees to create their
own mechanisms for appointing special or virtual representatives
would likely be bolstered by any statutory provisions allowing
4 19
trustees to pursue nonjudicial means of dispute resolution.
Although the use of special or virtual representatives in
mandatory arbitration appears relatively straightforward, some
problems may nevertheless arise. For example, there are those in the
trust community who take the view that self-help on the part of
either the settlor or trustee is inappropriate and that "legislation
would have to be enacted to enable arbitration to deal with the

414.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 613-14 (describing the concept of
virtual representation).
415.
See id. at 660-63 (describing the concept of guardianship).
416.
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 222-23.
417.
Id. at 223.
418.
Hayton, supranote 271, at 72.
419.
See supra notes 154-73 and accompanying text.

2012]

ARBITRA TION OF TRUST DISPUTES

''
problem of incapacitated, unborn and unascertained beneficiaries. 420
42 1
While this view is by no means universally held,
it is certainly true
that states retain a public policy interest in the protection of certain
vulnerable parties in both litigation and arbitration. 422 However,
most jurisdictions also retain the ability to vacate an arbitral award
or refuse enforcement if the award violates procedural due process or
the public policy of the state.4 23 The interests of any unascertained,
unborn, or legally incompetent parties would therefore likely be
sufficiently protected through standard procedures relating to judicial
424
review of arbitral awards.
Concerns also exist with respect to questions as to whether the
court-as opposed to the arbitral tribunal-must approve any
settlement or compromise of a trust dispute involving an
unascertained, unborn, or legally incompetent party.4 25 While
arbitrators are entirely competent to enter an award on an agreed
settlement as a matter of arbitration law, 426 some jurisdictions may
oppose similar actions in the trust context because the judicial duty to
approve voluntary disposition of a trust dispute is considered
nonderogable. 427 Other jurisdictions may see no problems with
permitting an arbitral tribunal to step into the shoes of the court in
this regard.4 28 Notably, if this issue turns on the proper
interpretation of a statute providing the court with exclusive
jurisdiction over a particular matter, then it might be better analyzed
429
as a type of arbitrability concern.

420.
Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 223.
421.
See ACTEC, supra note 13, at 32, 37-38 (proposing legislative reform to
address issues relating to incapacitated, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries in
arbitration); Bruyere & Marino, supra note 15, at 364-66 (discussing legislation
proposed in Hawai'i concerning trust arbitration).
422.
See Kr511, supra note 151,
16.9 (describing statutes enacted to protect
parties with unequal bargaining power in the commercial agency context).
423.
See New York Convention, supra note 143, art. V (discussing grounds upon
which a foreign arbitral award may be refused recognition); BORN, supra note 5, at
2620-33, 2827-63 (noting grounds for objection to enforcement under the Model
Arbitration Law and the New York Convention).
424.
See supranotes 192-256 and accompanying text.
425.
See Hayton, supra note 154, at 13-15 (discussing judicial role in protecting
particularly vulnerable parties).
426.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 2437-38 ("[T]he terms of most national laws and
institutional rules leave the arbitrators with the choice whether or not to make a
consent award.").
427.
See Hayton, supra note 154, at 15 (discussing English courts' oversight
capacity regarding voluntary compromises of probate disputes).
428.
See id. ("In the United States ... virtual representatives bind the interests
of those whom they represent without the need for any court approval."); Mautner &
Orr, supra note 154, at 166 ("The extension of the doctrine of virtual representation to
nonjudicial dispute resolution procedures has simplified the settlement process and
made it possible to finalize nonjudicial dispute resolution agreements without having
to seek court approval.").
429.
See infra notes 433-70 and accompanying text.
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Challenges could also arise as to the competency of a particular
representative. However, this appears to be less of a problem, since it
has been said that "[o]ne can leave it to the good sense of the
arbitrator to provide for due process and a fair hearing by appointing
appropriate skilled independent persons to represent minors and
430
unborn and unascertained beneficiaries."
Finally, questions could also arise as to whether a representative
needs to be appointed in any particular set of circumstances. For
example, it has been suggested that a representative need not be
appointed for a minor beneficiary if the minor is receiving a benefit
under the trust, since consent to receiving a benefit is not necessary
in some jurisdictions. 431 However, a representative would be
necessary in cases where a conflict of interest existed between a
432
minor and his or her natural guardian (i.e., the parent).
e.

Subject Matter Arbitrable

Finally, for a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust to be
enforceable, "the subject matter of the dispute [must be]
arbitrable. '433 Arbitrability "determines which disputes can be
submitted to arbitration" and which are reserved to the exclusive
434
purview of the courts.
Although national and international laws on arbitration
contemplate the possibility that certain issues are nonarbitrable,
seldom are the parameters of arbitrability firmly and clearly
drawn. 435 Cross-border disputes, including those involving several
U.S. states, are often particularly difficult as a result of the need for
436
potentially complicated conflict of laws analyses.
It might initially appear as if the various statutes allowing for
the arbitration of certain matters relating to trusts would be useful in
this analysis. Certainly the provisions are helpful in some regards,
most particularly by suggesting that certain rights relating to trusts

430.

Hayton, supra note 271, at 72.

See Wistemann, supra note 1, at 52 ("The consent of the parents is not
431.
needed where the minor child only benefits from a transaction.").
432.
See id. (discussing the potential involvement of the Swiss authorities in a
situation involving a conflict of interest).
Cohen & Staff, supranote 13, at 209.
433.
Kr6ll, supra note 151, $ 16-7.
434.
9-19 to -41 (discussing various
See LEW ET AL., supra note 119,
435.
16-7 to -8 (noting
jurisdictions' approaches to arbitrability); Kr6ll, supra note 151,
that the uncertainty regarding arbitrability stems from the broad, substantive nature
of arbitration provisions that are not "explicitly regulated").
See Wustemann, supra note 1, at 47 (noting potential difficulties associated
436.
with international trust disputes); In re Revocation of Revocable Trust of Fellman, 604
A.2d 263, 268-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (addressing interstate
probate dispute).
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43 7
are freely disposable and thus not inherently nonarbitrable.
However, most of the legislation is written in such a way that it is not
clear whether the language covers mandatory arbitration provisions
found in trusts. 438 Therefore, courts could limit application of the
legislation solely to arbitration agreements entered into by the
trustee after the creation of the trust. In so doing, courts could frame
the trustee's entering into an arbitration agreement as analogous to a
post-dispute arbitration agreement and a provision contained in the
trust as analogous to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. While the
analogy would not be entirely apt, in that trustees' arbitration
agreements would likely also be made pre- rather than postdispute, 43 9 courts might nevertheless attempt to make this sort of
distinction because it might allow them to rely on practices adopted
in other areas of arbitration, wherein states have declared that
certain rights may be made subject to a post-dispute arbitration
440
agreement but not a pre-dispute agreement.
However, this sort of broad-brush analysis is somewhat crude,
and there are better ways to analyze the issue. For example, at its
core, arbitrability focuses on whether the rights in question are freely
disposable by the parties. 44 1 Because "the freedom to dispose of one's
rights ... implies the possibility to renounce such rights," 442 it is
appropriate to ask whether beneficiaries can dispose of all or some of
their rights under a trust. As it turns out, beneficiaries can disclaim
any benefits they receive, which would suggest that beneficiaries'
rights are freely disposable and thus arbitrable. 443 While some
difficulties could arise to the extent that trust law limits beneficiaries'

437.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633 (1985) (noting that disputes that are arbitrable in one context cannot be held to be
inherently nonarbitrable in others).
See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
438.
439.
This would most likely include agreements made with external third
parties but could also include agreements made with beneficiaries regarding internal
disputes. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also supra note 174 and
accompanying text.
440.
See Caprasse, supra note 39, at 84 (discussing Belgian droits impgratifs);
see also BORN, supra note 5, at 820-21 (discussing European prohibition on pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer context).
441.
Thus, some jurisdictions define their concept of arbitrability by stating that
"[a]nyone can 'compromise' on rights which are free to be disposed of." Caprasse, supra
note 39, at 83 (quoting CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2059 (Fr.)). Other countries indicate
that "[any dispute already existing or that may arise from a given legal situation, and
which can be the object of a settlement, may by agreement be submitted to arbitration."
Id. at 83 (quoting Code Judiciaire [Judicial Code] of May 19, 1998, art. 1676 (Belg.),
availableat vsites.unb.br/fdgtconteudo/Lei-arb-belgica-ing.doc).
442.
Id. at 84.
443.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 88-96 (discussing the ability to
65.1-65.5
disclaim benefits in inheritance); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
("A person to whom a property interest is purportedly transferred is not obliged to
accept it.").
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ability to terminate a trust created for their benefit or to alter its
terms, arbitration of trust disputes would not be challenging the
terms of the trust in any way but would instead be upholding
44 4
them.
As illuminating as these analyses are, they are just a start. More
detailed guidance must be sought from general criteria regarding
445
arbitrability.
When considering whether a claim is arbitrable, courts and
arbitrators typically look at a number of factors including the extent
to which public interests are at stake, whether the dispute involves
significant inequalities in bargaining power, the effect of the decision
on third-party rights, the ability of arbitrators to grant legislatively
required remedies, and whether arbitral procedures (as opposed to
judicial procedures) are adequate to resolve the dispute. 446 Notably,
"the existence of a possibility for parties to express their will is an
important factor" in favor of arbitrability, a point which may be of
particular interest in trust disputes, given trust law's traditional
emphasis on settlor intent and the broad recognition of party
447
autonomy in instruments such as the Hague Convention on Trusts.
448
Legislative intent is also central to the analysis.
England and
the United States do not include language on arbitrability in their
arbitration statutes, meaning that "questions whether or not a
particular dispute is arbitrable ... turn almost entirely on judicial
interpretation of other statutes" or on general case law. 44 9 Other
jurisdictions address questions of arbitrability in their arbitration
statute, although the language is often quite general. 450 Nevertheless,
it is clear that several of these statutes' definitions of arbitrability are

444.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 425-36 (explaining limitations on
amendments of trusts); UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9,
66.1-66.26
(discussing limitations on the ability to terminate or modify a trust).
445.
See Caprasse, supra note 39, at 80 (giving general criteria for objective
arbitrability).
446.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 788-90 (stating the analytical considerations
used to identify "implied legislative intent" regarding arbitrability when national
legislation is silent on the issue).
447.
Caprasse, supra note 39, at 88; see also Hague Convention on Trusts, supra
note 3, arts. 6-10, 15-18 (discussing the priority of settlor intent in procedures
governed by the Hague Convention on Trusts).
448.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 788-89 (noting legislative intent regarding
arbitrability may be explicit or implicit).
449.
Id. at 781, 786. The Model Arbitration Law is also silent regarding
arbitrability. See id. at 776 (stating the Model Arbitration Law leaves nonarbitrability
provisions to individual legislatures and judiciaries).
450.
See id. at 775-88 (explaining the varying degrees of breadth of both
domestic and international arbitration statutes in different jurisdictions); Caprasse,
supra note 39, at 82-83.
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so broad that few, if any, problems will arise regarding the
arbitration of most trust disputes. 451 Thus, for example:
Switzerland has adopted an independent substantive rule for the
determination of arbitrability, according to which any dispute involving
an economic/financial interest may be settled by arbitration, without
any need to consider the possible stricter rules of the law applicable to
the merits of the dispute or the national law of one of the parties. Apart
from purely non-financial matters, arbitrability can only be denied in
an international arbitration with its seat in Switzerland for claims
which have exclusively been reserved for the state courts pursuant to
foreign mandatory provisions which have to be taken into account
under public policy considerations.
As nearly all types of trust disputes ultimately concern the
distribution of private wealth, the majority of such disputes can be
arbitrated given the liberal definition of arbitrability under Swiss
4 52
law.

Notably, this does not mean that every trust-related dispute is
arbitrable under Swiss law. For example, issues regarding the
provision of information to a beneficiary might not involve the kind of
financial or economic interests necessary for the matter to be
4 53
considered arbitrable in Switzerland.
A number of other states also focus on commercial or economic
interests when considering the arbitrability of a particular issue and
might therefore come to similar conclusions as Switzerland regarding
the arbitrability of trust disputes.4 54 For example, "[i]n the
Scandinavian countries, particularly in Denmark, it has been
asserted that a specific provision in the will calling for a certain ADR
procedure is likely to be recognized. '455 Arbitration provisions in
testamentary and other noncontractual documents will be upheld in
4 50
Germany and Austria.
However, even those countries that discuss arbitrability in their
arbitration statute might need to look to other legislation on occasion.
For example, Swiss courts might prohibit the arbitration of trust

451.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 777-79 (discussing Swiss and German statutes,
which allow arbitration of any claim regarding an economic interest).
Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 49 (emphasis omitted); see also Von Segesser,
452.
supra note 13, at 23 (discussing the meaning of "economic interest").
See Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 50-51 (explaining that except for cases
453.
involving a financial interest, a beneficiary's request for information would not be
arbitrable under Swiss law).
See Caprasse, supra note 39, at 81-82 (summarizing a French statute that
454.
prohibited arbitration except in cases involving commercial activities and transactional
disputes).
Bosques-Herngndez, supra note 17, at 22.
455.
See SCHWARZ & KONRAD, supra note 110 (discussing how Austrian
456.
arbitration law permits arbitration set up by "testamentary disposition or by other
legal transactions that are not based on the agreement of the parties" (footnotes
omitted)); Duve, supra note 110, 88 (discussing German statutory provisions allowing
binding arbitration clauses in testamentary and other noncontractual dispositions).
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disputes in cases involving forced heirship, based on various statutes
giving courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving succession
45 7
law.
Regardless of whether a state defines arbitrability statutorily or
through the common law, the central question is whether a certain
category of claims should be reserved to the courts. 458 Traditionally,
the analysis was conducted on the basis of entire subject matter
areas: for example, the court would ask whether all intellectual
property claims were considered arbitrable, or all consumer claims, or
all securities claims.4 59 As the general scope of arbitrability has
expanded, the practice has changed somewhat, with courts now
making more nuanced distinctions regarding the arbitrability of
certain subsets of claims that fall within a field that is generally
4 60
considered arbitrable.
For example, agency, franchise, and exclusive distributor
4 61
disputes are typically considered as amenable to arbitration.
However, some courts have refused to enforce pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in cases involving the termination of the rights of agents,
franchisees, or exclusive distributors, based on specific concerns
about the economic vulnerability of those parties. 462 Notably, this
limitation on arbitrability only affects specific types of claims,
creating a subclass of nonarbitrable issues within a subject matter
that is generally considered arbitrable.
This type of analysis is relevant to mandatory trust arbitration
for two reasons. First, these other inquiries focus on the protection of
vulnerable parties, which is also an issue in trust disputes involving
463
unborn, unascertained, or legally incompetent beneficiaries.
Interestingly, however, this may be one time when an emphasis on

457.
See Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 45-46 (explaining that Swiss law may
prohibit arbitration of disputes involving forced heirs). Other jurisdictions that
recognize forced heirship appear to adopt a similar approach. See Bosques-Herngndez,
supra note 17, at 23 (discussing Spain, Bolivia, Peru, and Honduras); Perrin, supra
note 1, at 657-58 (discussing clawback possibilities involving inter vivos trusts and
testamentary trusts).
458.
See Kr6ll, supra note 151,
16-7 ("[A]rbitrability... determines which
disputes can be submitted to arbitration.").
See BORN, supra note 5, at 767-69 (discussing laws that treat entire classes
459.
of disputes as nonarbitrable); Kroll, supra note 151,
16-7 (discussing objective
arbitrability).
460.
See Kroll, supra note 151, 1 16-7 (describing narrow restrictions on
objective arbitrability in Europe).
461.
See id.
16-4 (describing how arbitration is commonly used in cases
involving commercial representation).
462.
See id.
16-5, 16-8 to -23 (describing the substantive and procedural rules
preventing some commercial representation cases from proceeding to arbitration).
463.
See id.
16-9 (explaining that many jurisdictions enact provisions to
protect agents, distributors, and franchisees because they are considered to be weaker
than the commercial entities whose interests they represent); supra notes 399-432 and
accompanying text (discussing the issue of proper representation in trust arbitrations).
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the donative nature of trusts may work to the benefit of mandatory
arbitration since concerns about the arbitrability of issues involving
agents, franchisees, and exclusive distributors typically focus on
economic vulnerability arising from an inequality of bargaining
power.46 4 Since there can be no inequality of bargaining power in a
donative relationship, trust arbitration cannot be problematic in this
sense.
Second, limitations on the arbitrability of certain types of
agency, franchise, or distribution claims are typically based on
statutes that appear to grant courts exclusive jurisdiction over a
particular type of claim. 46 5 Trust law is full of similar types of
legislation that ostensibly gives exclusive jurisdiction over certain
4 66
matters to the courts.
This latter issue is extremely important. Essentially, the
question is whether exclusive jurisdiction provisions should be
interpreted as a prohibition on forum-selection clauses (meaning that
if the claim is heard in court, it must be heard in that particular
court, which would leave open the possibility of arbitration of that
claim) or whether exclusive jurisdiction provisions should be read4 as
67
barring resolution of the claim in all other fora, arbitral or judicial.
When the matter is discussed in the context of agency, franchise,
and distribution claims, the analysis concentrates primarily on
international disputes, where the choice-of-court analysis involves
judicial venues in two different countries. 468 In this context, the
issues primarily revolve around choice of law and whether a
mandatory provision of law will be applied extraterritorially. 46 9 This
obviously has relevance to international or interstate trust disputes,
470
which can involve similar choice of law concerns.

464.
See Krill, supra note 151,
16-9 (linking protection of commercial
representatives to the perception of their having less bargaining power); supra notes
73-91 and accompanying text.
465.
See Kr6ll, supra note 151, T 16-16 ("[S]ome national laws on commercial
agency explicitly stipulate that the courts at the agent's place of business ... have
exclusive jurisdiction."). But see id. 16-8 (explaining that in general, national statutes
do not explicitly address the arbitrability of disputes relating to commercial
representation).
466.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 215-17 (discussing exclusive
jurisdiction provisions in trust-related concerns).
467.
See Krll, supra note 151,
7 16-20 to -22 (comparing exclusion of
jurisdiction in arbitration versus litigation).
468.
See id. 7 16-24 to -74 (citing examples).
469.
See id. 7 16-18 to -20 (discussing the effect of mandatory laws on
arbitrability determinations).
470.
See Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 47 (discussing choice of law issues in
international trust disputes); see also In re Revocation of Revocable Trust of Fellman,
604 A.2d 263, 269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (discussing choice of
law issues in interstate disputes); von Segesser, supra note 13, at 22-23 (comparing the
Swiss rule for arbitrability to that of other jurisdictions).
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However, this issue can also be considered from a purely
domestic perspective, at least when trusts are involved. Trust law has
historically operated as a field apart, not only in terms of its
procedural and substantive law but also in terms of the venue in
which these matters are heard. 4 71 Many states require claims
regarding the administration and interpretation of trusts to be heard
in probate or chancery courts, a result that is achieved through
exclusive jurisdiction clauses. 4 72 Therefore, it may be that this sort of
legislation should be more properly interpreted as a type of internal
sorting mechanism within a national judicial system rather than a
method of denying the availability of alternative means of dispute
resolution. This conclusion is strengthened not only by the fact that
arbitration was relatively uncommon at the time that these specialty
courts first developed in medieval England but also by the fact that
many of the rationales supporting the creation of specialty courts (i.e.,
taking the dispute away from the jury and giving it to a decision
maker with specialized substantive and procedural expertise) would
be met equally well by arbitration. 473 As such, it seems inappropriate
to conclude that these statutes were meant to exclude arbitration, at
least without more in-depth analysis.
In considering this issue, it is also important to be aware of the
ramifications of a rule of limited nonarbitrability. First, allowing
these sorts of carve-outs diminishes predictability, since parties will
often be surprised by claim-specific limitations in an area of law that
is known to be generally arbitrable. 474 Second, this sort of protective
behavior is typically unnecessary. States enact exclusive jurisdiction
statutes because of the desire to protect vulnerable parties through
the application of certain substantive or procedural laws. 475 However,
arbitration of trust disputes does not infringe on any necessary
procedural protections, 4 7 nor does it allow the erosion of any
necessary substantive principles of law. 477 This is particularly true

471.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the isolation of the
trust bar due to the "specialized nature of trust law and procedure").
472.
See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 20, at 626 (describing the probate
process).
473.
See supra notes 45, 81-83 and accompanying text.
474.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 206 (noting potential pockets of
nonarbitrability in trust arbitration); Kr6ll, supra note 151,
16-79 to -80 (discussing
the advantages and disadvantages of a case-specific approach to arbitrability).
475.
Cf. Kr6ll, supra note 151,
16-9 (explaining that states enact exclusive
jurisdiction provisions in cases involving commercial representation disputes because
of concern for the representatives' weaker bargaining position relative to their
principals).
476.
See supranotes 194-224 and accompanying text.
477.
See Kr6ll, supra note 151, 1 16-21 to -22 (noting that arbitral tribunals
can apply principles of mandatory law even in cases where the parties have not
necessarily chosen that law); see also supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text
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given the type of judicial review that is available at the end of an
arbitration.478 Thus, commentators have concluded that:
[Tihe fact that a legal provision gives express, or even exclusive,
authority to a state court does not prevent arbitration. These rules
merely regulate the distribution of disputes among the different courts
of the State. They only indicate which court has the authority when
parties want to go to state courts. The rules say nothing about the
479
possibility to bring the dispute in a completely different arena.

Although a detailed analysis of the question of limited
nonarbitrability is beyond the scope of the current Article, it is an
issue that courts and commentators will need to consider in more
depth. Several factors may be relevant to that discussion. For
example, because many of these exclusive jurisdiction provisions have
as their purpose the protection of certain principles of substantive
law, analysts may wish to consider the ability of parties to choose the
law that applies to trust disputes. 48 0 The Hague Convention on
Trusts may be a useful starting point for this type of inquiry since it
reflects international consensus on a variety of relevant issues,
including the application of mandatory rules of foreign law. 48 1 While
the Hague Convention on Trusts does not provide answers to all
possible concerns (such as which rules of law are to be considered
nonderogable or are to be given extraterritorial application), it does
usefully describe the factors that are to be used in determining which
48 2
law is most closely connected with the trust.
Courts and commentators will also need to determine whether
judicial review of arbitral awards adequately protects a state's
interest in the application of certain substantive laws. 48 3 This

(responding to the criticism that arbitration's procedural flexibility leads to violations
of procedural and substantive rights).
478.
Although judicial review of arbitral awards is primarily procedural,
commentators have noted that the second look doctrine provides courts with an
opportunity to scrutinize an award to see if it has disregarded any important
mandatory public policies of the enforcing state. See Krbll, supra note 151,
16-66 to 67 (describing the second look doctrine); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985) (establishing the second look
doctrine).
479.
Caprasse, supra note 39, at 88.
480.
See Kroll, supra note 151,
16-20 ("The underlying rationale of [exclusive
jurisdiction] provisions is to ensure that the mandatory and protective provisions of the
national law on commercial agency are applied.").
481.
See Hague Convention on Trusts, supra note 3, arts. 6-10, 15-18
(establishing choice-of-law rules for trusts).
482.
See id. arts. 7, 15-16 (describing the factors that are to be used in
determining which law is most closely connected with the trust).
483.
See Kr6ll, supra note 151,
16-80 to -84 (suggesting post-award judicial
review protects this interest sufficiently). While this issue was originally raised as a
conflict of laws concern in the context of cross-border disputes, see id.
16-69
(discussing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., which involved the enforcement of an
international arbitration award), similar questions could arise in domestic trust
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analysis may focus on the extent to which an arbitral tribunal may or
must apply mandatory provisions of substantive law of a state other
than that whose law is said to govern the dispute. 484 Typically,
arbitrators are seen as having more freedom (or inclination) in this
regard than state courts. 48 5 It may also be appropriate to consider the
propriety of early intervention in a trust dispute (as would occur if
the dispute were determined to be nonarbitrable in the context of a
motion to compel arbitration) versus late intervention (as would occur
if the propriety of the dispute resolution process were only considered
in the context of a motion to vacate an arbitral award or oppose
enforcement thereof). 486 Commentators appear to conclude that late
intervention is the more appropriate approach, for a variety of
487
reasons.
As complicated as the arbitrability analysis may appear to be,
most commentators have nevertheless concluded that internal trust
disputes are or should be arbitrable, at least as a general
proposition, 48 8 an approach that is consistent with the general trend
toward increased arbitrability in other areas of law. 48 9 Although
courts and commentators need to consider whether certain discrete
disputes can or should be carved out of the realm of generally
arbitrable matters, those discussions are best left until another
4 90
day.

arbitration, given that some people in the trust industry have wondered whether
arbitrators in such cases actually apply the law to the matter at hand. See Spitko,
supra note 17, at 295-96 (suggesting that informal dispute resolution processes may
run the risk of increased bias or prejudice); Wustemann, supra note 1, at 34, 49, 50-51,
52-53 (describing some specific instances in which the potential nonapplication of
mandatory national law may be problematic from a Swiss perspective). Notably,
contemporary practice is for arbitrators to apply the law chosen by the parties or, in
the absence of party choice, the law that the arbitrators determine to be most relevant
to the dispute, which answers questions about whether trust arbitration would operate
outside the purview of the law. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2111, 2153 (explaining
interaction between party autonomy and arbitrator discretion).
16-82 (discussing extent to which arbitrators
484.
See Kr6ll, supra note 151,
may choose to apply law that is neither the law of the seat of arbitration nor the
substantive law chosen by the parties to govern the merits of a dispute).
485.
See id. 16-20 (discussing arbitrator discretion).
See id.
16-75 to -85 (comparing benefits of judicial review before and
486.
after rendering of final award).
See id. (favoring judicial review post-award rather than pre-award).
487.
488.
See Cohen & Staff, supra note 13, at 203-06, 226 (discussing the
advantages of arbitration and generally concluding that arbitration should be used to
resolve a wide range of trust disputes); Lloyd & Pratt, supra note 113, at 18-20
(arguing in favor of the enforceability of arbitration clauses in trusts); Wuistemann,
supra note 1, at 55-56 ("Arbitration is an ideal method for resolving trust disputes.").
489.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 837-41 (commenting favorably upon the retreat
from the nonarbitrability doctrine in most jurisdictions).
490.
Concerns have already been raised about the arbitrability of claims arising
under marital or succession law, as well as challenges based on the alleged incapacity
of the settlor. See supra notes 322-78, 409 and accompanying text. Interestingly, some
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IV. CONCLUSION

As the preceding analysis suggests, mandatory arbitration of
trust disputes gives rise to a number of complicated jurisprudential
questions. This Article has focused on the potential for the
impermissible ouster of the courts, the operability and effectiveness of
the arbitration provision, the extent to which an arbitration provision
can be said to be binding on the party against whom the arbitration
provision is sought to be enforced, proper representation of parties,
and arbitrability. 4 91 However, this Article has concluded that none of
these matters gives rise to any insurmountable obstacles, since viable
solutions to potential problems can be identified as a matter of either
trust or arbitration law.
This is not to say that every jurisdiction considers mandatory
arbitration of trust disputes in the same light. There are some U.S.
states, most prominently California and Texas, that have denied the
enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions found in trusts,
although the decisions in question have been appealed to higher
courts. 492 However, other U.S. states have taken a different approach.
For example, Arizona and Florida have both embraced mandatory
trust arbitration legislatively, while Michigan and New York have
abrogated negative case law through judicial means. 493 Further

of those issues could be framed in terms other than arbitrability. For example, concerns
about forced heirs could be analyzed as a nonsignatory matter rather than a question
of arbitrability, since forced heirs would not be taking "under or through" the trust like
other beneficiaries. See supra notes 271, 409 and accompanying text.
491.
Cohen and Staff have outlined these factors as conditions with which the
court must be satisfied before arbitration is a viable option. See Cohen & Staff, supra
note 13, at 209.
492.
See Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 614-15 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding a
mandatory arbitration provision in a trust unenforceable), rev. granted, 257 P.3d 1129
(Cal. 2011); Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding a
mandatory arbitration clause in a trust unenforceable), rev. granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS
487 (2012).
493.
See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2012) ("A trust instrument may
provide mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures to resolve issues between the
trustee and interested persons or among interested persons with regard to the
administration or distribution of the trust."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.401 (2010) ("A
provision in a will or trust requiring the arbitration of disputes, other than disputes of
the validity of all or a part of a will or trust, between or among the beneficiaries and a
fiduciary under the will or trust, or any combination of such persons or entities, is
enforceable"). Compare In re Estate of Jacobovitz, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (Sur. Ct.
Nassau Cnty. 1968) (holding that the probate of a will cannot be the subject of
arbitration), with In re Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty.
2006) (holding a trustee bound by an agreement to arbitrate); compare also In re
Meredith's Estate, 266 N.W. 351, 356 (Mich. 1936) ("No agreement [to submit trust
disputes to arbitration] under any circumstances could bind the estate unless all
persons interested therein were parties thereto."), with In re Nestorovski Estate, 769
N.W.2d 720, 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that In re Meredith's Estate "lacks
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development of mandatory trust arbitration may occur through proarbitration provisions of the UTC and similar state legislation, even
though there are some questions about whether and to what extent
the relevant language will apply to mandatory arbitration provisions
4 94
found in trust instruments.
Advances have also been made in other countries. Among the
common law jurisdictions, Guernsey is perhaps the most notable,
having adopted legislation allowing mandatory arbitration of various
kinds of internal trust disputes, although the Bahamas may soon
495
become the most welcoming offshore jurisdiction in this regard.
England's stance on this issue is less clear, with most of the recent
developments coming as a result of commentary rather than judicial
or legislative means. Nevertheless, the stage appears set for potential
4 96
developments in England in this regard.
Given the trust's origins as a common law device, it is not
surprising that the debate about mandatory trust arbitration has
been much less pronounced in civil law jurisdictions. Nevertheless, a
pro-arbitration approach appears to exist in a number of countries,
49 7
including Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.
the law regarding the
Despite
these advancements,
enforceability of arbitration provisions found in trusts remains

continued viability because it has been superseded by more recent legislative
developments and intervening changes in the court rules").
494. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-8-101, 15-8-103 (2009) (stating the provisions'
pro-arbitration purpose and defining key terms); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 11.96A.010, 11.96A.030 (West 2006) (stating the provisions' pro-arbitration purpose
and defining key terms); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 111, 816(23) (amended 2010), available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.orglshared/docs/trust-code/utc_final-rev2OlO.pdf
(discussing nonjudicial dispute resolution and empowering a trustee to "resolve a
dispute concerning the interpretation of the trust or its administration by mediation,
arbitration, or other procedure for alternative dispute resolution").
495. See The Trusts (Guernsey) Law, 2007, c. 2 § 63 (providing permissive rules
under which arbitration awards in trust disputes will be binding); Trustee
(Amendment) Bill, 2011, § 18 (Bah.) (establishing pro-arbitration rules for the
resolution of trust disputes); Hartnell, supra note 187 (discussing the Trustee Act
amendments).
496. See Premium Nafta Prods. Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co. Ltd., [2007] UKHL 40
[13] (explaining that the interpretation of an arbitration agreement between two
"rational businessmen" should defer to the parties' intentions), on appeal from Fiona
Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov, [20071 EWCA Civ 20, [2007] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 891;
UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, supra note 9, § 11.80 (establishing trustee as the final arbiter
on questions of fact).
497.
See SCHWARZ & KONRAD, supra note 110 (describing ways in which
Austrian law grants arbitrators the authority to decide disputes by arbitration);
Bosques-Hern~ndez, supra note 17, at 23 (describing Liechtenstein's pro-arbitration
rules allowing for compulsory arbitration provisions in trust deeds); Duve, supra note
110,
88 (discussing German statutory provisions that allow binding arbitration
clauses in testamentary or other noncontractual dispositions); Koch, supra note 33, at
187 ("Switzerland, Germany and Austria consider that any dispute involving a
financial or economic interest is arbitrable."); Wiistemann, supra note 1, at 49
(describing Switzerland's pro-arbitration rule for arbitrability).
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somewhat "thin and underdeveloped. ' 498 The lack of clear precedent
or legislation may slow the further development of trust arbitration
in some jurisdictions, at least if lawyers responsible for drafting trust
instruments continue to hesitate about recommending arbitration.
However, settlors may not be as powerless as some people believe.
Indeed, this Article has identified a variety of ways that settlors can
improve the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration provision
499
through proper drafting techniques.
Although this Article has attempted to undertake a relatively
comprehensive study of the potential problems and solutions in this
area of law, using an international and comparative approach so as to
assist courts, commentators, and counsel working with both domestic
and offshore trusts, more work remains to be done. For example, the
trust bench and bar would both benefit from a detailed discussion of
the concept of limited nonarbitrability and the way in which exclusive
jurisdiction provisions should be interpreted. 500 Additional research
into the differences between commercial and other types of trusts
would also be useful, particularly if those distinctions were found to
affect the arbitration analysis.
Further consideration should also be given to the types of
procedures that might be appropriate in a trust arbitration. Courts

Katzen, supra note 14, at 19.
498.
A growing amount of commentary is available on the subject of "best
499.
practices" in drafting. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816(23) cmt. (offering practitioners
suggestions for best practices); AAA WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES (2009),
http://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GETat
available
FILE&dDocName=ADRSTG_004135&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased
(offering a model arbitration clause); ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES,
19 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 9 (2008), available at http://www.iccdrl.com (search
"ICC Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes" and follow "Commission Report"
hyperlink) (providing a model arbitration clause and accompanying commentary);
ACTEC, supra note 13, at 34-42 (providing sample arbitration-related clauses for
trusts and wills); Bosques-Hernindez, supra note 17, at 8-12 (discussing the theories
under which an arbitration clause in a trust deed can be enforced); Hayton, supra note
271, at 71-72 (identifying and attempting to resolve obstacles to the enforceability of
arbitration clauses in trust deeds); Hayton, supra note 154, at 17 (suggesting tips for
drafting effective virtual representation clauses in trust instruments); Hwang, supra
note 1, at 84 (describing the ICC model arbitration clause for trusts); Bridget A.
Logstrom, Arbitration in Estate and Trust Disputes: Friend or Foe?, 30 ACTEC J. 266,
app. B, 289-90 (2005) (providing sample arbitration clauses); Bridget A. Logstrom et
al., Resolving Disputes with Ease and Grace, 31 ACTEC J. 235, 241-44 (2005)
(providing sample arbitration clauses); Timothy P. O'Sullivan, Family Harmony:An All
Too Frequent Casualty of the Estate PlanningProcess, 8 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 253,
315-16 (2007) (offering suggestions to practitioners on how to ensure the enforceability
of arbitration clauses); Wustemann, supra note 1, at 45-47 (describing the English
theory of deemed acquiescence, a similar Swiss theory, and forfeiture clauses). See
generally Strong, Enforceability, supra note 33 (advising practitioners on how to ensure
enforceability of arbitration clauses in trust deeds through proper drafting).
See supra notes 433-90 and accompanying text. This issue is taken up in
500.
detail in Strong, Procedures, supra note 33 (discussing the propriety of arbitration
procedures in trust disputes).
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are often more inclined to enforce arbitration agreements and awards
if the proceedings are governed by arbitral rules promulgated by a
reputable arbitral institution, 50 1 so the trust and arbitral
communities should work together to ensure that trust-appropriate
procedures are in place. Both the AAA and the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) have begun to address this issue, with
the ICC focusing primarily on the creation of a model arbitration
clause (although that provision also includes several items affecting
arbitral procedure) and the AAA focusing on actual rules of
procedure.50 2 However, initial inquiries suggest that both the AAA's
trust arbitration rules and the ICC's model clause could be improved
in a variety of ways, so there is more work to be done in this
503
regard.
While additional research in this field should be encouraged, it
appears clear that further development of mandatory trust
arbitration is inevitable, given recent events in the United States and
elsewhere. Not only are parties in favor of dispute resolution
procedures that promote speed, efficiency, confidentiality, personal
autonomy, cost-effectiveness, and (in international disputes) an
increased likelihood of an internationally enforceable award, but so,
too, are many commentators and legislatures. While some courts
continue to reflect a more conservative approach to the issue, many of
the older, more problematic precedents have been abrogated in recent
years, 50 4 thus opening the door to a more pro-arbitration policy. Trust
law will also undoubtedly benefit from the significant advances made
in arbitration law and practice over the last two to three decades.
Given that "there seem to be no good current policy grounds for
permitting the inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts but not
trust deeds," 50 5 the trust and arbitral communities should therefore
move forward jointly to promote the continued development of this
area of law.

501.
See BORN, supra note 5, at 150 ("lAin arbitral institution lends its standing
to any award that is rendered, which may enhance the likelihood of voluntary
compliance and judicial enforcement.").
502.
See generally AAA WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES (focusing on
rules of procedure in trust arbitrations); ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST
DISPUTES (providing a model trust arbitration clause and commentary thereon).
503.
See Strong, Procedures,supra note 33 (manuscript at 54-85) (analyzing the
effectiveness of the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules).
504.
See supranotes 24-26 and accompanying text.
505.
Lloyd & Pratt, supra note 113, at 18.

